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JOINT PUB 3-0



# DOCTRINE FOR JOINT OPERATIONS



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
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


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A large body of joint doctrine (and its supporting tactics, techniques, and procedures) has been and is being developed by the US Armed Forces through the combined efforts of the Joint Staff, Services, and combatant commands. The following chart displays an overview of the development process for these publications.



All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy. Joint Pub 3-0 is the keystone manual for the operations series of joint publications.



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THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318

9 September 1993

MESSAGE FROM THE CHAIRMAN

DOCTRINE FOR JOINT OPERATIONS

The strategies and command relationships contained in this publication establish the fundamental principles and concepts for joint and multinational operations, and it provides the basis for training our future leaders in joint warfare. This document will assist members of the US Armed Forces to plan and execute successfully as a joint team.

To better achieve maximum combat potential, military commanders must integrate the concepts and principles into their operations.

Joint Pub 3-0 offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate and fundamentally shapes the way we prepare for conflicts and other operations. It provides the bases that guide the employment of the joint air, land, sea, and space team.

COLIN L. POWELL  
Chairman  
of the  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Statement A per telecon Lt. Col. Geier  
Operational Plans and Interoperability  
Directorate J-7, JDD, 7000 Joint Staff  
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1. This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine and military guidance to govern joint operations of the Armed Forces of the United States.
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## DOCTRINE FOR JOINT OPERATIONS

### PREFACE

1. Purpose. Joint Pub 3-0 is the keystone document of the joint operations series. This publication sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations as well as the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

### 2. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces on one Service support forces of another Service.

b. In applying the doctrine set forth in this publication, care must be taken to distinguish between distinct but related responsibilities in the two channels of authority to forces assigned to combatant commands. The Military Departments and Services recruit, organize, train, equip, and provide forces for assignment to combatant commands and administer and support these forces. This authority is, by law, subject to the provisions of title 10, United States Code, Chapter 6, which is the section that details the authority of combatant commanders. Commanders of the unified and specified commands exercise combatant command (command authority) over their assigned forces. Service component commanders are subject to the orders of combatant commanders and, subject to the combatant commander's direction, are also responsible to the Military Departments and Services in the exercise of their administrative and support responsibilities.

c. This publication is authoritative but not directive. Commanders will exercise judgment in applying the guidance herein to accomplish their missions. This doctrine should be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable.

3. Scope. This publication describes how to think about directing, planning, and conducting joint and multinational operations, as well as interagency operations, across the full range of military operations (war and operations other than war). It guides the planning and execution of combatant command strategy, campaigns, and joint operations.

4. Basis. Joint Pub 3-0 is based on the following primary sources:

- a. The DOD Reorganization Act of 1986.
- b. DOD Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components."
- c. Joint Pub 1, "Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces."
- d. Joint Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces."
- e. CM-1502-92, 23 November 1992, "A Doctrinal Statement of Selected Joint Operational Concepts."

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## CHAPTER I

## THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

"The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a team. This does not mean that all forces will be equally represented in each operation. Joint force commanders choose the capabilities they need from the air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces at their disposal. The resulting team provides joint force commanders the ability to apply overwhelming force from different dimensions and directions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents. Effectively integrated joint forces expose no weak points or seams to enemy action, while they rapidly and efficiently find and attack enemy weak points. Joint warfare is essential to victory." (Joint Pub 1, "Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces")

1. Introduction

a. The above quote reflects the central philosophy necessary for successful joint operations. Joint team success requires unity of effort--common action throughout the joint force in pursuit of common objectives.

b. Joint Pub 3-0 provides guidance to joint force commanders (JFCs) and their subordinates for the direction, planning, execution, and support of campaigns and operations--in war and in operations other than war. This guidance includes:

(1) The strategic context within which JFCs operate in supporting national security policies and implementing national military strategy.

(2) Principles, concepts, and other general considerations that assist JFCs to integrate and synchronize operations and achieve unity of effort.

2. Security Environment

a. Contemporary threats faced by the US Armed Forces are more ambiguous and regionally focused than during the Cold War. Combatant commanders may confront a variety of factors that challenge the stability of countries and regions and threaten US national interests and security within their areas of responsibility (AORs). These

instabilities can lead to increased levels of competition, a wide variety of attempts at intimidation, drug trafficking, insurgencies, regional conflicts, and civil war. It is difficult to predict which nations or groups may threaten our interests and how and when such threats will emerge.

b. Even in a time of relative peace, theater commanders will be challenged by regional factions seeking to expand their influence by coercion or force. Some of these potential opponents have large, modern, conventional military forces equipped with high-quality systems comparable to those of the US Armed Forces. An adversary's possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); ballistic missiles; viable air, land, and naval forces; and sophisticated special operations forces constantly challenge a theater commander's ability to deter armed conflict and, if necessary, to fight and win.

c. Regional challenges will often involve an adversary whose system of beliefs interprets differently such fundamental ideas as right and wrong, the value of human life, and the concept of victory and defeat. What appears to be fanatical to US forces may be completely rational to our opponent. Understanding cultural differences is important if friendly forces are to establish the military conditions necessary to achieve strategic goals.

3. Range of Military Operations. The United States acts to meet various challenges, protect national interests, and achieve strategic aims in a variety of ways depending on the nature of the strategic environment. Figure I-1 shows the range of military operations.

a. War. When other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, and informational) are unable or inappropriate to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, placing the United States in a wartime state. In such cases, the goal is to win as quickly and with as few casualties as possible, achieving national objectives and concluding hostilities on terms favorable to the United States and its multinational partners.

Range of Military Operations			
Military Operations		General US Goal	Examples
COMBAT	War	Fight & Win	<u>Large-scale combat operations:</u> Attack                      Defend Blockades
	Operations Other Than War	Deter War & Resolve Conflict	Peace Enforcement      NEO Strikes              Raids              Show of Force Counterterrorism              Peacekeeping Counterinsurgency
		Promote Peace	Antiterrorism              Disaster Relief Peacebuilding              Nation Assistance Civil Support              Counterdrug NEO

Figure I-1. Range of Military Operations

b. Operations Other Than War. Operations other than war are an aspect of military operations that focus on deterring war and promoting peace. Chapter V discusses operations other than war in more detail.

(1) Military Operations Other Than War Involving the Use or Threat of Force

(a) In spite of efforts to promote peace, conditions within a country or region may result in armed conflict. When other instruments of national power are unable to influence a deteriorating or potentially hostile situation, military force may be required to demonstrate US resolve and capability, support the other instruments of national power, or terminate the situation on favorable terms. The general goals of US military operations during such periods are to support national objectives, deter war,

and return to a state of peace. Such operations involve a greater risk that US forces could become involved in combat than operations conducted to promote peace.

(b) Combatant commanders, at the direction of the NCA, may employ US forces to deter an adversary's action. The physical presence of these forces, coupled with their potential employment, can serve as a deterrent and facilitate achieving strategic aims. Should this deterrence fail, force may be required to compel compliance, for example, in the form of raids or strikes. Other such operations include peace enforcement, counterterrorism, enforcement of sanctions, support to insurgency and counterinsurgency, maritime interception, and evacuation of noncombatants.

(c) At any point when force or the threat of its use is contemplated, those responsible for ordering, planning, or executing such action should remember Clausewitz's dictum that the use of force and violence introduces the fear, physical strain, and the uncertainty that are some of the hallmarks of the nature of warfare. Just as there are important political, diplomatic, and legal differences between war and operations other than war, there is also a singularly important threshold where using military force of any kind or the threat of its use comes into play. In the range of military operations, this threshold is the distinction between combat and noncombat operations.

(2) Military Operations Other Than War Not Involving the Use or Threat of Force. Use of military forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict and maintains US influence in foreign lands. Such operations include humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, nation assistance, security assistance, foreign internal defense, counterdrug operations, arms control, support to US domestic civil authorities, evacuation of noncombatants, and peacekeeping. Such operations are typically joint in nature and may involve forward-presence forces or units deployed from another theater or CONUS, or a combination of both. These operations, by

definition, do not involve combat, but military forces always need to be prepared to protect themselves and respond to a changing situation.

c. Simultaneous Nature of Theater Operations

(1) Operations other than war can involve simultaneous actions within an AOR. These actions may or may not involve the use of force at times; part of the theater could also be in a wartime state. In such situations, theater commanders should pay particular attention to integrating and coordinating the effects and activities of forces toward a common purpose that supports attaining theater, national, and multinational strategic objectives.

(2) Some military operations may be conducted for one purpose. Disaster relief operations, for example, are peacetime military operations with a humanitarian purpose. A strike or raid--such as Operation EL DORADO CANYON, the 1986 joint operation to coerce Libya to conform with international laws against terrorism--can be an example of a military operation for a specific purpose of compelling action or deterrence. Often, however, military operations will have multiple purposes, such as the 1992-1993 operations in Somalia (Operations PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE) that combined humanitarian assistance efforts with peace enforcement operations.

(3) In war and operations other than war, combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs work with US ambassadors, the Department of State, and other agencies to best integrate the military with the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power.

4. National Strategic Direction. National security strategy and national military strategy, shaped by and oriented on national security policies, provide strategic direction for combatant commanders. Combatant commanders, in turn, provide guidance and direction through their combatant command strategies and plans for the employment of military forces, in conjunction with interagency and multinational forces, in the conduct of military operations. These strategies integrate national and military objectives (ends), national policies and military concepts (ways), and national resources and military forces and supplies (means). See Figure I-2.




Figure I-2. National Strategic Direction

a. National Security Strategic Context. The United States approaches its global commitments with a strategy founded on deterrence and buttressed by the capability to project power to safeguard its national interests. Successful military operations may not, by themselves, achieve the desired strategic end state. Military activities across the full range of operations need to be synchronized with other instruments of national power and focused on common national aims. (See definition of national security strategy in glossary.)

b. National Military Strategy. (See glossary.) National military strategy is derived from the national security strategy. The national military strategy and defense policy provide strategic guidance for the employment of military forces. This guidance capitalizes

on US strengths and permits it to exploit the weaknesses of those who may threaten our national interests. The National Military Strategy (NMS) provides advice of the Chairman, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense as to the recommended NMS and fiscally constrained force structure required to attain the national security objectives. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provides guidance for planning purposes to the CINCs and the Chiefs of the Services to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. The JSCP provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the NCA.

5. Executing National Security Strategy. In peace, conflict, and war, combatant commanders are the vital link in the operational chain of command established by the NCA (the President and Secretary of Defense, or their duly deputized alternates or successors). Directives flow from the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the combatant commanders, who plan and conduct the operations that achieve national and alliance and/or coalition strategic objectives.

a. The Total Force

(1) To meet future requirements, the Services and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), under additional authority established in title 10, United States Code, section 167, have organized, trained, and equipped Active and Reserve component forces and civilians. The Reserve and Active components are fully integrated partners in executing US military strategy. This total force policy reinforces public support for US military operations.

(2) Trained and ready forces that are rapidly and strategically deployable and initially self-sufficient are required for response to spontaneous, unpredictable crises. Such forces are usually drawn from the active force structure and are tailored into joint organizations that capitalize on the unique and complementary capabilities of the Services and USSOCOM. In many cases, Reserve component forces are required to expedite the deployment of such forces or provide capabilities that are necessary for a robust, versatile joint force.

(3) Reserve component forces provide the Nation with unique and complementary capabilities in time of war or national emergency, or at such other times as the national security requires. JFCs and their subordinates should be knowledgeable of the capabilities and limitations of both Active and Reserve component forces, blending them in such a manner as to maximize the overall capability of the joint force. JFCs and their staffs need to be familiar with Reserve component callup authority and response times.

b. Military Operations as Part of a Multinational Force. Military operations in regional crises may often involve coalitions different from familiar, longstanding alliance structures. Joint forces should be prepared for combat operations and operations other than war with the operations of forces from other nations. When assessing the theater strategic environment, theater commanders consider international security agreements, formal and informal command relationships with allies, collective security strategies, global and regional stability, and regional interrelationships. United Nations resolutions may also provide the basis for use of military force. Chapter VI discusses multinational operations.

c. Military Operations With Nonmilitary Organizations

(1) Combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs are likely to operate with agencies representing other US instruments of national power, with foreign governments, and with nongovernmental and international organizations in a variety of circumstances. Such agencies and organizations often operate employing "management" or "direction" rather than "command." They may be the lead effort during many operations other than war, with military organizations providing support. In the absence of a formal command structure, JFCs may be required to build consensus to achieve unity of effort. In some cases, lead agency is prescribed by law or regulation, or by agreement between the agencies involved.

(2) The interagency environment does not preclude establishing formal agreements between the military and civilian agencies of government. Such agreements can take the form of memorandums of understanding or terms of reference. Heads of agencies and military

commanders negotiate and co-sign plans. Robust liaison facilitates understanding, coordination, and mission accomplishment.

d. National Strategic Direction. The NCA, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, direct the national effort that supports combatant and subordinate commanders to ensure:

- (1) Military objectives to be achieved are defined, understood, and achievable.
- (2) Active Service forces are ready for combat and Reserve component forces are appropriately mobilized and readied to join active forces.
- (3) Intelligence systems and efforts focus on the operational area, including opposing nations and their armed forces.
- (4) Strategic direction is current and timely.
- (5) Defense and other governmental agencies support the JFC's employment of forces.
- (6) The CONUS base and other combatant commands are ready to provide needed support.
- (7) Allies and coalition partners are available when appropriate.
- (8) Forces and supplies deploy into the operational area in a timely manner to support the JFC's concept of operations.

e. Combatant Commands

- (1) Combatant commands are established by the NCA and are organized geographically or functionally. They plan and conduct joint operations or support other operations as directed by the NCA.
- (2) By law, the chain of command runs from the NCA to the combatant commanders, who are directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands. Combatant commanders are therefore the vital link between those who determine

national security policy and strategy and the military forces that conduct military operations designed to achieve national strategic objectives.

(3) The term "combatant commander" refers to the commander in chief (CINC) of both geographically and functionally organized combatant commands. The term "theater commander" refers to a combatant commander with an AOR assigned by the NCA. Functional combatant commanders support theater commanders or may conduct operations in direct support of the NCA.

(4) Based on guidance and direction from the NCA, combatant commanders prepare strategic estimates, strategies, and plans to accomplish the missions assigned by higher authority. Supporting combatant commanders and their subordinates ensure that their actions are consistent with the supported commander's strategy.

(5) General responsibilities for combatant commanders are established by law (title 10, United States Code, section 164) and expressed in the Unified Command Plan and Joint Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."

## 6. The Estimate Process and Strategy

a. The term "estimate" implies a one-sided evaluation of a two or more sided issue where many of the pertinent facts are unknown or distorted. The estimate assists in clarifying problems and devising integrated solutions to complex problems, thus reducing surprise and shock. A continuous estimate process provides a framework for disciplined reason even under the most trying circumstances. The estimate is the central focus for strategic, operational, and tactical analysis that needs to be maintained over time and in the face of continuing change. The first questions in any estimate are the following: What is the mission? What is the desired end state? What has changed? What are the resulting possibilities and consequences?

b. Combatant commanders develop and modify strategic estimates based on their assigned tasks after reviewing the strategic environment, the various threats, the nature of anticipated operations, national and alliance strategic direction, and forces available. Functionally oriented combatant commanders develop estimates for each theater they support. Operations in one theater often

affect other theaters. The interrelationships among theaters, therefore, are important in the assessment of a theater's strategic environment and development of the strategic estimate.

c. The estimate process is continuous, with the combatant commander's staff contributing to the product. The strategic estimate itself acts as the basis for strategy, plans, and actions that occur in response to deliberate taskings or crises. Where a subordinate commander's estimate of the situation is typically used for near-term decisions and may lead to an operation plan, the combatant commander's strategic estimate results in operational concepts and courses of action--broad statements of what is to be accomplished. One of the critical parts of the estimate process is defining the strategic end state to be achieved.

d. Supported by the strategic estimate(s), combatant commanders develop strategies consistent with national policy and plans. These strategies translate national and multinational direction into concepts to meet strategic and contingency planning requirements. Combatant commanders' plans provide strategic direction; assign missions, tasks, forces, and resources; designate objectives; provide authoritative direction; promulgate rules of engagement (ROE) (approved by the NCA); establish constraints and restraints; and define policies and concepts to be integrated into subordinate or supporting plans. Chapter III discusses combatant command strategic planning in more detail. Appendix C provides a format for a strategic estimate.

## 7. The Strategic Goal and Conflict Termination

a. National military strategy attempts to promote peace, deter aggression, and, failing that, fight and win. But in the larger context, defeating an enemy military force is rarely sufficient, in and of itself, to ensure a long-term solution to a crisis. Properly conceived conflict termination criteria are key to ensuring that victories achieved with military force endure. To facilitate conception of effective termination criteria, US forces must be dominant in the final stages of an armed conflict by achieving the leverage sufficient to impose a lasting solution.

b. The design and implementation of leverage and knowing how and when to terminate a conflict are involved in operational art and are discussed in Chapter III. Since

the nature of the termination will shape the futures of the contesting nations, it is fundamentally important to understand that conflict termination is an essential link between national security strategy, national military strategy, and posthostility aims--the desired outcome. This principle holds true for both war and military operations other than war.

(1) Political Considerations. A government considering the use of force needs to weigh the prospects, methods, and time associated with conflict termination in balance first with the political aim, then with the popular and resource support that reasonably may be available over time. There are two general means for obtaining objectives by force. The first seeks domination or overthrow of the opponent's military strength and political policy--an imposed settlement. The second seeks concession through coordinated military and negotiating actions. Negotiating power in armed conflict springs from two sources: military success and military potential. Military success provides military, geographic, political, psychological, or economic advantage and the quid pro quo for negotiations. Military potential establishes the threat of further advantage accruing to the possessor, which forces the opposing nation to consider a negotiated conclusion. Negotiating an advantageous conclusion to conflict requires time and power and the demonstrated will to use both. In addition to imposed and negotiated termination, there is an armistice or truce, which is a negotiated intermission in hostilities, not a peace. In effect, it is a device to buy time pending negotiation of a permanent settlement or resumption of hostilities. A nation needs to consider the advantages accruing to a truce and the prospects for its supervision.

(a) Even when pursuing an imposed termination, the government requires some means of communication with the opponent(s). Declarations of intentions, requirements, and minor concessions may speed conflict termination, as the enemy considers the advantages of early termination versus extended resistance in the light of fading leverage.

(b) The issue of conflict termination centers on national will and freedom of action. Once the opponent's strategic aim shifts from

maintaining or extending gains to reducing losses, the possibilities for negotiating an advantageous termination improve. Military, economic, diplomatic, and informational effort need to be coordinated toward causing that shift and, once made, toward exploiting it. Conflict termination should be considered from the outset of planning and should be refined as the conflict moves toward advantageous termination.

(2) Military Considerations

(a) In its strategic context, military victory is measured in the achievement of the overall political aim and associated termination objectives. Operational and tactical victory is measured by its contribution to strategic success. Military objectives may differ significantly for a negotiated settlement than for an imposed one. Military strategic advice to political authorities regarding national military objectives for termination should include estimates of military feasibility, adequacy, and acceptability and estimates of the time, costs, and military forces required to achieve the objectives. Implementing military commanders need to understand the overall political aim and military objectives for termination and should request clarification from higher authority in the absence of the political authorities.

(b) Another military consideration is the followup political exploitation of completed military action and the military role in the transition to peace. This exploitation includes matters such as military government, civil affairs, and humanitarian assistance and requires early planning and coordination both at the national level and in theater among diplomatic, military, and political leadership.

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## CHAPTER II

## FUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT OPERATIONS

1. General

a. Joint operations doctrine reflects the nature of modern warfare and the strategic requirements of our nation. It is built on a sound base of warfighting theory and practical experience. It applies the principles of war (Figure II-1 and Appendix A), the fundamentals of joint warfare (as developed in Joint Pub 1, Chapter III), and other key concepts consistent with the policies of our government. It seeks to provide JFCs with a broad range of options to defeat an enemy in war or to conduct operations other than war. It is a doctrine that recognizes the fundamental and beneficial effects of teamwork and unity of effort, and the synchronization of military operations in time, space, and purpose. The first fundamental for employment of US joint forces is to achieve strategic aims as rapidly as possible, with the least possible loss of American lives.

b. Advances in technology are likely to continue to increase the tempo, lethality, and depth of warfare. Joint doctrine should be flexible enough to recognize the impact of emerging technologies and integrate emerging advances that may provide the US Armed Forces with a decisive advantage.




Figure II-1. Principles of War

c. This chapter describes various concepts that are essential to successful joint operations. They apply across the range of military operations--combat and noncombat, in war and in operations other than war.

## 2. The Levels of War

### a. General

(1) The levels of war are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions. Although there are no finite limits or boundaries between them, the three levels, in general, are strategic, operational, and tactical. They apply to war and to operations other than war. Refer to the glossary for definitions of the three levels of war.

(2) Levels of command, size of units, types of equipment, or types of forces or components are not associated with a particular level. National assets such as intelligence and communications satellites, previously considered principally in a strategic context, are an important adjunct to tactical operations. Actions can be defined as strategic, operational, or tactical based on their effect or contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives, but many times the accuracy of these labels can only be determined during historical studies.

(3) Advances in technology, information age media reporting, and the compression of time-space relationships contribute to the growing interrelationships between the levels of war. The levels of war help commanders visualize a logical flow of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate command. However, commanders at every level must be aware that in a world of constant, immediate communications, any single event may cut across the three levels.

### b. The Strategic Level

(1) Strategy is the art and science of developing and employing armed forces and other instruments of national power in a synchronized fashion to secure

national objectives. The NCA translate policy into national strategic military objectives. These military objectives facilitate theater strategic planning.

(2) A theater commander usually participates in discussions with the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with allies and coalition members. The theater strategy is thus an element that relates to both US national strategy and operational activities within the theater. Strategy, derived from policy, is the basis for all operations.

c. The Operational Level

(1) The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on operational art--the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, and execution of campaigns and major operations. Operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will be employed and should influence the enemy disposition before combat. It governs the deployment of those forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from battle, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

(2) Operational art helps commanders use resources efficiently and effectively to achieve strategic objectives. It provides a framework to assist commanders in ordering their thoughts when designing campaigns and major operations. Operational art helps commanders understand the conditions for victory before seeking battle, thus avoiding unnecessary battles. Without operational art, war would be a set of disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success or failure.

(3) Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and effective joint and multinational cooperation. Operational art is practiced not only by JFCs but also by their senior staff officers and subordinate commanders. Joint operational art looks not only at the employment of military forces but also at the arrangement of their efforts in time, space, and purpose. Joint

operational art, in particular, focuses on the fundamental methods and issues associated with the synchronization of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces.

(4) Among many considerations, operational art requires commanders to answer the following questions:

(a) What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends)

(b) What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways)

(c) How should the resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)

(d) What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?

d. The Tactical Level. Tactics is the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or to the enemy in order to use their full potential. Tactics are employed to fight and win engagements and battles. An engagement is normally short in duration and fought between small forces, such as individual aircraft in air-to-air combat. Engagements include a wide variety of actions between opposing forces in the air, on and under the sea, or on land. A battle consists of a set of related engagements. Battles typically last longer; involve larger forces such as fleets, armies, and air forces; and could affect the course of a campaign. Battles may be short, as in the Battle of Midway in 1942, and fought in relatively small areas, as in Pusan, 1950. They may also vary in intensity and last several weeks, as in the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944.

3. Unified Action. Refer to Figure II-2.

a. Whereas the term "joint operations" is primarily concerned with the coordinated actions of the United States Armed Forces, the term "unified action" has a broader connotation. The concept of unified action

(sometimes referred to as unified operations) highlights the synchronized application of all of the instruments of national and multinational power and includes the actions of nonmilitary organizations as well as military forces.




Figure II-2. Unified Action

b. All JFCs are responsible for unified actions that are planned and conducted in accordance with the guidance and direction received from senior authorities (i.e., NCA, alliance or coalition leadership, superior commander). JFCs should ensure that their joint operations are synchronized in time, space, and purpose with the actions of other military forces (multinational operations) and nonmilitary organizations (government agencies such as the Agency for International Development (AID), nongovernmental organizations such as religious relief agencies, corporations, international agencies such as the International Red Cross, and even the United Nations). Activities and operations with such

nonmilitary organizations can be complex and may require considerable effort by JFCs and their staffs and subordinate commanders, especially during operations other than war.

c. Combatant commanders typically play a pivotal role in unifying actions (all of the elements and actions that comprise unified actions are normally present at the CINC's level). Subordinate JFCs also synchronize their operations directly with the activities and operations of other military forces and nonmilitary organizations in the operational area.

#### 4. Joint Warfare

a. Modern warfare requires a synchronized effort to achieve objectives in the face of a wide range of threats. The integration of all US military capabilities--often in conjunction with forces from other nations, other US agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and United Nations forces and capabilities--is required to generate decisive joint combat power. JFCs synchronize these capabilities and contributions in time, space, and purpose.

b. To achieve assigned objectives, joint forces conduct campaigns and major operations. Functional and Service components of the joint force conduct subordinate and supporting operations, not independent campaigns.

c. The overarching operational concept in Joint Pub 1 is that JFCs synchronize the actions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces to achieve strategic and operational objectives through integrated, joint campaigns and major operations. The goal is to increase the total effectiveness of the joint force, not necessarily to involve all forces or to involve all forces equally. As Joint Pub 1 states, "Campaigns represent the art of linking battles and engagements in an operational design . . . oriented on the enemy's strategic and operational centers of gravity . . . They serve as the unifying focus for our conduct of warfare . . . Campaigns of the US Armed Forces are joint." Campaigns reflect the nature of the operation directed by the NCA (strategic nuclear, peacekeeping, and conventional operations, among others).

d. Refer to Appendix B for an overview of the contributions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations.

5. Command Relationships. For detailed guidance, refer to Joint Pub 0-2.

a. General

(1) Joint forces operate within two distinct channels of authority--one for operations and the other for administrative and logistic matters. For operations, the NCA issue orders through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the combatant commanders and joint task forces (JTFs) that report directly to the NCA.

(2) The Military Departments are responsible for training, administration, and logistic support of their forces, wherever employed. They exercise this responsibility through Service components. Service forces assigned or attached to joint forces work directly with their respective departments and Services on these matters.

(3) Unity of effort in joint forces is enhanced through the application of the flexible range of command relationships identified in Joint Pub 0-2. Joint force command relationships are an array of options JFCs can use to adapt the organization of assigned forces to situational requirements and arrange component operations in time, space, and purpose.

b. Combatant Command

(1) Combatant commanders exercise combatant command (COCOM) authority over assigned forces. This broad authority allows the combatant commanders to perform a variety of functions, including organizing and employing commands and forces; assigning tasks; designating objectives; and directing military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish assigned missions.

(2) Combatant commanders may exercise COCOM:

(a) Through Service component commanders.

(b) Through functional component commanders, if established for a particular purpose, such as the special operations component.

(c) Through a commander of a subordinate unified command (unified command only).

(d) Through the commander of a JTF reporting directly to the CINC.

(e) Through a single-Service force commander reporting directly to the CINC. Normally, missions requiring operations of a single-Service force will be assigned to the applicable Service component commander. A CINC may establish a separate single-Service force but normally does so only under exceptional circumstances.

(f) Directly over specific operational forces that, because of the mission assigned and the urgency of the situation, must remain immediately responsive to the CINC.

(3) COCOM is exercised only by the CINCs. The commander of the US element of a multinational command can also exercise COCOM only when authorized by the Secretary of Defense. COCOM cannot be delegated.

c. Operational Control

(1) Operational control (OPCON) may be exercised at any echelon at or below the level of the combatant command. OPCON is inherent in COCOM and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish assigned missions.

(2) OPCON is normally exercised through Service component commanders. OPCON in and of itself does not include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. OPCON does include the authority to delineate functional responsibilities and geographic AORs of subordinate commanders.

(3) OPCON is also normally exercised by functional component commanders over assigned and attached forces and over other forces as established by JFCs.

d. Tactical Control

(1) Tactical control (TACON) may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. TACON is the detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. TACON provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets. TACON does not provide organizational authority or authoritative direction for administrative and logistic support; the commander of the parent unit continues to exercise those responsibilities unless otherwise specified in the establishing directive.

(2) TACON is typically exercised by functional component commanders over military capability or forces made available for tasking that are not assigned or attached to the functional component.

e. Support

(1) A support relationship is established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. The NCA establish such relationships between combatant commanders when deployment and execution orders are issued to ensure the combatant commander tasked to achieve national objectives receives the support needed from other combatant commanders. JFCs may establish support relationships within the joint force to enhance unity of effort for given

operational tasks, emphasize or clarify priorities, provide a subordinate with an additional capability, or combine the effects of similar assets.

(a) Mutual Support. Mutual support is the action that units render each other against an enemy because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities.

(b) General Support. General support is the action that is given to the supported force as a whole rather than to a particular subdivision thereof.

(c) Direct Support. Direct support is a mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly the supported force's request for assistance.

(d) Close Support. Close support is the action of the supporting force against targets or objectives that are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force.

(2) Establishing supported and supporting relationships between components is a useful option to accomplish needed tasks. For example, some naval operations, when conducted to enable or enhance air and land operations, can dramatically increase the successes achieved by the supported forces. This concept applies equally to all dimensions of the joint force. Each subordinate element of the joint force can support or be supported by other elements.

(3) As defined in Joint Pub 0-2, "Unless limited by the establishing directive, the commander of the supported force will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort." General direction includes the designation of targets or objectives, timing, and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency. The supporting commander has the responsibility to ascertain the

needs of the supported commander and take such action to fulfill them as is within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks.

(4) The establishing directive indicates the purpose in terms of the effect desired and the scope of the action to be taken. It should include:

- (a) The strength of forces allocated to the supporting mission.
- (b) The time, place, and duration of the supporting effort.
- (c) The priority of the supporting mission relative to the other missions of the supporting force.
- (d) The authority, if any, of the supporting force to depart from its supporting mission in the event of exceptional opportunity or an emergency.
- (e) The general or special authority for any operational or other instructions to be issued by the forces being supported or by other authority in the action areas.

f. Coordinating Authority. (Not technically a command relationship.)

- (1) A coordinating authority is a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more Services or two or more forces of the same Service.
- (2) The coordinating authority has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement.
- (3) Coordinating authority may be exercised by commanders or individuals at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. The common task to be coordinated needs to be specified in the establishing directive without disturbing the normal organizational relationships in other matters.

(4) Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship between commanders, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations.

(5) A coordinating authority may be established by a JFC at any level for the purpose of obtaining coordination of specific functions or activities among assigned, attached, and supporting forces.

6. Organization of Forces. For detailed guidance, refer to Joint Pub 0-2.

a. General

(1) JFCs have full authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders. JFCs should allow Service tactical and operational groupings to function generally as they were designed. The intent is to meet the needs of JFCs, while maintaining the tactical and operational integrity of Service organizations.

(2) Joint forces are composed of significant elements of two or more Services and are commanded by a JFC with a joint staff. Joint forces include combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, and JTFs. An appropriate order assigns or attaches personnel and units to joint forces.

(3) The manner in which JFCs organize their forces directly affects the responsiveness and versatility of joint force operations. The first principle in joint force organization is that JFCs organize forces to accomplish the mission based on the JFCs' vision and concept of operations. Unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution are key considerations. JFCs may elect to centralize selected functions within the joint force, but should strive to avoid reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces.

(4) Organization of joint forces also need to take into account interoperability with multinational forces. Complex or unclear command relationships and

organizations can be counterproductive to developing synergy among multinational forces. Simplicity and clarity of expression are critical.

b. Combatant Commands

(1) A combatant command is a command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander. Combatant commands are established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities.

(2) The Unified Command Plan (UCP) defines geographic AORs for selected combatant commands, including all associated land, water areas, and airspace. Such AORs are referred to as theaters. By establishing geographic combatant commands (theater commands), the NCA decentralizes the authority to plan, prepare, and conduct military operations within that theater to the theater commander, consistent with strategic guidance and direction.

(3) Other combatant commanders are assigned functional responsibilities such as transportation, special operations, or developing and training force packages. Functionally oriented combatant commands can operate across all geographic regions or can provide forces to operate under the control of other JFCs. The combatant commands can also conduct operations while reporting directly to the NCA.

(4) Combatant commanders receive strategic direction from the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are responsible to the Secretary of Defense for accomplishing assigned missions.

(5) Combatant commanders may directly control the conduct of military operations or may delegate that authority and responsibility to a subordinate commander. Such an arrangement allows the subordinate commander to control operations while the combatant commander supports the operation with forces and resources. This relationship is frequently referred to as a two-tiered system, and was successfully employed in Operations URGENT FURY (Grenada, 1983) and JUST CAUSE (Panama, 1989).

(6) The two types of combatant commands are unified and specified.

c. Unified Commands

(1) Unified commands are typically established when a broad continuing mission exists requiring execution by significant forces of two or more Services and necessitating single strategic direction.

(2) The commanders of unified commands may establish:

(a) Subordinate unified commands when authorized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct operations on a continuing basis. Establishing such commands must be in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands. Commanders of subordinate unified commands have functions, authority, and responsibilities similar to those of the commanders of unified commands.

(b) Functional component commands when such a command structure enhances the overall capability to accomplish the mission of the establishing commander. Functional component commands may also be established by commanders of subordinate unified commands and JTFs.

(c) JTFs to accomplish missions with specific, limited objectives and which do not require overall centralized control of logistics. JTFs may also be established by the Secretary of Defense and commanders of subordinate unified commands and existing JTFs.

d. Specified Commands

(1) Specified commands are normally composed of forces from one Service, but may include units and staff representation from other Services.

(2) The commander of a specified command has the same authority and responsibilities as the commander of a unified command except that no authority exists to establish subordinate unified commands.

e. Joint Task Forces

(1) JTFs are appropriately constituted and designated forces composed of assigned or attached forces of two or more Services.

(2) Commanders of JTFs (CJTFs) are responsible to the JTF-establishing authority and exercise OPCON over assigned and attached forces. JTF staffs are normally augmented with representatives from component commands of the establishing headquarters.

(3) JTF operations are normally operational in nature, conducted to achieve operational-level objectives.

(4) JTFs are normally disestablished upon achieving their assigned objective(s) or accomplishing their missions.

f. Service Components

(1) All joint forces include Service components. Administrative and logistic support for joint forces are provided through Service components. JFCs may also exercise OPCON through the Service component commanders. This relationship is appropriate when stability, continuity, economy, ease of long-range planning, and scope of operations dictate organizational integrity of Service components. These conditions apply when most of the required functions in a particular dimension are unique to a single-Service force, or when Service force capabilities or responsibilities do not significantly overlap.

(2) Conducting operations through Service components has certain advantages, which include clear and uncomplicated command lines. Logistics remain a Service responsibility, with the exception of arrangements described in Service support agreements or otherwise directed by the JFC.

(3) Services provide Service component commands and forces to unified combatant commands and subordinate joint forces. These Service component commands are typically referred to as ARFOR (Army Forces), NAVFOR (Navy Forces), AFFOR (Air Force Forces), and MARFOR (Marine Corps Forces). Within combatant commands,

more specific designations are made, combining the type of Service force with the combatant command. For example, the Marine Corps component to US Atlantic Command is MARFORLANT; the Army component to US Pacific Command is USARPAC; the Air Force component to US Southern Command is SOUTHAF; the Navy component to US Central Command is NAVCENT; and the Special Operations component (a functional component) to US European Command is SOCEUR. Service components are frequently referred to by other names, such as theater army, naval fleet, fleet marine force, or theater air force.

(4) Responsibilities of the Service component commander include:

- (a) Making recommendations to the JFC on the proper employment of the forces of the Service component.
- (b) Accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned.
- (c) Selecting and nominating specific units of the parent Service component for assignment to subordinate forces. Unless otherwise directed, these units revert to the control of the Service component commander when such subordinate forces are dissolved. If the Service component does not have the appropriate forces available, it identifies the requirement to the combatant commander. Service components then maintain an administrative and logistic support relationship to those forces provided to the subordinate force.

(5) Regardless of the organizational and command arrangements within joint commands, Service component commanders retain responsibility for certain Service-specific functions and other matters affecting their forces, including internal administration, training, logistics, and Service component intelligence operations.

(6) The relationship between commanders of Service forces is determined by the JFC. In addition to logistic support arrangements, one component may

support another with forces or operations in a variety of command relationships as previously described.

g. Functional Components

(1) JFCs may establish functional components to provide centralized direction and control of certain functions and types of operations when it is feasible and necessary to fix responsibility for certain normal, continuing functions, or when it is appropriate and desirable to establish the authority and responsibility of a subordinate commander. These conditions apply when the scope of operations requires that the similar capabilities and functions of forces from more than one Service be directed toward closely related objectives and unity of command and effort are primary considerations. For example, when the scope of operations is large, and JFCs need to divide their attention between major operations or phases of operations that are functionally dominated--and synchronize those operations--it may be useful to establish functionally oriented commanders responsible for the major operations. JFCs may conduct operations through functional components or employ them primarily to manage and coordinate selected functions.

(2) Functional competency can be appropriate when forces from two or more Services operate in the same dimension or medium. A joint force land component commander (JFLCC) is one example. Functional component staffs should be joint with Service representation in approximate proportion to the mix of subordinate forces. Functional component staffs require advanced planning for efficient operations. Joint staff billets for needed expertise and individuals to fill those billets should be identified. Such individuals should be used when joint staffs are formed for exercises and actual operations. Liaison elements from and to other components facilitate coordination.

(3) The nature of operations, mix of Service forces, and command and control capabilities are normally primary factors in selecting the functional component commander.

(4) Functional component commanders--such as the joint force air component commander (JFACC), the JFLCC, the joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC), and the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC)--have the responsibilities of both superior and subordinate commanders as described in Joint Pub 0-2.

(5) While functional component commanders typically exercise OPCON over assigned and attached forces and TACON over other military capability or forces made available, JFCs assign missions and establish command relationships to meet the requirements of specific situations. JFCs may also establish a supporting and/or supported relationship between components to facilitate operations. Regardless, the establishing JFC defines the authority and responsibilities of functional component commanders based on the concept of operations and may alter their authority and responsibilities during the course of an operation.

h. Combination

(1) Most often, joint forces are organized with a combination of Service and functional components with operational responsibilities.

(2) Joint forces organized with Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force components will still have special operations forces organized as a functional component.

(3) JFCs will normally designate a JFACC, whose authority and responsibilities are defined by the establishing JFC based on the JFC's concept of operations.

i. Figure II-3 depicts an illustrative organization for a theater command. It is presented as an example only.




Figure II-3. Possible Components in a Joint Force

## 7. Command and Control

a. Command and control (C2) is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Command, in particular, includes both the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources to accomplish assigned missions.

b. Command at all levels is the art of motivating and directing people and organizations into action to accomplish missions. Command requires visualizing the

current state of friendly and enemy forces, then the future state of those forces that must exist to accomplish the mission, then formulating concepts of operations to achieve that state. JFCs influence the outcome of campaigns and major operations by:

- (1) Assigning missions.
- (2) Designating the priority effort(s).
- (3) Prioritizing and allocating resources.
- (4) Assessing risks to be taken.
- (5) Deciding when and how to make adjustments.
- (6) Committing reserves.
- (7) Seeing, hearing, and understanding the needs of subordinates and seniors.
- (8) Guiding and motivating the organization toward the desired end.

c. Control is inherent in command. To control is to regulate forces and functions to execute the commander's intent. Control of forces and functions helps commanders and staffs compute requirements, allocate means, and integrate efforts. Control is necessary to determine the status of organizational effectiveness, identify variance from set standards, and correct deviations from these standards. Control permits commanders to acquire and apply means to accomplish their intent and develop specific instructions from general guidance. Ultimately, it provides commanders a means to measure, report, and correct performance.

d. Control serves its purpose if it allows commanders freedom to operate, delegate authority, place themselves in the best position to lead, and synchronize actions throughout the operational area. Moreover, the C2 system needs to support the ability of commanders to adjust plans for future operations, even while focusing on current operations. Skilled staffs work within command intent to direct and control units and resource allocation to support the desired end. They also are

alert to spotting enemy or friendly situations that may require changes in command relationships or organization and advise the commander accordingly.

e. The related tools for implementing command decisions include communications, computers, and intelligence. Space-based systems provide commanders capabilities such as surveillance, navigation, and location that greatly facilitate command. The precision with which these systems operate significantly upgrades the speed and accuracy of the information that commanders exchange, both vertically and laterally.

f. Effective command at varying operational tempos requires reliable, secure, and interoperable communications. Communications planning increases options available to JFCs by providing the communications systems necessary to pass critical information at decisive times. These communication systems permit JFCs to exploit tactical success and facilitate future operations. Nonetheless, command style is dictated by the commander, not by the supporting communication system. Joint Pub 3-56 discusses C2 of joint operations.

g. Liaison is an important aspect of joint force C2. Liaison teams or individuals may be dispatched from higher to lower, lower to higher, laterally, or any combination of these. They generally represent the interests of the sending commander to the receiving commander, but can greatly promote understanding of the commander's intent at both the sending and receiving headquarters.

8. Organization of an Operational Area. (Refer to Figures II-4 and II-5.)

a. To assist in the coordination and deconfliction of joint action, JFCs may define operational areas or joint areas. The size of these areas and the types of forces employed within them depend on the scope and nature of the crisis and the projected duration of operations. For operations somewhat limited in scope and duration, theater commanders can employ the following operational areas:

(1) Joint Operations Area. A joint operations area (JOA) is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a CINC or subordinate unified commander, in which a JFC (normally a JTF commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. JOAs

are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area. JOAs are also appropriate when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters.

(2) Joint Special Operations Area. A joint special operations area (JSOA) is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a JFC who has geographic responsibilities, for use by a joint special operations component or Joint Special Operations Task Force for the conduct of special operations. JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and special operations in the same general operational area.




Figure II-4. Operational Areas Within a Theater

(3) Joint Rear Area. The joint rear area (JRA) facilitates the protection and operation of bases, installations, and forces that support combat operations. JRAs are not necessarily contiguous with areas actively engaged in combat. JRAs may include intermediate support bases and other support facilities intermixed with combat elements. The JRA is particularly useful in nonlinear combat situations.

(4) Amphibious Objective Area. The amphibious objective area (AOA) includes the objectives to be secured by an amphibious task force (ATF). It needs to be large enough for necessary sea, air, land, and special operations. Refer to Joint Pub 3-02, "Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations," for further information and guidance.

(5) Area of Operations. JFCs may define areas of operations (AOs) for land and naval forces. AOs do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Component commanders with AOs typically designate subordinate AOs within which their subordinate forces operate. These commanders employ the full range of joint and Service doctrinal control measures and graphics to delineate responsibilities, deconflict operations, and promote unity of effort. Refer to associated discussion of "boundaries" in Chapter III.

(6) Area of Interest. JFCs at all levels can designate areas of interest (AIs) to monitor enemy activities outside the operations area. An AI is usually larger than the operational area and encompasses areas from which the enemy can act to affect current or future friendly operations.

b. When warranted, theater commanders may designate theaters of war and, perhaps, subordinate theaters of operations for each major threat. Theater commanders can elect to directly control operations in the theater of war or theater of operations, or may establish subordinate joint forces for that purpose, allowing themselves to remain focused on the broader theater (i.e., the AOR).

(1) Theater of War. In time of war, the NCA or a theater commander may elect to define a theater of war within the theater commander's AOR. The theater

of war is that area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war. A theater of war does not normally encompass the theater commander's entire AOR and may contain more than one theater of operations.

(2) Theater of Operations. Theater commanders may further define one or more theaters of operations--that area required to conduct or support specific combat operations--within the theater of war. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separate and focused on different enemy forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations over extended periods of time. Subordinate unified commanders are typically assigned theaters of operations.




Figure II-5. Combat and Communications Zones

(3) Combat and Communications Zones. Theater commanders may also establish combat zones and communications zones (COMMZs). The combat zone is an area required by forces to conduct large-scale combat operations. It normally extends forward from the land force rear boundary. The COMMZ contains those theater organizations, lines of communication (LOCs), and other agencies required to support and sustain combat forces. The COMMZ usually includes the rear portions of the theaters of operations and theater of war and reaches back to the CONUS base or perhaps to a supporting combatant commander's AOR. The COMMZ includes airports and seaports that support the flow of forces and logistics into the operational area. It is usually contiguous to the combat zone but may be separate--connected only by thin LOCs--in very fluid, dynamic situations.

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## CHAPTER III

## PLANNING JOINT OPERATIONS

1. General

a. Planning for employment of joint teams begins with articulating and understanding the objective, purpose of the operations, and commander's intent (the commander's vision of the end state to be achieved). CINCs and JFCs reporting directly to the NCA receive guidance and direction from the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CINCs refine the guidance and direction for subordinate JFCs. Subordinate JFCs then translate this guidance and theater strategy into clearly defined and attainable objectives. JFCs then conduct campaigns and operations to accomplish these objectives.

b. JFCs issue prioritized mission-type orders (see glossary) to subordinate commanders and define command relationships to facilitate mission accomplishment consistent with their concept of operations. Missions are assigned to subordinate commanders, not staff officers or coordination authorities. With receipt of the mission goes the authority and responsibility to conduct operations in accordance with the superior commander's intent and concept of operations.

2. The Link Between National and Combatant Command Strategies

a. In peacetime, national policy, national security strategy, defense policy, and national military strategy are sources of guidance for combatant commanders and Chiefs of the Services. National strategic plans provide strategic direction; assign missions, tasks, forces, and resources; and designate objectives and ROE. They also establish constraints and restraints and define policies and concepts to be integrated into combatant command strategies and plans.

b. US and alliance and/or coalition strategic objectives are the basis for combatant command strategies. Combatant commanders design strategic concepts and develop plans to accomplish these objectives within their geographic or functional areas. Combatant commanders plan against specific tasks in the JSCP and also strive to anticipate additional conditions when employment of US forces may be called for. In those cases, JFCs may develop and maintain the framework of plans even in

peacetime. The nature of regional instabilities, however, is such that some plans might be formulated just before employment of US forces or even concurrently.

### 3. Combatant Command Strategic Planning

#### a. General

(1) Combatant command strategic planning in peacetime provides the framework for employing forces in peacetime and in response to crises. Combatant command planners develop peacetime assessments that ease transition to crisis or war as well as to postconflict. Peacetime intelligence and logistic assessments, for example, are essential for force projection operations and rapid transition to combat operations.

(2) When directed by the NCA to conduct military operations, the combatant commanders refine peacetime strategies and modify existing plans or develop campaign plans as appropriate. The result, expressed in terms of military objectives, military concepts, and resources (ends, ways, and means), provides guidance for a broad range of activities.

#### b. Determining the Strategic End State and Supporting Military Conditions

(1) The desired end state should be clearly described by the NCA before US Armed Forces are committed to an action. An end state is the set of required conditions that achieve the strategic objectives. There may be a preliminary end state--described by a set of military conditions--when military force is no longer the principal means to the strategic aim. There may also be a broader end state that typically involves returning to a state of peace and stability and may include a variety of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military conditions. The relative emphasis among these instruments of national power will vary according to the nature of the crisis.

(2) While military end-state conditions will normally represent what combatant commanders want their campaigns to achieve, commanders are rarely concerned with only those conditions. Often,

combatant commanders may be required to support the other instruments of national power as directed by national and multinational leadership.

(3) Defining the end state, which may change as the operation progresses, and ensuring it supports achieving national objectives are the critical first steps in the estimate and planning process. Additionally, clearly defining the desired end state reduces the wasting of scarce resources and helps clarify (and may reduce) the risk associated with the operation. In order to clearly describe the desired end state, planners should consider what may be necessary to end the armed conflict and the period of postconflict activities likely to follow. Commanders at all levels should have a common understanding of the conditions that define success before initiation of the operation.

(4) Achieving the desired end state seldom, if ever, ends US national efforts to protect interests in a situation. The term "end state" simply represents the set of conditions necessary to resolve a crisis and transition from predominant use of the military instrument of national power to other instruments.

c. The Strategic Estimate

(1) The strategic estimate is a tool available to combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs as they develop campaign plans and subordinate campaign and operation plans. JFCs use strategic estimates developed in peacetime to facilitate the employment of military forces across the range of military operations. The strategic estimate is more comprehensive in scope than estimates of subordinate commanders, encompasses all strategic concepts, and is the basis for combatant command strategy.

(2) In the strategic estimate, commanders focus on the threat and consider other circumstances affecting the military situation as they develop and analyze courses of action. Strategic estimates typically include:

(a) Assigned objectives from national authorities.

(b) Translation of national objectives to objectives applicable to the combatant command or theater.

(c) Visualization of the strategic environment and how it relates to the accomplishment of assigned objectives.

(d) Assessment of the threats to accomplishment of assigned objectives.

(e) Assessment of strategic alternatives available, with accompanying analysis, risks, and the requirement for plans.

(f) Consideration of available resources, linked to accomplishment of assigned objectives.

(3) The result of the estimate is a visualization of the current enemy and friendly situation, including opportunities available for exploitation. The estimate includes a visualization of what these states must look like to accomplish the mission and a clear expression of alternatives to achieve that state. Commanders employ the estimate to consider the enemy's likely intent and courses of action (COAs) and compare friendly alternatives, which results in a decision.

(4) The strategic estimate process is continuous and based on direction from national and multinational leadership. Estimates provide the basis for broad strategic concepts, courses of action, and resulting plans. Estimates for the current operation can often provide the basis for estimates for future operations.

(5) JFCs develop strategic estimates after reviewing the strategic environment, potential threats, the nature of anticipated operations, and national strategic direction. The strategic estimate process helps clarify the strategic end state and supporting military conditions. Both supported and supporting

JFCs prepare strategic estimates based on assigned tasks. Combatant commanders who support multiple JFCs prepare estimates for each supporting operation.

(6) A format for a strategic estimate is at Appendix C.

d. Theater Strategic Concepts

(1) Theater strategic concepts are statements of intent as to what, where, and how operations are to be conducted in broad, flexible terms. These statements must incorporate a variety of factors, including nuclear and conventional deterrence, current or potential alliances or coalitions, forces available, C2 capabilities, intelligence assets, anticipated postconflict measures, mobilization, deployment, and sustainability. Theater strategic concepts allow for the employment of strategic and theater nuclear forces, conventional and special operations forces, space assets, military assistance from all Services and supporting commands, and interagency and multinational forces in each COA.

(2) Theater strategic concepts should provide for unity of effort and strategic advantage. Strategic advantage is the favorable overall relative power relationship that enables one nation or group of nations to effectively control the course of politico-military events to ensure the accomplishment of objectives through national, international, and theater efforts.

(3) Combatant commanders use the advantages and capabilities of assigned, attached, and supporting military forces, as well as alliance, coalition, and interagency relationships and military assistance enhancements in theater as the basis of military power. Combatant commanders also consider the other instruments of national power for their contribution to gaining and maintaining strategic advantage.

(4) Though geographic and functional responsibilities of the combatant commanders may differ, there are several common strategic considerations. Strategic concepts must integrate ends, ways, and means and consider:

- (a) Protection of US citizens, forces, and interests and implementation of national policies.
- (b) Integration of deterrence measures and transition to combat operations.
- (c) Adjustments for multinational, interagency, or United Nations circumstances.
- (d) Identification of conflict termination criteria and postconflict objectives and measures.
- (e) Identification of potential military requirements across the range of military operations.
- (f) Support for security assistance or nation assistance.
- (g) Inputs to higher strategies or subordinate planning requirements.

#### 4. The Campaign

##### a. General

(1) A campaign is a series of related joint major operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives. A campaign plan describes how these operations are connected in time, space, and purpose. Within a campaign, major operations consist of coordinated actions in a single phase of a campaign and usually decide the course of the campaign.

(2) Campaigns are joint. They serve as the focus for the conduct of war and often in operations other than war. A wartime campaign is the synchronization of air, land, sea, space, and special operations--as well as interagency and multinational operations--in harmony with diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts to attain national and multinational objectives.

(3) Based on strategy adopted during the crisis action procedures, combatant commanders design campaigns to accomplish national or multinational

strategic military objectives. They plan and execute campaigns by applying operational art. Described in Chapter II, operational art integrates strategy, operational design, and tactical action. How commanders apply operational art will vary with the nature of operational conditions, the nature of the strategic objectives, the time and space available in the theater, and the number and type of forces involved.

(4) Campaigns, especially in multinational efforts, must be kept simple and focused on clearly defined objectives. The more complex the campaign or the more actors involved, the more time and effort it takes to plan and coordinate. Whenever possible, JFCs at all levels should plan far enough in advance to allow subordinates sufficient time to react to guidance and conduct their own planning and rehearsals.

(5) JFCs consider the strategic environment during the estimate and planning process in order to determine potential constraints. These constraints often limit the JFC's freedom of action and influence the timing and form of the campaign. Constraints can also include the availability and capability of forces; the ability to deploy and sustain those forces; ROE; participation and objectives of other players such as the United Nations, alliances, or ad hoc coalitions; and even the US national desire to win quickly.

(6) Once military operations are contemplated, planning for campaigns and major operations is a continuous process. Before initiation of combat operations, commanders focus on future operations. During operations, commanders must direct their attention to both current and future operations. This process is complex and frequently frustrating. Planning for future operations includes estimating the probable outcome of current operations, which then serve as the starting point for future operations. Thus, current and future operations are not independent of one another--the outcome of current operations will shape future operations.

(7) Campaigns and major operations can span a wide variety of situations, from quick-hitting, limited-objective operations to much more extensive requirements. Planning and, indeed, doctrine and

tactics, techniques, and procedures should accommodate this variety of potential scenarios and should provide JFCs a flexible range of capabilities and options from which to organize forces and plan and conduct operations.

(8) Campaign planning, like all joint operational planning, is based on evolving assumptions. It is characterized by the need to plan for related, simultaneous, and sequential operations and the imperative to accomplish strategic objectives through these operations. Campaign planning is as much a way of thinking about warfare as it is a type of planning.

### **The Gulf War, 1990-1991**

On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. Much of the rest of the world, including most other Arab nations, united in condemnation of that action. On August 7, the operation known as DESERT SHIELD began. Its principal objectives were to deter further aggression and to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The United Nations Security Council passed a series of resolutions calling for Iraq to leave Kuwait, finally authorizing "all necessary means," including the use of force, to force Iraq to comply with UN resolutions.

The United States led in establishing a political and military coalition to force Iraq from Kuwait and restore stability to the region. The military campaign to accomplish these ends took the form, in retrospect, of a series of major operations. These operations employed the entire capability of the international military coalition and included operations in war and operations other than war throughout.

The campaign--which included Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and the subsequent period of postconflict operations--can be viewed in the following major phases:

- DEPLOYMENT AND FORCE BUILDUP (to include crisis action planning, mobilization, deployment, and deterrence).
- DEFENSE (with deployment and force buildup continuing).
- OFFENSE.
- POSTWAR OPERATIONS (to include redeployment).

**Deployment and Force Buildup.** While diplomats attempted to resolve the crisis without combat, the coalition's military forces conducted rapid planning, mobilization, and the largest strategic deployment since World War II. One of the earliest military actions was a maritime interdiction of the shipping of items of military potential to Iraq.

The initial entry of air and land forces into the theater was unopposed. The Commander in Chief, US Central Command (USCINCCENT), balanced the arrival of these forces to provide an early, viable deterrent capability and the logistic capability needed to receive, further deploy, and sustain the rapidly growing force. Planning, mobilization, and deployment continued throughout this phase.

**Defense.** While even the earliest arriving forces were in a defensive posture, a viable defense was possible only after the buildup of sufficient coalition air, land, and maritime combat capability. Mobilization and deployment of forces continued. Operations security measures, operational military deceptions, and operational psychological operations were used to influence Iraqi dispositions, expectations, and combat effectiveness and thus degrade their abilities to resist USCINCCENT's selected COA before engaging enemy forces. This phase ended on January 17, 1991, when Operation DESERT STORM began.

**Offense.** Operation DESERT STORM began with a major airpower effort--from both land and sea--against strategic targets; Iraqi air, land, and naval forces; logistic infrastructure; and C2. Land and special operations forces supported this air effort by targeting forward-based Iraqi air defense and radar capability. The objectives of this phase were to gain supremacy in the air, significantly degrade Iraqi C2, deny information to enemy commanders, destroy enemy forces and infrastructure, and deny freedom of movement. This successful air operation would establish the conditions for the attack by coalition land forces.

While airpower attacked Iraqi forces throughout their depth, land forces repositioned from deceptive locations to attack positions using extensive operations security (OPSEC) measures and simulations to deny knowledge of movements to the enemy. Two Army corps moved a great distance in an extremely short time to positions from which they could attack the more vulnerable western flanks of Iraqi forces.

US amphibious forces threatened to attack from eastern seaward approaches, drawing Iraqi attention and defensive effort in that direction.

On February 24, land forces attacked into Iraq and rapidly closed on Iraqi flanks. Under a massive and continuous air component operation, coalition land forces closed with the Republican Guard. Iraqis surrendered in large numbers. To the extent that it could, the Iraqi military retreated. Within 100 hours of the start of the land force attack, the coalition achieved its strategic objectives and a cease-fire was ordered.

Postwar Operations. Coalition forces consolidated their gains and enforced conditions of the cease-fire. The coalition sought to prevent the Iraqi military from taking retribution against its own dissident populace. Task Force Freedom began operations to rebuild Kuwait City.

The end of major combat operations did not bring an end to conflict. The coalition conducted peace enforcement operations, humanitarian relief, security operations, extensive weapons and ordnance disposal, and humanitarian assistance. On April 5, for example, President Bush announced the beginning of a relief operation in the area of northern Iraq. By 7 April, US aircraft from Europe were dropping relief supplies over the Iraqi border. Several thousand Service personnel who had participated in Operation DESERT STORM eventually redeployed to Turkey and northern Iraq in this joint and multinational relief operation.

This postwar phase also included the major operations associated with the redeployment and demobilization of forces.

#### b. Fundamentals of Campaign Plans

(1) Campaign plans are unique, with considerations that set them apart from other plans. Campaign plans synchronize air, land, sea, space, and special operations as well as interagency and multinational operations. These plans synchronize operations by establishing command relationships among subordinate commands, by describing the concept of operations, by assigning tasks and objectives, and by task organizing assigned forces. Campaign plans:

- (a) Provide broad concepts of operations and sustainment for achieving multinational, national, and theater strategic objectives.
- (b) Provide an orderly schedule of decisions.
- (c) Achieve unity of effort with air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces, in conjunction with interagency and multinational forces, as required.
- (d) Incorporate the combatant commander's strategic and operational intent.
- (e) Orient on strategic and operational centers of gravity of the threat.
- (f) Protect friendly centers of gravity and attack enemy centers of gravity.
- (g) Phase a series of related operations.
- (h) Establish the organization of subordinate forces and designate command relationships.
- (i) Serve as the basis for subordinate planning and clearly define what constitutes success, including termination objectives and potential posthostilities activities.
- (j) Provide strategic direction; operational focus; and tasks, objectives, and concepts to subordinates.
- (k) Provide direction for the employment of nuclear weapons as required.

(2) Although not formally part of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), campaign plans, when developed, are developed in concert with crisis action procedures. The campaign planning process begins while the supported commander is developing a COA recommendation with specific guidance being developed after the COA is approved by the NCA. (Joint Pubs 5-0, "Joint Planning," and 5-00.1, "JTTP for Campaign Planning," can be used to assist in this process.) Based on the campaign plan, appropriate elements are then translated into OPORD

format of JOPES for execution. Although not formally submitted under JOPES, campaign plans may require CJCS review.

c. Campaign plans form the basis for developing subordinate campaign plans and supporting plans and, under uncertain circumstances, the framework for a series of operations plans for phases of campaigns.

(1) Subordinate Campaign Plans. Subordinate JFCs may develop subordinate campaign plans or operation plans that accomplish (or contribute to the accomplishment of) theater strategic objectives. Thus, subordinate unified commands typically develop campaign plans to accomplish assigned missions. Also, JTFs can develop and execute campaign plans if missions require military operations of substantial size, complexity, and duration. Subordinate campaign plans should be consistent with the strategy, guidance, and direction developed by the combatant commander and should contribute to achieving combatant command objectives.

(2) Supporting Plans

(a) Supporting plans are prepared by supporting commanders to satisfy the requirements of the supported commander's plan. Typically, supporting commands' plans provide augmentation forces, force enhancements, or functional support such as logistics, communications, and transportation.

(b) Supporting plans address such discrete operations as nuclear and chemical operations, mobilization, deployment and redeployment operations, and Service support operations, as well as plans for generating and focusing national resources in one or more theaters.

(c) When the NCA, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, direct a combatant command to conduct specified military operations, other combatant commands are identified to support those operations. For example, during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, USCENTCOM was designated the supported command, with most other combatant commands providing support.

5. Operational Art. JFCs employ operational art, in concert with strategic guidance and direction received from superior leaders, in developing campaigns and operations.

a. Synergy

(1) JFCs employ air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces in a wide variety of operations in war and in operations other than war. JFCs not only attack the enemy's physical capabilities but also the enemy's morale and will. Joint Pub 1 contains the basis for this multidimensional concept--one which describes how JFCs can apply all dimensions of joint capability to accomplish their mission.

(2) When required to employ force, JFCs seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration in various dimensions, all culminating in attaining the assigned objective(s) in the shortest time possible and with minimal casualties. JFCs arrange symmetrical and asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and enemy vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations. Engagements with the enemy may be thought of as symmetrical, if our force and the enemy force are similar (land versus land, etc.) or asymmetric, if forces are dissimilar (air versus sea, sea versus land, etc.). As Joint Pub 1 indicates, JFCs are uniquely situated to seize opportunities for asymmetrical action and must be especially alert to exploit the tremendous potential combat power of such actions. See discussion of leverage below.

(3) It is difficult to view the contributions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces in isolation. Each is critical to the success of the joint force, and each has certain unique capabilities that cannot be duplicated by other types of forces. Given the appropriate circumstances, any dimension of combat power can be dominant--and even decisive--in certain aspects of an operation or phase of a campaign, and each force can support or be supported by other forces. The contributions of these forces will vary over time with the nature of the threat and other strategic, operational, and tactical circumstances. The challenge for supported JFCs is to integrate and synchronize the wide range of capabilities at their disposal into full dimensional operations against the enemy.

(4) The synergy achieved by synchronizing the actions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces in joint operations and in multiple dimensions enables JFCs to project focused capabilities that present no seams or vulnerabilities to an enemy to exploit. JFCs are especially suited to develop and project joint synergy given the multiple unique and complementary capabilities available only within joint forces.

(5) The synergy of the joint force depends in large part on a shared understanding of the operational situation. The JFC's vision should address how components will communicate and share information on the status and location of enemy forces as well as other regional elements.

(6) The JFC's vision of how operations will be conducted includes not only how to arrange operations but also a clear understanding of the desired end state. Successful JFCs are familiar with the capabilities and limitations of component forces. JFCs integrate and synchronize operations in a manner that applies force from different dimensions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents.

b. Simultaneity and Depth. The concepts of simultaneity and depth are foundations of deep operations theory. The intent is to bring force to bear on the opponent's entire structure in a near simultaneous manner that is within the decisionmaking cycle of the opponent. The goal is to overwhelm and cripple enemy capabilities and enemy will to resist.

(1) Simultaneity is a key characteristic of the American way of war. It refers to the simultaneous application of capability against the full array of enemy capabilities and sources of strength. Simultaneity does not mean that all elements of the joint force are employed with equal priority or that even all elements of the joint force will be employed. It refers specifically to the concept of attacking appropriate enemy forces and functions in such a manner as to cause confusion and demoralization. Simultaneity in joint force operations contributes directly to an enemy's collapse by placing more demands on enemy forces and functions than can be handled. For example, following 38 days of intensive and highly synchronized coalition air operations, land forces

initiated two major, mutually supporting, offensive thrusts against defending Iraqi forces in Kuwait and Iraq. Simultaneously, amphibious forces threatened an assault from the sea, creating confusion within the enemy leadership structure and causing several Iraqi divisions to orient on the amphibious threat. The orientation of these divisions on the sea facilitated their defeat in detail by other land forces striking into the heart of Kuwait. Concurrently, coalition air operations continued the relentless attack against C2 nodes and the transportation infrastructure. The result was a swift conclusion to the Gulf War, culminated by simultaneous and synchronized operations by all elements of the coalition.

(2) Simultaneity also refers to the concurrent conduct of operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The combination of increased tempo and simultaneous operations dictates a need for tightly integrated operations. Tactical commanders fight engagements and battles, understanding their relevance to the operational plan. JFCs set the conditions for battles within a major operation to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Theater commanders integrate theater strategy and operational art. At the same time, they remain acutely aware of the impact of tactical events. Rapidly unfolding operations increase the interrelationships between the levels of war such that commanders cannot be concerned with events only at their echelon.

(3) The evolution of warfare and advances in technology have continuously expanded the depth of operations. Airpower can be projected at greater distances while surface forces are able to maneuver more rapidly and project their influence at increasing depths. To be effective, JFCs should not allow an enemy sanctuary or respite. Joint force operations should be conducted across the full breadth and depth of the operational area, creating competing and simultaneous demands on enemy commanders and resources. Just as with simultaneity, the concept of depth seeks to overwhelm the enemy throughout the battle area from multiple dimensions, contributing to its speedy defeat or capitulation. Interdiction, for example, is one manner in which JFCs add depth to operations.

(4) The concept of depth applies to time as well as to space (geographically). Operations extended in depth, in time as well as space, shape future conditions and can disrupt an opponent's decision cycle.

(5) Depth contributes to protection of the force by destroying enemy potentials before its capabilities can be realized and employed.

(6) Simultaneity and depth place a premium on situational awareness at the operational level. JFCs should exploit the full capabilities of the joint force and supporting capabilities to develop and maintain a clear picture of events in the operational area as well as their linkage to future operations and attainment of strategic objectives.

c. Anticipation

(1) Anticipation is key to effective planning. JFCs should remain alert for the unexpected and for opportunities to exploit the situation. JFCs consider what might happen and look for the signs that may bring the possible event to pass. They continually gather information by personally observing and communicating with subordinates, higher headquarters, other forces in the operational area, and allies and coalition members. JFCs avoid surprise by monitoring operations as they unfold and signaling to their staff and subordinate units the actions they are to take to stay in control of events as much as possible. JFCs also realize the impact of operations and prepare for their results, such as the surrender of large numbers of opposing forces.

(2) Situational awareness is a prerequisite for commanders and planners to be able to anticipate opportunities and challenges. Knowledge of the enemy, oneself, and allies and partners is critical. Understanding what is happening during the battle, coupled with the knowledge of enemy capabilities, intentions, and likely COAs, enables commanders to focus joint efforts where they best and most directly contribute to achieving objectives.

(3) Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) can assist JFCs in defining likely or potential enemy COAs, as well as the indicators that suggest

the enemy has embarked on a specific COA. As such, IPB can significantly contribute to a JFC's ability to anticipate and exploit opportunities.

(4) Anticipation is not without risk. Commanders and planners that tend to lean in anticipation of what they expect to encounter are more susceptible to operational deception efforts by an opponent. Therefore, commanders and planners should carefully consider the information upon which decisions are being based. Where possible, multiple or redundant sources of information from various dimensions should be employed in the decisionmaking process.

d. Balance

(1) Balance is the maintenance of the force, its capabilities, and its operations in such a manner as to contribute to freedom of action and responsiveness. Balance refers to the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities within the joint force as well as the nature and timing of operations conducted.

(2) JFCs strive to maintain friendly force balance while aggressively seeking to disrupt an enemy's balance by striking with powerful blows from unexpected directions or dimensions and pressing the fight. Deception, special operations, manipulation of the electromagnetic spectrum, direct attack of enemy strategic centers of gravity, interdiction, and maneuver all converge to confuse, demoralize, and destroy the opponent. Denial of enemy reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition activities contributes to the protection of friendly forces. Even as the joint force defeats one enemy force, it prepares to turn and strike another. High-tempo joint operations set the conditions for battle. JFCs prepare to shift as conditions change and new challenges are presented. Through continuous planning and wargaming, the commander strives never to be without options.

(3) JFCs designate priority efforts and establish appropriate command relationships to assist in maintaining the balance of the force.

(4) Preserving the responsiveness of component capabilities is central to operational art. Combinations of operations and organization of the joint force should maintain or expand force

responsiveness, not inhibit it. Decentralization of authority can contribute to responsiveness by reducing the distance in time and space between decisionmakers and ongoing operations.

e. Leverage

(1) Joint Pub 1 describes achieving leverage (that is, gaining, maintaining, and exploiting advantages in combat power across all dimensions) among the forces available to JFCs as "the centerpiece of joint operational art." Force interaction with respect to friendly force relationships can be generally characterized as supported (the receiver of a given effort) or supporting (the provider of such an effort). The command relationships that provide the framework for arranging for such support are discussed extensively in joint doctrine, including elsewhere in this publication. A principal JFC responsibility is to assess continuously whether force relationships enhance to the fullest extent possible the provision of fighting assistance from and to each element of the joint force in all dimensions. Support relationships afford an effective means to weight (and ensure unity of effort for) various operations, each component typically receiving and providing support at the same time. For example, a land component may be supported for a deep maneuver, a JFACC for theater counterair and direct attack of enemy centers of gravity, a maritime component for sea control and an amphibious forcible entry, and a special operations component for direct action and other missions. The potentially large number of such relationships requires the close attention not only of JFCs but also their components to plan and execute.

(2) Force interaction with regard to enemy forces is another way for JFCs to achieve concentration in the various dimensions. JFCs arrange symmetrical and asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and enemy vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations. The history of joint operations highlights the enormous lethality of asymmetrical operations and the great operational sensitivity to such threats. Asymmetrical operations are particularly effective when applied against enemy forces not postured for immediate tactical battle but instead operating in more vulnerable aspects--operational deployment and/or movement, extended logistic

activity (including rest and refitting), or mobilization and training (including industrial production). Thus, JFCs aggressively seek opportunities to apply asymmetrical force against an enemy in as vulnerable an aspect as possible--air attacks against enemy ground formations in convoy (the air and SOF interdiction operations against German attempts to reinforce its forces in Normandy), naval attacks against troop transports (US attacks against Japanese reinforcement of Guadalcanal), and land operations against enemy naval, air, or missile bases (allied maneuver in Europe in 1944 to reduce German submarine bases and V-1 and V-2 launching sites). There are literally dozens of potential modes of attack to be considered as JFCs plan the application of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces against the various aspects of enemy capabilities.

(3) As a final part of force interaction, JFCs must take action to protect or shield all elements of the joint force from enemy symmetrical and asymmetrical action. This function of protection has particular relevance in joint warfare, as JFCs seek to reduce the vulnerability of their forces and enhance their own freedom of action.

(4) JFCs gain decisive advantage over the enemy through leverage. This leverage can be achieved in a variety of ways. Asymmetrical actions that pit joint force strengths against enemy weaknesses and maneuver in time and space can provide decisive advantage. Synergy from the concentration and integration of joint force actions also provides JFCs with decisive advantage. Leverage allows JFCs to impose their will on the enemy, increase the enemy's dilemma, and maintain the initiative.

(5) Dimensional superiority, isolation of the enemy, and attack of enemy strategic centers of gravity can contribute to joint force leverage and are addressed in Chapter IV.

f. Timing and Tempo

(1) The joint force should conduct operations at a tempo and point in time that best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the enemy. With proper timing, JFCs can dominate the action, remain unpredictable, and operate beyond the enemy's ability

to react. In its 1940 attack on France, for instance, Germany combined the speed, range, and flexibility of aircraft with the power and mobility of armor to conduct operations at a pace that surprised and overwhelmed French commanders, disrupting their forces and operations. France capitulated in little more than 1 month.

(2) The tempo of warfare has increased over time as technological advancements and innovative doctrines have been applied to military requirements. While in many situations JFCs may elect to maintain an operational tempo that stretches the capabilities of both friendly and enemy forces, on other occasions JFCs may elect to conduct operations at a reduced pace. This reduced pace may be particularly appropriate when enemy forces enjoy a mobility advantage or when friendly forces are not yet able to conduct decisive operations.

(3) JFCs may vary the tempo of operations. During selected phases of a campaign, JFCs may elect to reduce the pace of operations, frustrating enemy commanders while buying time to build a decisive force or tend to other priorities in the operational area such as relief to displaced persons. During other phases, JFCs may conduct high-tempo operations designed specifically to exceed enemy capabilities.

(4) Just as JFCs carefully select which capabilities of the joint force to employ, so do they consider the timing of the application of those capabilities. While JFCs may have substantial capabilities available, they selectively apply such capabilities in a manner that synchronizes their application in time, space, and purpose. Defining priorities assists in the timing of operations.

(5) Timing refers to the effects achieved as well as to the application of force. JFCs plan and conduct operations in a manner that synchronizes the effects of operations so that the maximum benefit of their contributions are felt by the opponent at the desired time. Although some operations of the joint force can achieve near-immediate effects, JFCs may elect to delay their application until the contributions of other elements can be brought to bear in a synchronized manner. Additionally, commanders and planners strive to ensure that effects achieved

through combat operations build toward decisive results but are not unduly or inappropriately felt by opponents long after their defeat.

g. Operational Reach and Approach

(1) On the first page of On War, Clausewitz likens war to a duel. In joint operational art, effective symmetrical attack (fully supported by all components of the joint force) and asymmetrical attack constitute the dueler's sword; the actions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces to protect each other is the dueler's shield; and, in its broadest sense, basing is the dueler's footing, affecting the reach of the sword and the strength and resiliency of the shield. Basing, whether from overseas locations, sea-based platforms, or CONUS, directly affects operational reach.

(2) Operational reach is the distance over which military power can be concentrated and employed decisively. Reach is influenced by the geography surrounding and separating the opponents. It is extended by locating forces, reserves, bases, and logistics forward (as in Operation PROVEN FORCE during the Gulf War when air forces were placed on Iraq's northern border, while naval forces from US European Command operated against Iraq's western flank), by increasing the range of weapon systems (for instance, long-range bombers and missiles that can operate from CONUS bases), and by improving transportation availability and the effectiveness of lines of communication and throughput. Nevertheless, for any given operation, there is a finite range beyond which the joint force cannot prudently operate or maintain effective operations.

(3) Thus, basing in the broadest sense is an indispensable foundation of joint operational art, directly affecting the combat power that the joint force is capable of generating by affecting such critical factors as sortie and resupply rates. In particular, the arrangement and successive positioning of advanced bases (often in austere, rapidly emplaced configurations) underwrites the progressive ability of the joint force to shield its components from enemy action and deliver symmetric and asymmetric blows with increasing power and ferocity. Basing is often directly affected by political and diplomatic considerations and as such

can become a critical junction where strategic, operational, and tactical considerations interact. US force basing options span the spectrum from permanently basing forces in mature, strategically important theaters to temporary sea-basing during crisis response in littoral areas of instability. Bases (including the flexible and responsive capability of sea-basing) are typically selected to be within operational reach of the opponent, where sufficient infrastructure is in place or can be fabricated to support the operational and sustaining requirements of deployed forces, and where they can be assured of some degree of security from enemy attacks. Basing thus plays a vital role in determining the operational approach, which may be conceived of in terms of lines of operations.

(4) Lines of operations define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives.

(5) A force operates on interior lines when its operations diverge from a central point and when it is therefore closer to separate enemy forces than the latter are to one another. Interior lines benefit a weaker force by allowing it to shift the main effort laterally more rapidly than the enemy. A force operates on exterior lines when its operations converge on the enemy. Successful operations on exterior lines require a stronger or more mobile force, but offer the opportunity to encircle and annihilate a weaker or less mobile opponent.

(6) In modern war, lines of operation attain a three-dimensional aspect and pertain to more than just maneuver. JFCs use them to focus combat power effects toward a desired end. JFCs apply combat power throughout the three dimensions of space and over time in a logical design that integrates the capabilities of the joint force to converge on and defeat enemy centers of gravity.

#### h. Forces and Functions

(1) Commanders and planners can design campaigns and operations that focus on defeating either enemy forces or functions, or a combination of both. Typically, JFCs structure operations to attack both enemy forces and functions concurrently in order to

create the greatest possible contact area between friendly and enemy forces and capabilities. These types of operations are especially appropriate when friendly forces enjoy technological and/or numerical superiority over an opponent.

(2) JFCs can focus on destroying and disrupting critical enemy functions such as C2, resupply, and air defense. Attack of an enemy's functions is normally intended to destroy enemy balance, thereby creating vulnerabilities to be exploited. Destruction or disruption of critical enemy functions can create uncertainty, confusion, and even panic in enemy leadership and forces and may contribute directly to the collapse of enemy capability and will. The appropriateness of functional attack as the principal design concept frequently is based on time required and available to cripple enemy critical functions as well as the enemy's current actions and likely response to such attacks.

i. Arranging Operations

(1) General

(a) JFCs must determine the best arrangement of major operations. This arrangement will often be a combination of simultaneous and sequential operations to achieve the desired end-state conditions quickly and at the least cost in personnel and other resources. Commanders consider a variety of factors when determining this arrangement, including geography of the operational area, available strategic lift, changes in command structure, logistic buildup and consumption rates, enemy reinforcement capabilities, and public opinion. Thinking about the best arrangement helps determine tempo of activities in time and space.

(b) The dynamic nature of modern warfare that includes projection of forces complicates decisions concerning how to best arrange operations. During force projection operations, for example, a rapidly changing enemy situation may cause the commander to alter the planned arrangement of operations even as forces are deploying. The arrangement that the commander chooses should not foreclose future options.

(2) Phases

(a) The arrangement of major operations relates directly to the commander's decision on phasing. A phase represents a period during which a large portion of the forces are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities (deployment, for example). A transition to another phase--such as a shift from deployment to defensive operations--indicates a shift in emphasis. World War II's Operation OVERLORD contained six phases: buildup, rehearsals, embarkation, assault, buildup, and breakout.

(b) Phasing may be sequential or concurrent. Phases may overlap. The point where one phase stops and another begins is often difficult to define in absolute terms.

(c) During planning, commanders establish conditions for transitioning from one phase to another. The commander adjusts the phases to exploit opportunities presented by the enemy or to react to unforeseen situations.

(d) Phasing assists commanders to think through the entire operation and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, and time. The primary benefit of phasing is that it assists commanders in achieving major objectives, which cannot be attained all at once, by planning manageable subordinate operations to gain progressive advantages, and so achieving the major objectives as quickly and affordably as possible. Campaign phasing should consider aspects such as prehostilities (including predeployment activities), lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow-through, and posthostilities (including redeployment).

(e) Actions during a prehostilities phase may be for deterrence or to seek to set the terms for battle and enhance friendly and limit enemy freedom of action. The friendly force should not seek battle until it has set the terms or established the conditions for battle in its favor and should avoid being rushed into battle before such conditions are established, if possible. During predeployment activities, JFCs tailor forces for deployment. The command,

control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) and logistic requirements of the force must be developed during the predeployment phase in order to support JFC concepts of operations. When in-place forces are not sufficient and/or are not appropriate for the envisioned operation, early determination of the forces required and the order in which they are needed, based on the JFC's concept of operations, assists in identifying the time required to deploy the force. Sealift and airlift capabilities are critical to JFC concepts.

(f) A lodgment phase allows the movement and buildup of a decisive combat force in the operational area. In operations during peacetime, deployment will normally include movements to host-nation air or sea ports. In operations conducted before and during combat, initial deployment may require forcible entry, followed by the occupation and expansion of lodgment areas.

(g) A decisive combat and stabilization phase initially focuses on the rapid buildup of joint force capabilities. The appropriate sequencing of forces into the operational area can contribute greatly to the stabilization of the situation. Further, deployment of forces may serve as a deterrent to hostilities, but if deterrence fails, deployment will permit JFCs to build up full dimensional capabilities rapidly to conduct decisive action as early as possible. Such decisive action focuses on winning, that is, achieving the objectives defined by the NCA and JFC, and may include control of enemy territory and population and destruction of the enemy's ability and will to continue.

(h) During a follow-through phase, JFCs synchronize joint force activities to bring the operation to a successful conclusion. Follow-through includes those actions that ensure the political objectives are achieved and sustained. Part of this phase may be to ensure the threat (military and/or political) is not able to resurrect itself. In essence, such a phase focuses on ensuring that the results

achieved endure. During this phase, joint forces may conduct operations in support of other governmental agencies. JFCs continuously assess the impact of current operations during hostilities on the termination objectives. The outcome of military operations should not conflict with the long-term solution to the crisis.

(i) During the posthostilities and redeployment phase, JFCs may retain responsibility for operations or they may transfer control of the situation to another authority and redeploy their forces. JFCs should identify posthostilities requirements as early as possible to best accomplish these missions and simultaneously redeploy assets no longer needed to resolve the crisis.

(j) Logistics is crucial to phasing. Joint force planners consider establishing logistic bases, opening and maintaining LOCs, establishing intermediate logistic bases to support new phases, and defining priorities for services and support. Logistics, then, is key to arranging the operations of campaigns and should be planned and executed as a joint responsibility.

(k) Changes in phases at any level can represent a period of vulnerability for the force. At this point, missions and task organizations often change. The careful planning of branches and sequels can reduce the risk associated with transition between phases.

### (3) Branches and Sequels

(a) No plan of operations can be projected with confidence much beyond the initial stages of the operation. Commanders build flexibility into their plans to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing conditions. Branches and sequels directly relate to the concept of phasing. Their proper use can add flexibility to a campaign or major operation plan.

(b) Branches. Branches are options built into the basic plan. Such branches may include shifting priorities, changing unit organization

and command relationships, or changing the very nature of the joint operation itself. Branches add flexibility to plans by anticipating situations that could alter the basic plan. Such situations could be a result of enemy action, availability of friendly capabilities or resources, or even a change in the weather or season within the operational area.

(c) Sequels. Sequels are subsequent operations based on the possible outcomes of the current operation--victory, defeat, or stalemate. At the campaign level, phases can be viewed as the sequels to the basic plan.

j. Centers of Gravity

(1) A center of gravity is the foundation of capability--what Clausewitz called "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends . . . the point at which all our energies should be directed." It is that characteristic, capability, or location from which alliances, nations, and military forces derive their will to fight, their physical strength, or freedom of action. At the strategic level, centers of gravity might include a military force, an alliance, national will or public support, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national strategy itself.

(2) The centers of gravity concept is useful as an analytical tool, while designing campaigns and operations to assist commanders and staffs in analyzing friendly and enemy sources of strength as well as weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Analysis of centers of gravity, both enemy and friendly, is a continuous process throughout an operation.

(3) The essence of operational art lies in being able to mass effects against the enemy's sources of power in order to destroy or neutralize them. In theory, destruction or neutralization of enemy centers of gravity is the most direct path to victory. However, centers of gravity can change during the course of an operation, and, at any given time, centers of gravity may not be apparent or readily discernible. For example, the center of gravity might concern the mass of enemy units, but that mass might not yet be formed. In such cases,

determining the absence of a center of gravity and keeping it from forming could be as important as defining it.

(4) Identification of enemy centers of gravity requires detailed knowledge and understanding of how opponents organize, fight, make decisions, and their physical and psychological strengths and weaknesses. JFCs and their subordinates should be alert to circumstances that may cause centers of gravity to change and adjust friendly operations accordingly.

(5) Enemy centers of gravity will frequently be well protected, making direct attack difficult and costly. This situation may require joint operations that result in indirect attacks until conditions are established that permit successful direct attacks.

(6) It is also important to identify friendly centers of gravity so that they can be protected. Long sea and air LOCs from CONUS or supporting theaters can represent a center of gravity. National will can also be a center of gravity, as it was for the United States during the Vietnam and Persian Gulf Wars.

k. Direct versus Indirect. To the extent possible, JFCs attack enemy centers of gravity directly. Where direct attack means attacking into an opponent's strength, JFCs should seek an indirect approach. This approach may take many forms. For example, if the center of gravity is a large enemy force, the joint force may attack it indirectly by isolating it from its C2, severing its LOCs (including resupply), and defeating or degrading its air defense and indirect fire capability. When vulnerable, the enemy force can be attacked directly by appropriate elements of the joint force. In this way, JFCs will employ a synchronized combination of operations to expose and attack enemy centers of gravity through weak or vulnerable points--seams, flanks, specific forces or military capabilities, rear areas, and even military morale and public opinion and support.

#### 1. Decisive Points

(1) By correctly identifying and controlling decisive points, a commander can gain a marked advantage over the enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an action. Decisive points are usually geographic in nature, such as a constricted sea lane,

a hill, a town, or an air base. They could also include other elements such as command posts, critical boundaries, airspace, or a communications node. Decisive points are not centers of gravity; they are the keys to attacking protecting centers of gravity.

(2) There will normally be more decisive points in an operational area than JFCs can control, destroy, or neutralize with available resources. Therefore, planners must analyze potential decisive points and determine which enable eventual attack of the enemy's centers of gravity. The commander designates the most important decisive points as objectives and allocates resources to control, destroy, or neutralize them.

(3) Geographic decisive points that assist commanders to gain or maintain the initiative are crucial. Controlling these points in the attack assists commanders to gain freedom of operational maneuver. They thus maintain the momentum of the attack and sustain the initiative. If a defender controls such a point, it can help exhaust the attacker's momentum and facilitate the defender's counterattack.

#### m. Culmination

(1) Culmination has both offensive and defensive application. In the offense, the culminating point is the point in time and space at which an attacker's combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender. Here the attacker greatly risks counterattack and defeat and continues the attack only at great peril. Success in the attack at all levels is to secure the objective before reaching culmination. A defender reaches culmination when the defending force no longer has the capability to go on the counter-offensive or defend successfully. Success in the defense is to draw the attacker to culmination, then strike when the attacker has exhausted available resources and is ill-disposed to defend successfully.

(2) Synchronization of logistics with combat operations can forestall culmination and help commanders control the tempo of their operations. At both tactical and operational levels, theater logistic planners forecast the drain on resources associated with conducting operations over extended

distance and time. They respond by generating enough military resources at the right times and places to enable their commanders to achieve strategic objectives before reaching their culminating points. If the commanders cannot do so, they should rethink their concept of operations.

n. Termination

(1) Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve achieved advantages is a component of strategy and operational art. Before forces are committed, JFCs must know how the NCA intend to terminate the operation and ensure its outcomes endure, and then determine how to implement that strategic design at the operational level. In war, termination design is driven in part by the nature of the war itself. Wars over territorial disputes or economic advantage tend to be interest-based and lend themselves to negotiation, persuasion, and coercion. Wars fought in the name of ideology, ethnicity, or religious or cultural primacy tend to be value-based and reflect demands that are seldom negotiable. Often, wars are a result of both value and interest-based differences.

(2) The underlying causes of a particular war--such as cultural, religious, territorial, or hegemonic--must influence the understanding of conditions necessary for termination of hostilities and resolution of conflict. National and allied or coalition decisionmakers normally rely on the advice of senior military leaders concerning how and when to end combat operations. Passing the lead from the military to other agencies to achieve final strategic aims following conflict usually requires the participation of JFCs.

(3) Military operations typically conclude with attainment of the strategic ends for which the NCA committed forces. In some cases, these aims will be military strategic aims that, once achieved, allow transition to other instruments of national power and agencies as the means to achieve broader aims. World War II and the transition from the end of the war to other means to achieve a free and independent Europe is an example.

(4) Commanders strive to end combat operations on terms favorable to the United States and its allies or coalition partners. The basic element of this goal is gaining control over the enemy in the final stages of combat. When friendly forces can freely impose their will on the enemy, the opponent may have to accept defeat, terminate active hostilities, or revert to other types of conflict such as geopolitical actions or guerrilla warfare. Nonetheless, a hasty or ill-designed end to the operation may bring with it the possibility that related disputes will arise, leading to further conflict. There is a delicate balance between the desire for quick victory and termination on truly favorable terms.

(5) JFCs and their subordinate commanders consider the conditions necessary to bring operations to a favorable end. They translate political aims into strategy and operational design. They provide decisionmakers with critical information on enemy intent, objectives, strategy, and chances of success in obtaining desired goals. JFCs and subordinate commanders consider the nature and type of conflict, the objective of military force, the plans and operations that will most affect the enemy's judgment of cost and risk and the impact on alliance and coalition warfare.

(6) If the conditions have been properly set and met for ending the conflict, the necessary leverage should exist to prevent the enemy from renewing hostilities. Moreover, the strategic aims for which the United States fought should be secured by the leverage that US and multinational forces gained and can maintain. Wars are fought for political aims. Wars are only successful when political aims are achieved and these aims endure.

(7) A period of postconflict activities exists from the immediate end of the conflict to the redeployment of the last US Service member. A variety of operations other than war occur during this period. These operations involve all instruments of national power and include those actions that ensure political objectives are achieved and sustained. Part of this effort may be to ensure the threat (military and/or political) does not resurrect itself. The effort

focuses on ensuring that the results achieved endure and the conditions that resulted in the conflict do not recur.

(8) Even as forces transition from combat operations to postconflict activities, requirements for humanitarian assistance will emerge. Working with the Department of Defense and with non-DOD and non-US Government agencies, JFCs prepare to meet the requirements of humanitarian support, including the provisioning of food and shelter and the protection of various groups against the depredations of opposing groups.

(9) During postconflict operations, JFCs may transfer control to other authorities and redeploy forces. JFCs should identify postconflict requirements as early as possible so as to facilitate transition and to permit the simultaneous redeployment of forces no longer required.

6. Key Planning Considerations. The elements of operational art discussed above form the basis for plans and orders and set the conditions for successful battle. The initial plan establishes the commander's intent, the concept of operations, and the initial tasks for subordinate units. It allows the greatest possible operational and tactical freedom for subordinate leaders. It is flexible enough to permit leaders to seize opportunities consistent with the commander's intent, thus facilitating quick and accurate decisionmaking during operations. The initial plan not only affects the current operation but also sets the stage for future operations. As commanders prepare to conduct military operations, they should remember that all military operations have a psychological effect on all parties concerned--friendly, neutral, and hostile. Supporting psychological operations (PSYOP) designed to induce or reinforce favorable foreign attitudes and behavior must be integrated into all plans at the initial stages of planning to ensure maximum effect.

a. Mission. The mission statement is the impetus for the detailed planning that follows. It is the JFC's expression of what the joint force must accomplish and why. Orders contain both specified and implied tasks. During mission analysis, commanders translate these tasks into missions for their subordinates. Commanders do so by analyzing the mission statement and concept of operations, understanding the intent of senior commanders, assessing the current situation, and

organizing all resources available to achieve the desired end. Clarity of the mission statement and its understanding by subordinates, before and during the operation, is vital to success.

b. Commander's Intent

(1) The commander's intent describes the desired end state. It is a concise expression of the purpose of the operation. It may include how the posture of units at that end state facilitates transition to future operations. It may also include the commander's assessment of the enemy commander's intent. The commander's intent is not, however, a summary of the concept of operations.

(2) JFCs begin to form their intent as they analyze the mission assigned by a superior commander. Together, with the higher headquarters' order, the JFC's intent is the initial impetus for the entire planning process. JFCs initially provide their intent verbally to the staff with the restated mission and planning guidance. JFCs refine their intent as they consider staff estimates and complete the commander's estimate. The intent statement may also contain an assessment of where and how the commander will accept risk during the operation.

(3) The JFC's intent helps subordinates pursue the desired end state without further orders, even when operations do not unfold as planned. Thus, the commander's intent provides focus for all subordinate elements.

(4) The intent statement is usually written, but could be verbal when time is short. It should be concise and clear. The intent should be able to focus subordinate commanders on the purpose of the operation and describe how it relates to future operations. A JFC's order should contain the intent statement of the next senior commander in the chain of command.

c. Concept of Operations

(1) The concept of operations describes how the JFC visualizes the operation will unfold based on the selected COA. This concept expresses what, where, and how the joint force will affect the enemy or the situation at hand. The commander provides sufficient

detail for the staff and subordinate commanders to understand what they are to do without further instructions. In the concept of operations, JFCs describe the overall objectives of the joint force, the missions assigned to components of the force, and how the components will work together to accomplish the mission.

(2) To reinforce intent and priorities, commanders typically designate a main effort (for each phase, if the campaign has more than one phase). This designation is as true in the offense as it is in the defense and also applies in operations other than war. Designating a main effort helps commanders and their staffs allocate resources accordingly. These designations provide focus to the operation, set priorities and determine risks, promote unity of effort, and facilitate an understanding of the commander's intent.

d. Targeting

(1) Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. As with all actions of the joint force, targeting and attack functions are accomplished in accordance with international law, the law of war, and international agreements and conventions, as well as ROE approved by the NCA for the particular operation. Military commanders, planners, and legal experts must consider the desired end state and political aims when making targeting decisions.

(2) Targeting occurs at all levels of command within a joint force and is performed at all levels by forces capable of delivering fires or attacking targets with both lethal and nonlethal disruptive and destructive means. Targeting is complicated by the requirement to deconflict duplicative targeting by different forces or different echelons within the same force and to synchronize the attack of those targets with other dimensions of the joint force.

(3) Targeting and the Campaign Plan. JFCs establish broad planning objectives and guidance for attack of enemy strategic and operational centers of gravity and interdiction of enemy forces as an integral part of joint campaigns and major operations. With the

advice of subordinate commanders, JFCs set priorities, provide targeting guidance, and determine the weight of effort to be provided to various operations. Subordinate commanders recommend to JFCs how to use their combat power more effectively to achieve the objective. Weight of effort for any aspect of joint targeting, for instance, may be expressed:

- (a) In terms of percentage of total available resources.
- (b) By assigning priorities for resources used with respect to the other aspects of the theater campaign or operation.
- (c) As otherwise determined by the JFC.

(4) Targeting Process. (See Joint Pub 2-01.1, "JTTP for Intelligence Support to Targeting.")

(a) The targeting process is cyclic. It begins with guidance and priorities issued by JFCs and continues with identification of requirements by components, the prioritization of these requirements, the acquisition of targets or target sets, the attack of targets by components, the assessment of the effects of those missions by both components and JFCs, and continuing guidance from JFCs on future fires or attack of targets.

(b) Targeting mechanisms should exist at multiple levels. The NCA or headquarters senior to JFCs may provide guidance, priorities, and targeting support to JFCs. Joint force components identify requirements, nominate targets that are outside their boundaries or exceed the capabilities of organic and supporting assets (based on JFC's apportionment and subapportionment decisions), and conduct execution planning. After the JFC makes the targeting and apportionment decisions, components plan and execute assigned missions.

(c) JFCs may establish and task an organization within their staffs to accomplish these broad targeting oversight functions or may delegate the responsibility to a subordinate commander.

Typically, JFCs organize Joint Targeting Coordination Boards (JTCBs). If the JFC so designates, a JTCB may be an integrating center for this effort or a JFC-level review mechanism. In either case, it needs to be a joint activity comprised of representatives from the staff, all components, and, if required, their subordinate units. JFCs task commanders or staff officers with the JTCB function based on the JFC's concept of operations and the individual's experience, expertise, and situational awareness appropriate to the situation.

(d) The JFC defines the role of the JTCB. Typically, the JTCB reviews target information, develops targeting guidance and priorities, and may prepare and refine joint target lists. The JTCB should also maintain a complete list of restricted targets and areas where SOF are operating to avoid endangering current or future operations.

(e) In multinational operations, the JTCB may be subordinate to a multinational Targeting Coordination Board, with JFCs or their agents representing the joint force on the multinational board.

(f) JFCs will normally delegate the authority to conduct execution planning, coordination, and deconfliction associated with targeting and will ensure that this process is also a joint effort involving applicable subordinate commands. Whoever is designated this responsibility must possess or have access to a sufficient C2 infrastructure, adequate facilities, and ready availability of joint planning expertise. Should such an agency be charged with joint functional command responsibilities, a joint targeting mechanism is also needed to facilitate this process at this level. In any event, all components are heavily involved in targeting and should establish procedures and mechanisms to manage the targeting function.

e. Apportionment. Apportionment is the determination and assignment of the total expected effort by percentage and/or priority that should be devoted to the various air operations and/or geographic areas for a given period of

time. The total expected effort made available to the JFACC is determined by the JFC in consultation with component commanders based on the assigned objectives and the concept of operations.

(1) Apportionment assists JFCs to ensure the weight of the JFACC air effort is consistent with campaign phases and objectives.

(2) Given the many functions that airpower can perform, its theater-wide application, and its ability to rapidly shift from one function to another, JFCs pay particular attention to its apportionment. JFCs normally apportion by priority or percentage of effort into geographic areas, against assigned mission-type orders, and/or by categories significant for the campaign. These categories can include strategic attack, interdiction, counterair, maritime support, and close air support. After consulting with other component commanders, the JFACC makes the apportionment recommendation.

(3) Following the JFC apportionment decision, the JFACC allocates apportioned air sorties to the functions, areas, and/or missions they support.

#### f. Concept of Logistics

(1) The JFC's concept for logistics is a key part of the synchronization of the joint effort. Through the logistic concept, JFCs enable the deployment, entry, buildup, application, and redeployment of joint forces. JFCs identify and reinforce priorities between combat and logistic requirements. Logistic considerations are key to the commander's estimate process, will greatly impact on the development of COAs, and may dictate COA selection.

(2) COCOM gives combatant commanders authoritative direction over all aspects of logistics necessary to accomplish the mission. Within their commands, combatant commanders use this authority to ensure effectiveness and economy in operations and to prevent or eliminate the unnecessary duplication of facilities and the overlap of functions among Service components. In critical situations, combatant commanders may modify the normal logistic process

within their commands. They may use all facilities and supplies of all assigned and attached forces to accomplish the mission.

(3) Combatant commanders ensure that the concept of logistics supports the concept of operations. The logistic concept of the campaign plan does this by establishing a base of operations, opening and maintaining LOCs, providing intermediate bases of operations to support phasing, and establishing priorities for service and support for each phase of a campaign. The logistic concept also uses available host-nation support. Joint Pub 4-0, "Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations," provides more information on the theater logistic system and logistic planning.

g. Other Considerations

(1) Disciplined Operations

(a) Joint forces operate in accordance with applicable ROE, conduct warfare in compliance with international laws, and fight within restraints and constraints specified by superior commanders. JFCs apply the combat power necessary to ensure victory against combatants, but are careful to limit unnecessary injury and damage. Objectives are justified by military necessity and attained through appropriate and disciplined use of force.

(b) Exercising discipline in operations includes limiting collateral damage--the inadvertent or secondary damage occurring as a result of actions initiated by friendly or enemy forces. Service publications provide guidance on special categories of objects that are protected by provisions of international law and the Geneva and Hague Conventions. They also govern appropriate Service member conduct in war and provide guidance on control and treatment of displaced civilians.

(c) JFC use of forces includes the proper treatment of enemy prisoners of war, noncombatants, and civilians. A warring state that disregards the human rights of individuals makes warfare unnecessarily harsh, may increase the resolve of its enemy, and changes the nature

of the conflict. Laws of war are intended to reduce casualties and enhance fair treatment of combatants and noncombatants alike.

(d) ROE, which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces conduct operations other than war or begin or continue combat, are promulgated by the NCA. Many factors influence ROE, including national command policy, mission, operational environment, commander's intent, and international agreements regulating conduct. ROE always recognize the inherent right of self-defense. Properly developed ROE are clear and tailored to the situation. ROE will typically vary from operation to operation and may change during an operation. For example, ROE during Operations JUST CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, and PROVIDE COMFORT were widely diverse. Within each operation, the ROE were different and changed over time.

(2) Risk

(a) Risk is inherent in military operations. In peacetime operations, commanders consider a variety of risks--such as the implications of failure to national prestige or to joint force morale, or risk to the safety of individual joint force members. By recognizing these risks, commanders can take steps to minimize them. Careful planning and anticipation are key.

(b) In combat or potential combat situations, commanders carefully identify conditions that constitute success--both for the envisioned end state and for the major operations or stages that lead to that end state. To the extent that these conditions are met, commanders reduce the risk. When these conditions are not met, or only partially met, commanders identify the risk associated with continuing. To alleviate or reduce risk, commanders may apply additional force--by reallocating combat forces or by shifting supporting operations, for example. Or they may decide the risk is acceptable.

(c) Commanders consider many factors as they identify risk in combat or potential combat situations. As in peacetime operations,

commanders consider the risk to joint force members. It is for this reason, in part, that an indirect approach to enemy centers of gravity, attacking enemy vulnerabilities rather than strengths, is important in the design of campaigns and major operations.

(d) As previously described, simultaneous attack of enemy capabilities throughout the enemy's depth can minimize risk by paralyzing enemy capabilities and quickly ending hostilities.

(3) Rehearsals. Rehearsal is the process of learning, understanding, and practicing a plan in the time available before actual execution. Rehearsing key combat and logistic actions allows participants to become familiar with the operation and to visualize the plan. This process assists them in orienting themselves to their surroundings and to other units during execution. Rehearsals also provide a forum for subordinate leaders to analyze the plan, but caution must be exercised in adjusting the plan in order to prevent errors in synchronization. While rehearsals with combat units usually occur at the tactical level, headquarters at the operational level can rehearse key aspects of a plan using command post exercises, typically supported by computer-aided simulations. While the joint force may not be able to rehearse an entire operation, JFCs should identify key elements for rehearsal.

(4) Command and Control Warfare. (For additional information, see Joint Pub 3-13, "Command and Control Warfare.")

(a) Command and control warfare (C2W) seeks to deny the adversary the effective use of its C2 capabilities while at the same time protecting friendly C2 functions. C2W integrates the use of OPSEC, military deception, PSYOP, electronic warfare (EW), and physical destruction. C2W accomplishes its objectives by denying the adversary the information it needs to make effective decisions (OPSEC), influencing the decisions that the adversary makes (deception and PSYOP), and degrading or destroying the adversary's C2 systems (EW and physical destruction).

(b) The synergistic effects of the coordinated use of the five elements of C2W provide the JFC with the potential to deliver a decisive blow against an adversary before the outbreak of armed conflict or during its initial period. It does so by allowing JFCs to think, plan, communicate, and act faster than their adversaries. C2W assists JFCs to seize the initiative and causes the adversaries to react to the JFCs' actions.

#### **C2W in Desert Storm, 1991**

Before the beginning of the air operation, OPSEC and deception had already begun to affect the Iraqi leadership's perception of what the coalition intended to do. The opening phase of the air operation focused on destroying or disrupting the Iraqi C2 system, limiting the leadership's ability to gather accurate information and to transmit its decisions. During the air operation, OPSEC and deception continued to hide the preparations for the actual land operation while using maneuver forces and air strikes to portray a false intention to make the main attack into Kuwait. PSYOP, supported by B-52 strikes, targeted the front-line Iraqi soldier's confidence in Iraqi leadership. The result of this integrated use of the elements of C2W was the decreased ability of the Iraqi leadership to respond effectively to the land operation when it began.

(c) To be effective, C2W needs to be fully integrated into the commander's concept of the operation and synchronized with other operations. The synchronization of these actions will require rapid and reliable intelligence support and communications. JFCs should ensure that the C2W objectives are part of the planning guidance and priorities.

(d) C2W considerations will play an important role in the targeting process. Targets will be selected or protected to support C2W objectives. The timing of strikes against specific targets may be determined by the JFC's C2W objectives. For example, an adversary's signals intelligence site would not be targeted for destruction if the deception operation was

using it as one of the means to insert false information into the adversary's intelligence system.

(5) Deception

(a) Military deception, as executed by JFCs, targets enemy decisionmakers (opposing commanders) through the enemy intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination systems. The purpose is to cause opposing commanders to form inaccurate impressions about friendly force capabilities or intentions, misappropriate their intelligence collection assets, or fail to employ combat or support units to their best advantage. Deception operates at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels as an integral and systematic component of C2W. While historically most military deceptions have been successful in some fashion, careful analysis of risks involving (as a minimum) deception failure and exposure of friendly counterintelligence means and methods must be conducted before commencing deception operations.

(b) Deception operations are an integral element of joint operations. Planning for deception operations is top-down, in the sense that subordinate deception plans support the higher level plan. Deception is focused on causing the opponents to act in a desired manner, not simply to be misled in their thinking. This deception requires a thorough knowledge of opponents and their decisionmaking processes. Anticipation is key. During the formulation of the commander's concept, particular attention is placed on defining how the JFC would like the enemy to act at critical points in the battle. Those desired enemy actions then become the goal of deception operations.

(c) Deception plans should support the main effort of the joint force. Deception measures mislead the enemy by manipulating, distorting, or falsifying conditions. These deception measures cause the enemy to act in a manner that supports the friendly commander's preferred COA.

### **Deception in the Yom Kippur War, 1973**

On October 6, 1973, the Egyptian 3rd Army surprised the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) by attacking across the Suez Canal. Egyptian forces gained a significant foothold in the Sinai and began to drive deeper until a determined defense and counterattack drove them back.

To achieve the initial surprise, Egyptian forces conducted deception operations of strategic, operational, and tactical significance to exploit Israeli weaknesses. At the strategic level, they conveyed the notions that they would not attack without both a concerted Arab effort and an ability to neutralize the Israeli Air Force, and that tactical preparations were merely in response to feared Israeli retaliation for Arab terrorist activity. At the operational level, Egyptian forces portrayed their mobilization, force buildup, and maneuvers as part of their annual exercises. Egyptian exercises portraying an intent to cross the canal were repeated until the Israelis became conditioned to them and therefore did not react when the actual attack occurred. At the tactical level, Egyptian forces expertly camouflaged their equipment, denying information to Israeli observers and creating a false impression of the purpose of the increased activity.

For their part, Israeli forces were overconfident and indecisive at the operational and strategic levels. In spite of the deception, tactical observers reported with increasing urgency that the Egyptian buildup and activity were significant. Their reports caused concern, but no action. Egyptian forces exploited these vulnerabilities and timed the attack to occur on Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement, when they perceived the response of Israeli forces would be reduced.

As a result of their deception efforts, synchronized with other operations of the force, Egyptian forces quickly and decisively overwhelmed Israeli forces in the early stages of the Yom Kippur War.

(d) Commanders at all levels can plan deception operations. Strategic or operational plans may include the employment of lower-level units,

although subordinate commanders may not know of the overall deception effort. It is therefore essential for commanders to coordinate their deception plans with their senior commander to ensure overall unity of effort.

(e) Deception operations depend on intelligence operations to identify appropriate deception targets, to assist in developing a credible story, to identify and orient on appropriate receivers (the readers of the story), and to assess the effectiveness of the deception effort.

(f) Deception operations are not free, but are a powerful tool in full dimensional operations. Forces and resources must be committed to the deception effort to make it believable, possibly to the short-term detriment of some aspects of the campaign. Operational security for deception operations may dictate that only a select group of senior commanders and staff officers in the joint force know which actions are purely deceptive in nature. This situation can cause confusion within the force and must be closely monitored by JFCs and their staffs.

(6) Psychological Operations

(a) PSYOP are actions to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences. They are designed to influence the emotions, motives, reasoning, and, ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. PSYOP have strategic, operational, and tactical applications, including support to deception operations.

(b) At the strategic level, PSYOP may take the form of political or diplomatic positions, announcements, or communiques. A military capability may be positioned for its deterrent effect. In Operation DESERT STORM, the solidarity of the coalition against Iraq might well have had strategic psychological effect. At the operational level, PSYOP can include the distribution of leaflets, loudspeaker broadcasts, and other means of transmitting information that encourage enemy forces to defect, desert, flee, or surrender. Persistent

attacks can have a synergistic effect with PSYOP, accelerating the degradation of morale and further encouraging desertion. At the tactical level, PSYOP include the use of loudspeakers to promote fear or dissension in enemy ranks.

(c) PSYOP can contribute significantly to all aspects of joint operations. Joint Pub 3-53, "Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations," provides additional detail.

(7) Operations Security and Military Deception

(a) OPSEC is a process of planning and action to gain and maintain essential secrecy about the JFCs actual capabilities, activities, and intentions. Military deception is a form of military operations and is part of the strategy and tactics used to evoke opposing command decisions and actions that will favor JFC success during operations.

(b) History has shown the value and need for reliable, adequate, and timely intelligence, and the harm that results from its inaccuracies and absence. It is therefore vital and advantageous to deny the opposing force commanders the critical information they need (essential secrecy) and cause them to derive inaccurate, timely appreciations that influence their actions (desired appreciations).

(c) Deception initiatives are appropriate when preparations for an operation indicate a pending offensive action or when it is vital to bring an enemy to battle on the commander's terms. Any deception initiative will be supported by OPSEC measures to maintain essential secrecy on capabilities, activities, intentions, and deceptions.

(d) The success of cover and deception (including what is now meant by OPSEC and military deception) in World War II led General Eisenhower to write the following: "During WWII, both cover and deception and psychological warfare, in its various forms, contributed materially and at times paid high dividend for the effort which we put into them. Particularly

in the case of the former, experience indicated that due to the extent to which strategic and tactical cover plans assisted in the attainment of real objectives, no major operations should be undertaken without planning and executing appropriate deceptive measures."

(e) OPSEC is applied to all military activities at all levels of command. The JFC should provide OPSEC planning guidance to the staff at the time of the commander's decision and, subsequently, to supporting commanders in both the administrative and operational chains of command. By maintaining liaison and coordinating the OPSEC planning guidance, the JFC will ensure unity of effort in gaining and maintaining the essential secrecy considered necessary for success.

(8) Electronic Warfare

(a) EW is any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Control of the electromagnetic spectrum ranges from protecting friendly systems to countering enemy systems. This control is not limited to radio or radar frequencies, but includes optical and infrared regions as well as those regions in which directed-energy weapons might function.

(b) The three major subdivisions of EW are electronic attack (EA), electronic protection (EP), and electronic warfare support (ES), which may overlap. Some EW actions may be both offensive and protective in nature and may inherently use ES in their execution.

(c) EW should be employed to attack the enemy according to established principles of warfare. The decision to employ EW should be based not only on overall joint campaign objectives but also the risks of possible enemy responses and other effects on the campaign effort.

(d) The JFC should ensure maximum coordination among EW and other operations activities, and intelligence and communications (including frequency management) support activities for

maximum effect. This coordination is necessary to ensure effective exchange of information, eliminate undesirable duplication of effort, and provide for mutual support. See glossary for definitions and Joint Pub 3-51, "Electronic Warfare in Joint Military Operations," for additional guidance.

(9) Civil Affairs. Civil affairs are those interrelated military activities that embrace the relationship between military forces and civil authorities and populations. Civil affairs missions include civil-military operations and civil administration. JFCs integrate civil affairs and synchronize their effects with combat operations to minimize civilian interference with military operations and safeguard noncombatants and their property. Joint Pub 3-57, "Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs," describes civil affairs operations.

## 7. Control and Coordinating Measures

a. JFCs employ various maneuver and movement control and fire support coordinating measures to facilitate effective joint operations. These measures include boundaries, phase lines, objectives, coordinating altitudes to deconflict air operations, air defense areas, amphibious objective areas, submarine operating patrol areas, and minefields.

### b. Boundaries

(1) Boundaries define surface areas to facilitate coordination and deconfliction of operations. In land and sea warfare, a boundary is a line by which areas between adjacent units or formations are defined. A naval boundary may be designated for seas adjacent to the area of land conflict to enhance coordination and execution of naval operations.

(2) JFCs may use lateral, rear, and forward boundaries to define AOs for land and naval forces. Such areas are sized, shaped, and positioned to enable land or naval force commanders to accomplish their mission while protecting deployed forces.

(3) Theater air sorties are not constrained by land boundaries, per se. However, since the airspace above surface areas is used by all components of the

joint force, JFCs promulgate airspace control measures to deconflict the multiple uses required of this space (see Joint Pub 3-52).

(4) Boundaries may require relatively frequent adjustment based on the actual and projected rate of maneuver and the operational environment.

c. Fire Support Coordinating Measures

(1) Joint fire support coordinating measures and the procedures associated with those measures assist in the C2 of joint forces. Within their AOs, land and amphibious commanders employ permissive and restrictive fire support coordinating measures to enhance the expeditious attack of targets; protect forces, populations, critical infrastructure, and sites of religious or cultural significance; and set the stage for future operations. Commanders position and adjust fire support coordinating measures consistent with the operational situation and in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. Fire support coordinating measures are addressed in Joint Pub 3-09, "Doctrine for Joint Fire Support."

(2) Fire Support Coordination Line

(a) Fire Support Coordination Lines (FSCLs) are permissive fire support coordinating measures. They are established and adjusted by appropriate land force commanders within their boundaries in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL must inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide, both in the air and on the ground. FSCLs facilitate the expeditious attack of targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure. Supporting elements may attack targets beyond the FSCL, provided the attack will not produce adverse effects on, or to the rear of, the line. The FSCL is not a boundary--the synchronization of operations on either side of the FSCL is the responsibility of the establishing commander out to the limits of the land force boundary.

(b) The decision on where to place or even whether to use an FSCL requires careful

consideration. If used, its location is based on estimates of the situation and concept of operations. Location of enemy forces, anticipated rates of movement, weapons capabilities, and tempo of the operation are considered in the commander's estimate, as well as other factors deemed appropriate. FSCL is normally positioned closer to the forward line of own troops (FLOT) in the defense than in the offense; however, the exact positioning is situationally dependent.

(c) By establishing an FSCL at sufficient depth so as to not limit high-tempo maneuver, land force commanders ease the coordination requirements for attack operations within their AOs by forces not under their control, such as naval gunfire or air interdiction. FSCL applies to all fires of air, land, or sea weapon systems using any type of ammunition against surface targets. (The FSCL is a term oriented to air-land operations; there is no similar term used at sea.)

(d) An associated benefit of employing an FSCL is the reduction in potential for fratricide. Short of an FSCL, all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface attack operations are controlled by the appropriate land force commander. Commanders employ restrictive measures to enhance the protection of friendly forces operating beyond an FSCL.

(e) Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is especially critical to commanders of air, land, and special operations forces. Their forces may now be operating beyond an FSCL or may plan to maneuver on that territory in the future. Such coordination is also important when attacking forces are employing wide-area munitions or munitions with delayed effects. Finally, this coordination assists in avoiding conflicting or redundant attack operations. In exceptional circumstances, the inability to conduct this coordination will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to do so may increase the risk of fratricide and could waste limited resources.

(f) The land force commander adjusts the location of the FSCL as required to keep pace with operations. In high-tempo maneuver operations, the FSCL may change frequently, such as every several hours. The establishing commander quickly transmits the change to higher, lower, adjacent, and supporting headquarters to ensure attack operations are appropriately coordinated by controlling agencies. Anticipated adjustments to the location of the FSCL are normally transmitted to other elements of the joint force sufficiently early to reduce potential disruptions in their current and near-term operations.

## CHAPTER IV

## JOINT OPERATIONS IN WAR

1. Considerations Before Combat

a. General. Actions JFCs are able to take before the initiation of hostilities can assist in determining the shape and character of future operations. Most inclusive is preparing the theater, which involves intelligence and counterintelligence operations to understand clearly the capabilities, intentions, and possible actions of potential opponents, as well as the geography, weather, demographics, and culture(s) of the operational area. Additionally, the infrastructure required to deploy and support combat operations must be identified and emplaced as appropriate. In many cases, these actions enhance bonds between future coalition partners, increase understanding of the region, help ensure access when required, and strengthen future multinational military operations.

b. Preparing the Theater(1) Intelligence

(a) At the advent of a crisis or other indication of potential military action, JFCs examine available intelligence estimates. As part of the IPB process, JFCs then focus intelligence efforts to refine estimates of enemy capabilities, dispositions, intentions, and probable actions within the context of the current situation. They examine assumptions in existing plans for continued validity. JFCs focus on enemy centers of gravity, as well as weaknesses and vulnerabilities. They look for specific indications and warning of imminent enemy activity that may require an immediate response or an acceleration of friendly decision cycles.

(b) JFCs direct reconnaissance operations (including surveillance, a subset of reconnaissance) by elements of the joint force to develop further the situation and gain information critical to decisionmaking. In some cases, such information can be gained by passive or unobtrusive means. In other cases, elements of the joint force may have to fight to gain the

information desired. Armed reconnaissance operations conducted by manned systems have the potential to fight for information as well as process the information on site, providing commanders with real-time intelligence. SOF can be employed for special reconnaissance or other HUMINT operations.

(c) JFCs use a broad range of supporting capabilities to develop a current intelligence picture. These supporting capabilities include national intelligence and combat support agencies (for example, NSA, CIA, CIO, DIA, and DMA), which are coordinated in support of the JFC by the national military joint intelligence center (NMJIC). J-2s should integrate these supporting capabilities with the efforts of the joint intelligence center (JIC). Liaison personnel from the various agencies provide access to the entire range of capabilities resident in their agencies and can focus those capabilities on the JFC's intelligence requirements. Intelligence operations serve to reduce uncertainty.

(d) The joint publications in the 2-0 series discuss intelligence support to joint operations.

(2) Organizing and Training Forces. Preparing the theater also includes organizing and, where possible, training forces to conduct operations throughout the theater. When it is not possible to train forces in the theater of employment, as with CONUS-based forces with multiple taskings, maximum use should be made of regularly scheduled and ad hoc exercise opportunities. JTFs and components that are likely to be employed in theater operations should be exercised regularly during peacetime. Staffs should be identified and trained for planning and controlling joint operations. JFCs and the composition of their staffs should reflect the composition of the joint force to ensure those responsible for employing joint forces have thorough knowledge of their capabilities and limitations. The training focus for all forces and the basis for exercise objectives should be the combatant commander's joint mission essential task list (JMETL).

(3) Maintaining Theater Access. JFCs establish and maintain access (including exercises, basing, transit, and overflight rights) to operational areas in which they are likely to operate. In part, this effort is national or multinational, involving maintenance of intertheater (between theaters) air and sea LOCs. Supporting combatant commanders can greatly enhance this effort. Either at the outset or as operations progress, JFCs establish and secure intratheater (within the theater) LOCs through the application of appropriate joint force.

c. Isolating the Enemy

(1) With NCA guidance and approval and with national support, JFCs strive to isolate enemies by denying them allies and sanctuary. The intent is to strip away as much enemy support or freedom of action as possible, while limiting the enemy's potential for horizontal or vertical escalation. This step serves to deny the enemy both physical and psychological support and may separate the enemy leadership and military from their public support. JFCs accomplish this step in a number of ways. JFCs support diplomatic, economic, and informational actions. Establishing and maintaining a coalition, for example, can contribute to political isolation of an opponent. Establishing and enforcing embargoes, blockades, quarantines, and air and maritime exclusion zones contribute to economic and physical isolation.

(2) JFC seeks to isolate the main enemy force from its strategic leadership and its supporting infrastructure. This isolation is accomplished by PSYOP and by interdicting critical C2 nodes, sources of sustaining resources, and transportation networks. JFCs employ air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces appropriate to the task.

d. Movement to Attain Operational Reach

(1) Forces, sometimes limited to forward-presence forces, can be positioned within operational reach of enemy centers of gravity to achieve decisive force at the appropriate location. At other times, mobilization and strategic deployment systems can be called up to begin the movement of reinforcing forces from CONUS or other theaters to redress any

unfavorable balance of forces and to achieve decisive force at the appropriate location. Such actions send strong signals of intent to a potential opponent.

(2) JFCs carefully consider the movement of forces in such situations. At times, movement of forces can contribute to the escalation of tension, while at other times its deterrent effect can reduce those tensions. Knowledge of the operational area and its major players is critical.

e. Special Operations. Special operations before hostilities provide powerful operational leverage. Among their potential contributions, SOF can be employed to gather critical information, undermine a potential opponent's will or capacity to wage war, or enhance the capabilities of multinational forces. SOF can gain access and influence in foreign nations where the presence of conventional US forces is unacceptable or inappropriate. They can also ameliorate the underlying conditions that are provoking a crisis in an effort to preclude open hostilities from occurring.

f. Protection. JFCs must protect their forces and their freedom of action. This protection dictates that JFCs be aware of and participate as appropriate in regional political and diplomatic activities. JFCs, in concert with US ambassadors, may spend as much time on regional political and diplomatic efforts as on direct preparation of their forces for combat.

g. Space. Throughout all prebattle operations, JFCs continue to exploit the advantages that control of space provides. Intelligence and communications systems are maneuvered or activated as necessary to provide JFCs with an accurate and timely appraisal of the current situation as well as the ability to respond rapidly to events and directives from the CINC or from higher authority.

h. Physical Environment. Seasonal effects on terrain, weather, and sea conditions can significantly affect operations of the joint force and should be carefully assessed before and during operations. Mobility of the force, synchronization of operations, and ability to employ precision munitions can be affected by degraded conditions. Climatological and hydrographic studies and long-range forecasts help JFCs understand the most advantageous time and location for operations.

2. Considerations at the Outset of Combat. As combat operations commence, JFCs need to exploit full dimensional leverage to shock, demoralize, and disrupt opponents immediately. JFCs seek decisive advantage quickly, before close combat if possible.

a. Force Projection

(1) The NCA may direct combatant commanders to resolve a crisis quickly, employing immediately available forward-presence forces, and, at the lowest level possible, to preclude escalation of the crisis. When this response is not enough, the projection of forces from CONUS or another theater may be necessary. For example, the ability to generate high intensity combat power from the sea can provide for effective force projection operations in the absence of timely or unencumbered access. When opposed, force projection can be accomplished rapidly by forcible entry coordinated with strategic airlift and sealift, and prepositioned forces. Force projection represents a way in which the United States will often respond to regional crises.

(2) JFCs strive to achieve early decisive advantage by rapidly building a force that can overwhelm opponents. Key to success is the synchronized employment of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces and capabilities. This employment provides JFCs a wide range of options that pose multiple and complex problems for an opponent.

(3) Force projection usually begins as a rapid response to a crisis. Alert may come with little or no notice, bringing with it tremendous stress on personnel and systems, accompanied by requests from the media for information. In any event, rapid, yet measured, response is critical. JFCs may be able to resolve the crisis and achieve strategic objectives early by rapidly committing available forward-presence forces. In other cases, the lack of such forces or nonavailability of sufficient forces to be decisive may require employment of forces organized and deployed for the specific situation.

(4) Joint forces participate in force projection operations in both war and operations other than war. These operations may be either unopposed or opposed by an adversary. JFCs sequence, enable, and protect the arrival of forces to achieve early

decisive advantage. To accomplish this decisive advantage, forcible entry operations may be required at the onset. An example of enabling and protecting the arrival of forces when access is initially unavailable is the seizure and defense of lodgment areas by naval forces, which would then serve as initial entry points for the continuous and uninterrupted flow of additional forces and materiel into theater. In this capacity, naval forces can complement the capabilities of land-based forces. Joint Pub 1 cites another example: "In the same way, land operations can provide or protect critical bases for air, land, sea, and space operations and enable these operations to be supported and extended throughout the theater."

(5) Both types of operations demand a versatile mix of forces that are organized, trained, equipped, and poised to respond quickly.

(a) Opposed operations require a viable forcible-entry capability with forces prepared to fight immediately upon entry. Forcible entry is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

(b) Unopposed operations may afford an opportunity, following arrival in the operational area, to continue to build combat power, train, rehearse, acclimate, and otherwise establish the conditions for successful operations. In unopposed entry, JFCs control the flow of forces that best facilitates the buildup of forces necessary for the envisioned operations. Logistic capability may be a higher priority than combat capability, which could be initially limited to that needed for protection. Civil affairs forces can assist in accessing host-nation support assets. Focused intelligence and echeloned C2 assist commanders to anticipate but remain flexible. JFCs protect the force during unopposed entry by knowing where the enemy is and by preventing enemy interference with the arriving force. This protection is accomplished by continuous IPB and by focused intelligence operations. At such times, JFCs conduct reconnaissance and security operations and may interdict or directly attack enemy forces as necessary, sometimes

pre-emptively. Typically, JFCs incorporate the capabilities of supporting forces and assets provided by supporting commands.

(6) The protection of forces will often be a friendly center of gravity during early entry operations. Therefore, early entry forces should deploy with sufficient organic and supporting capabilities to preserve their freedom of action and protect personnel and equipment from potential or likely threats.

(7) JFCs introduce forces in a manner that enables rapid force buildup into the structure required for anticipated operations and simultaneous protection of the force. From a C2 perspective, echelonment is essential. Early entry forces should include the C2 capability to assess the situation, make decisions, and conduct initial operations. The situation may be more or less hostile than originally anticipated. The availability and organization of host-nation resources may reduce, or increase, the need for front loading of logistic assets.

(8) Operations with allies and coalition members often require a robust liaison and communications capability. Linguists must be capable of communicating warfighting concepts between military forces of diverse cultures. Also, additional sufficient communications equipment may be required for non-US forces to enable interoperable communications.

b. Dimensional Superiority

(1) JFCs will normally seek to secure air and maritime superiority early in the conduct of joint operations. World War II's Operation POINT BLANK established air superiority, which was considered a prerequisite for Operation OVERLORD. Air and maritime superiority enable and enhance joint operations in all dimensions. While air and maritime superiority are not ends in themselves, history shows that control of the sea and/or the air has been a pivotal wartime factor. The Navy component commander or JFMCC is normally the supported commander for sea control operations, and the JFACC is normally the supported commander for counterair operations.

(2) Superiority battles are not limited to the air and maritime environments. JFCs seek to achieve superiority immediately in C4I--space control is a necessary precursor to this superiority. They seek to lay open the enemy's intentions, capabilities, and actions to observation and assessment, while simultaneously depriving the enemy of similar information about the friendly force and deceiving the enemy as to the veracity of the information obtained about the friendly force. JFCs seek to increase their situational awareness through sensor fusion and complementary intelligence efforts, while enhancing the capabilities to command and control the joint force.

(3) As another example of seeking early superiority before close combat, land commanders may seek to first achieve counterbattery or indirect fire superiority, thereby enhancing protection of their forces. Additionally, JFCs can seek to achieve a mobility differential by selectively attacking key enemy forces and transportation networks to degrade enemy maneuver.

c. Direct Attack of Enemy Strategic Centers of Gravity

(1) Also as part of achieving decisive advantages early, joint force operations may be directed immediately against enemy centers of gravity. Where possible, specific operations may be conducted to attack directly strategic centers of gravity by air, missile, special operations, and other deep-ranging capabilities. When air operations constitute the bulk of the capability needed to attack directly enemy strategic centers of gravity or to conduct air superiority operations, JFCs will normally task JFACCs, as supported commanders, to conduct such operations.

(2) There are several purposes to these attacks. They may in themselves be decisive. If they are not, they begin the offensive operation throughout the enemy's depth that can cause paralysis and destroy cohesion.

d. Special Operations. Special operations enhance the power and scope of full dimensional operations and tend to be asymmetrical in their application. Innovative special operations can directly and indirectly attack enemy centers of gravity that may be difficult to reach

by conventional action. SOF frequently require support from other forces, but can support other forces in operations such as intelligence gathering, target acquisition and designation, and interdiction. SOF capabilities are diverse, but they need to be employed judiciously so as not to negate their effectiveness. They are not a substitute for conventional forces.

e. Protection. JFCs strive to conserve the fighting potential of the joint force.

(1) Protection from the Enemy's Firepower and Maneuver. JFCs counter the enemy's firepower and maneuver by making personnel, systems, and units difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. Commanders also keep forces in a balanced stance, always aware of enemy capabilities and possible actions. They protect their force from enemy maneuver and firepower, including the effects of mass destruction weapons. Air and maritime superiority operations; air defense; and protection of airports and seaports, LOCs, and friendly force lodgment areas are important activities associated with maximizing combat power. This aspect of force protection can be achieved by a combination of actions of the joint force, including power projection from the sea. Operations security and deception are key elements of protection.

(2) Health, Welfare, Morale, and Maintenance. JFCs keep personnel healthy and maintain their fighting spirit. This protection includes guarding equipment and supplies from loss or damage. JFCs ensure systems are in place for adequate medical care, quick return of minor casualties to duty, and preventive medicine. They provide effective systems for maintenance evacuation and rapid replacement or repair of hardware. Joint Pub 4-02 discusses health support for joint operations.

(3) Safety. JFCs make safety an integral part of all joint training and operations. Sustained, high-tempo operations put personnel at risk. Command interest, discipline, and training lessen those risks. Safety in training, planning, and operations is crucial to successful combat operations and the preservation of combat power. A variety of Service publications discuss doctrine, techniques, and procedures related to safety.

(4) Prevention of Fratricide. JFCs reduce the potential for fratricide--the unintentional killing or wounding of friendly personnel by friendly fire. The destructive power and range of modern weapons, coupled with the high intensity and rapid tempo of modern combat, increase the potential for fratricide. Commanders must be aware of those situations that increase the risk of fratricide. The primary mechanisms for limiting fratricide are command interest, disciplined operations, close coordination among component commands, and detailed situational awareness. Commanders should seek to minimize the potential for fratricide while not limiting boldness and audacity in combat.

3. Sustained Combat Operations. JFCs seek to extend operations throughout the breadth and depth of the operational area. JFCs conduct sustained operations when a "coup de main" is not possible. During sustained operations, JFCs simultaneously employ air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces. During one major operation, one component or major category of operations, such as air operations, might be the main effort, with others in support. When conditions change, the main effort might shift to another component or function. Strategic attack and interdiction continue throughout to deny the enemy sanctuary or freedom of action. When prevented from concentrating, opponents can be attacked, isolated at tactical and operational levels, and defeated in detail. At other times, JFCs may cause their opponents to concentrate, facilitating their attack by friendly forces.

a. The Relationship Between Offense and Defense

(1) While defense may be the stronger form of war, it is the offense that is normally decisive. In striving to achieve strategic objectives most quickly and at least cost, JFCs will normally seek the earliest opportunity to conduct decisive offensive operations.

(2) Joint operations will normally include elements of both offense and defense. JFCs strive to apply the many dimensions of combat power simultaneously across the depth, breadth, and height of the operational area. To conduct such operations, JFCs normally achieve concentration in some areas or in specific functions and require economy of force in others. During initial entry operations, entry forces may be required to defend while force buildup

occurs. Even in sustained offensive operations, selected elements of the joint force may need to pause, defend, resupply, or reconstitute, while other forces continue the attack. Further, force protection includes certain defensive measures throughout the campaign. Commanders at all levels must possess the mental agility to rapidly transition between offense and defense and vice versa.

(3) The relationship between offense and defense, then, is an enabling one. Defensive operations, where required, enable JFCs to conduct or prepare for decisive offensive operations.

b. Linear and Nonlinear Operations

(1) Joint Pub 1 states the following: "The full dimensional joint campaign is in major respects 'nonlinear.' That is, the dominant effects of air, sea, space, and special operations may be felt more or less independently of the front line of ground troops. The impact of these operations on land battles, interacting with the modern dynamics of land combat itself, helps obtain the required fluidity, breadth, and depth of operations. In the same way, land operations can provide or protect critical bases for air, land, sea, and space operations and enable these operations to be supported and extended throughout the theater."

(2) As technology and doctrines have expanded the lethality, tempo, and depth of operations, the potential for conventional forces to conduct nonlinear operations has increased. Linearity refers primarily to the conduct of operations along lines of operations with identified FLOTs. In linear operations, emphasis is placed on maintaining the position of the land force in relation to other friendly forces. From this relative positioning of forces, security is enhanced and massing of forces can be facilitated. Also inherent in linear operations is the security of rear areas, especially LOCs between sustaining bases and fighting forces. World Wars I and II offer multiple examples of linear operations.

(3) In the land context, nonlinear operations tend to be conducted from selected bases of operations (ashore or afloat), but without clearly defined lines of operations. Since rear areas are likewise not

clearly defined, their security as well as that of LOCs are not priority concerns. The conduct of land operations in Operation JUST CAUSE is an excellent example of nonlinear operations. In such operations, land forces tend to focus more on their assigned objectives (for example, destroying an enemy force or seizing and controlling critical terrain or population centers) and less on their geographic relationship to other friendly forces. Maritime operations, special operations, and the operations of insurgent forces tend to be nonlinear. To protect themselves, individual forces conducting nonlinear rely more on situational awareness, mobility advantages, and freedom of action than on mass. Nonlinear operations place a premium on C4I, mobility, and innovative means for sustainment.

c. Maneuver

(1) The principal purpose of maneuver is to gain positional advantage relative to enemy centers of gravity in order to control or destroy those centers of gravity. The focus of both land and naval maneuver is to render opponents incapable of resisting by shattering their morale and physical cohesion (their ability to fight as an effective, coordinate whole) rather than to destroy them physically through attrition. This condition may be achieved by attacking enemy forces and controlling territory, populations, key waters, and LOCs (in all dimensions). Land and naval maneuver (which includes the action of air assets organic to the surface force) is required to control population, territory, and key waters.

(2) There are multiple ways to attain positional advantage. A naval expeditionary force with airpower, cruise missile firepower, and amphibious assault capability, within operational reach of enemy centers of gravity, has positional advantage. Land force attack aviation, if able to strike at the opponent's centers of gravity, also has positional advantage. Maintaining dimensional superiority contributes to positional advantage by facilitating freedom of action.

(3) Maneuver of forces relative to enemy centers of gravity can be key to the JFC's campaign or major operation. Maneuver is the means of concentrating forces at decisive points to achieve surprise,

psychological shock, and physical momentum. Maneuver may also exploit the effects of massed and/or precision firepower or WMD.

(4) JFCs consider the contribution of special operations in attaining positional advantage. Through reconnaissance and surveillance, direct action, or support of insurgent forces, SOF may expose vulnerabilities and attack the enemy at tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

(5) At all levels of war, successful maneuver requires not only fire and movement but also agility and versatility of thought, plans, operations, and organizations. It requires designating and then, if necessary, shifting the main effort and applying the principles of mass and economy of force.

(a) At the strategic level, deploying units to and positioning units within an operational area are forms of maneuver if such movement seeks to gain positional advantage. Strategic maneuver should place forces in position to begin the phases or major operations of a campaign.

(b) At the operational level, maneuver is a means by which JFCs set the terms of battle by time and location, decline battle, or exploit existing situations. Operational maneuver usually takes large forces from a base of operations to an area where they are in position to achieve operational objectives. As shown by USCINCENT's concept of operations in Operation DESERT STORM, the ability to maneuver must be a trait not only of combat forces but also of the logistic resources that support them.

(c) Once deployed into battle formations into the operational area, maneuver is typically considered tactical in nature.

(6) The concept for maneuver, both naval and land, needs to be articulated in the JFC's concept of operations and includes timing, sequencing, and method and location of entry into the operational area. Types of joint force maneuvers include forcible entry, sustained action at sea and from the sea, and sustained action on land.

(7) Forcible Entry

(a) Forcible entry is seizing and holding a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition. Forcible entry capabilities give JFCs unique opportunities for altering the nature of the situation, such as the opportunity for gaining the initiative at the outset of combat operations. Forcible entry operations can strike directly at enemy centers of gravity and can open new avenues for military operations. Forcible entry operations can horizontally escalate the operation, exceeding the enemy's capability to respond. In many situations, forcible entry is the only method for gaining access into the operational area or for introducing decisive forces into the region. For more information, see Joint Pubs 3-02 and 3-18.

(b) Forcible entry operations are normally joint operations and may include airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations, or any combination thereof. Subordinate joint and Service publications provide details on these operations.

(c) Forcible entry is normally complex and risky. These operations require detailed intelligence and unity of effort. Forces are tailored for the mission and echeloned to permit simultaneous deployment and employment. Forcible entry forces need to be prepared to fight immediately upon arrival and require robust C4I capabilities to move with forward elements.

(d) OPSEC and deception are critical to successful forcible entry. Forcible entry relies on speed and surprise and is almost always employed in coordination with special operations. Forcible entry usually requires support from naval gunfire and/or aviation assets. Follow-on forces need to be prepared to expand the operation, sustain the effort, and accomplish the mission.

(e) SOF may precede forcible entry forces to identify, clarify, and modify conditions in the area of the lodgment. SOF may conduct the

assaults to seize small, initial lodgments such as airfields or ports. They may provide fire support and conduct other operations in support of the forcible entry. They may conduct reconnaissance and surveillance and interdiction operations well beyond the lodgment.

(f) The sustainment requirements and challenges for forcible entry operations can be formidable, but must not be allowed to become such an overriding concern that the forcible entry operation itself is jeopardized. JFCs carefully balance the introduction of logistic forces needed to support initial combat with combat forces required to establish, maintain, and protect the lodgment.

### Operation JUST CAUSE

In the early morning hours of December 20, 1989, USCINCSO's JTF Panama conducted multiple, simultaneous forcible entry operations to begin Operation JUST CAUSE. By parachute assault, forces seized key lodgments at Torrijos-Tocumen Military Airfield and International Airport and at the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) base at Rio Hato. The JTF used these lodgments for force buildup and to launch immediate assaults against the PDF.

The JTF commander synchronized the forcible entry operations with numerous other operations involving virtually all capabilities of the joint force. The parachute assault forces strategically deployed at staggered times from CONUS bases, some in C-141 Starlifters, others in slower C-130 transport planes. One large formation experienced delays from a sudden ice storm at the departure airfield--its operations and timing were revised in the air. H-hour was even adjusted for assault operations because of intelligence that indicated a possible compromise. SOF reconnaissance and direct action teams provided last minute information on widely dispersed targets.

At H-hour the parachute assault forces, forward-presence forces, SOF, and air elements of the joint force simultaneously attacked 27 targets--most of them in the vicinity of the Panama Canal Zone. Illustrating that JFCs organize and apply force in a manner that fits the situation, the JTF commander employed land and special operations forces to attack strategic targets and stealth aircraft to attack tactical and operational-level targets.

The forcible entry operations, combined with simultaneous and follow-on attack against enemy command and control facilities and key units, seized the initiative and paralyzed enemy decisionmaking. Most fighting was concluded within 24 hours. Casualties were minimized. It was a classic coup de main.

(g) Forcible entry has been conducted throughout the history of the US Armed Forces. Forcible entry is usually a complex operation and should therefore be kept as simple as possible in concept. Schemes of maneuver and coordination between forces need to be clearly understood by all participants. When airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations are combined, unity of effort is vital. Rehearsals are a critical part of preparation for forcible entry.

(8) JFCs and their staffs should be familiar with Service doctrine on land and naval maneuver.

d. Attack of Enemy Strategic Centers of Gravity. As described earlier in this chapter, JFCs seek to attack enemy strategic centers of gravity, employing the appropriate forces and capabilities of the joint force. Such operations typically continue throughout the overall joint operation. JFCs time their effects to coincide with effects of other operations of the joint force and vice versa. As with all operations of the joint force, attacks of enemy strategic centers of gravity should be designed to support the JFCs' objectives and concept of operations, while limiting their potential negative effects on posthostilities efforts.

e. Interdiction

(1) Interdiction is a powerful tool for JFCs. Interdiction diverts, disrupts, delays, or destroys the enemy's surface or subsurface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. Interdiction-capable forces include land- and sea-based fighter and attack aircraft and bombers; ships and submarines; conventional airborne, air assault, or other ground maneuver forces; SOF; amphibious raid forces; surface-to-surface, subsurface-to-surface, and air-to-surface missiles, rockets, munitions, and mines; artillery and naval gunfire; attack helicopters; EW systems;

antisatellite weapons; and space-based satellite systems or sensors. The JFACC is the supported commander for the JFC's overall air interdiction effort.

(2) Interdiction-capable commanders require access to C2 systems able to take advantage of real and near-real-time intelligence. Such intelligence is particularly useful in dealing with targets of near or immediate effect on surface forces or whose location was not previously known with sufficient accuracy.

(3) Interdiction operations can be conducted by many elements of the joint force and can have tactical, operational, and strategic effects. Air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces can conduct interdiction operations as part of their larger or overall mission. For example, naval expeditionary forces charged with seizing and securing a lodgment along a coast may include the interdiction of opposing air, land, and naval forces as part of the overall amphibious plan.

#### **BATTLE OF THE BISMARCK SEA March 2-4, 1943**

The Battle of the Bismarck Sea is an outstanding example of the application of firepower at the operational level--in this case, air interdiction.

During the first part of 1943, the Japanese high command attempted to establish a line of defense in the Southwest Pacific, to run from Northeast New Guinea, through New Britain to the northern Solomon Islands. After a defeat at Wau, New Guinea (the intended right flank of this line), the Japanese command at Rabaul decided to reinforce its garrison at Lae, in the Huon Gulf of New Guinea. Relying on inclement weather to cover its move, a convoy of 8 destroyers and 8 transports carrying over 8,700 personnel and extensive cargo departed Rabaul at midnight of February 28.

General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) intelligence had identified the likelihood of this reinforcement. Lieutenant General George C. Kenney's Allied Air Forces, SWPA, had stepped up

long-range reconnaissance, forward positioning of air forces, and training in low-level strikes against shipping.




Figure IV-1. Battle of the Bismarck Sea

Late on March 1, the convoy was spotted moving westward off the northern coast of New Britain. Early on March 2, Lieutenant General Kenney's air forces attacked as the convoy was moving into the Dampier Strait. Multiple formations of B-17's attacked throughout the day, sinking two transports and damaging several others. By the morning of March 3, the convoy was nearing the Huon Peninsula on New Guinea. It was now within range of all of Kenney's Papuan-based aircraft. Clearing midmorning skies exposed the convoy. In a synchronized attack, 13 B-17 heavy bombers, 31 B-25 medium bombers, 12 A-20 light bombers, 28 P-38 fighters, and 13 Australian Beaufighters unleashed their firepower on the vulnerable Japanese ships. The attack continued throughout the day as more planes roared off the Moresby and Milne runways to join the fight. Before nightfall, over 330 allied aircraft had participated

and, except for 4 destroyers that had fled to the north, all ships were sunk, sinking, or badly damaged. During the night and the next day, bombers and PT boats finished the job.

MacArthur was jubilant. His press release stated, in part, "Our decisive success cannot fail to have the most important results on the enemy's strategic and tactical plans. His campaign, for the time being at least, is completely dislocated." Looking back on SWPA operations, MacArthur, in 1945, still regarded the Battle of the Bismarck Sea as "the decisive aerial engagement" of the war in his theater. The Japanese high command was shocked and aborted its second projected offensive against Wau, New Guinea. By relying on Kenney's aggressive airmen, MacArthur demonstrated the major impact of interdiction on a theater campaign.

(4) For more discussion of joint interdiction operations, refer to Joint Pub 3-03.

f. Synchronizing Maneuver and Interdiction

(1) Synchronizing interdiction and maneuver (both land and sea) provides one of the most dynamic concepts available to the joint force. Interdiction and maneuver should not be considered separate operations against a common enemy, but rather complementary operations designed to achieve the JFC's campaign objectives. Moreover, maneuver by land or naval forces can be conducted to interdict enemy surface potential. Potential responses to synchronized maneuver and interdiction can create an agonizing dilemma for the enemy. If the enemy attempts to counter the maneuver, enemy forces can be exposed to unacceptable losses from interdiction. If the enemy employs measures to reduce such interdiction losses, enemy forces may not be able to counter the maneuver. The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronizing interdiction and maneuver assists commanders in optimizing leverage at the operational level.

(2) As a guiding principle, JFCs should exploit the flexibility inherent in joint force command relationships, joint targeting procedures, and other techniques to resolve the issues that can arise from the relationship between interdiction and maneuver. When maneuver is employed, JFCs need to carefully

balance doctrinal imperatives that may be in tension, including the needs of the maneuver force and the undesirability of fragmenting theater air assets. JFCs have a flexible range of techniques to assist in implementing this principle in a variety of situations. The JFC's objectives, intent, and priorities, reflected in mission assignments and coordinating arrangements, enable subordinates to exploit fully the military potential of their forces while minimizing the friction generated by competing requirements. Effective targeting procedures in the joint force also alleviate such friction. As an example, interdiction requirements will often exceed interdiction means, requiring JFCs to prioritize requirements. Land and naval force commanders responsible for synchronizing maneuver and interdiction within their AOs should be knowledgeable of JFC priorities. Component commanders aggressively seek the best means to accomplish assigned missions. JFCs alleviate this friction through clear statements of intent for theater-level interdiction (that is, interdiction effort conducted relatively independent of surface maneuver operations). In doing this, JFCs rely on their vision as to how the major elements of the joint force contribute to accomplishing strategic objectives. The campaign concept articulates that vision. JFCs then employ a flexible range of techniques to assist in identifying requirements and applying resources to meet them. JFCs define appropriate command relationships, establish effective joint targeting procedures, and make apportionment decisions.

(3) Interdiction is not limited to any particular region of the joint battle, but generally is conducted forward of or at a distance from friendly forces. Interdiction may be planned to create advantages at any level from tactical to strategic with corresponding impacts on the enemy and the speed with which interdiction affects front-line enemy forces. Interdiction deep in the enemy's rear area can have broad theater strategic or operational effects; however, deep interdiction normally has a delayed effect on land and naval combat which will be a direct concern to the JFC. Interdiction closer to land and naval combat will be of more immediate operational and tactical concern to maneuver forces. Thus, JFCs vary the emphasis upon interdiction operations and surface maneuvers depending on the strategic and operational situation confronting them.

(4) JFCs may choose to employ interdiction as a principal means to achieve the intended objective (with other components supporting the component leading the interdiction effort).

(5) Where maneuver is part of the JFC's concept, JFCs may synchronize that maneuver and interdiction. For the joint force campaign level, JFCs synchronize maneuver and interdiction to present the enemy with the dilemma previously discussed. Indeed, JFCs may employ a scheme of maneuver that enhances interdiction operations or vice versa. For instance, actual or threatened maneuver can force an enemy to respond by attempting rapid maneuver or resupply. These reactions can provide excellent and vulnerable targets for interdiction.

(6) All commanders should consider how their capabilities and operations can complement interdiction in achieving campaign objectives and vice versa. These operations may include actions such as deception operations, withdrawals, lateral repositioning, and flanking movements that are likely to cause the enemy to maneuver large surface forces in such a manner as to make them better targets for interdiction.

(7) Likewise, interdiction operations need to conform to and enhance the JFC's scheme of maneuver during the campaign. JFCs need to properly integrate maneuver and interdiction operations to place the enemy in the operational dilemma of either defending from disadvantageous positions or exposing forces to interdiction strikes during attempted repositioning.

(8) JFCs are responsible for the conduct of theater operations. To facilitate these operations, JFCs may establish boundaries within the theater for the conduct of operations. Within the joint force theater of operations, all missions must contribute to the accomplishment of the overall objective. Synchronization of efforts within land or naval AOs is of particular importance.

(a) Land and naval commanders are directly concerned with those enemy forces and capabilities that can affect their near-term operations (current operations and those required to facilitate future operations). Accordingly, that part of interdiction with a

near-term effect on land and naval maneuver normally supports that maneuver to enable the land or naval commander to achieve the JFC's objectives. In fact, successful operations may depend on successful interdiction operations, for instance, to isolate the battle or weaken the enemy force before battle is fully joined.

(b) The size, shape, and positioning of land or naval force AOs will be established by JFCs based on their concept of operations and the land or naval force commander's requirement for depth to maneuver rapidly and to fight at extended ranges. Within these AOs, land and naval operational force commanders are designated the supported commander and are responsible for the synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this synchronization, such commanders designate the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations within their AOs.

(c) The supported commander should articulate clearly the vision of maneuver operations to those commanders that apply interdiction forces within the supported commander's boundaries to attack the designated interdiction targets or objectives. In particular, supported commanders should provide supporting commanders as much latitude as possible in the planning and execution of their operations. The supported commanders should clearly state how they envision interdiction enabling or enhancing maneuvers and what they want to accomplish with interdiction (as well as those actions they want to avoid, such as the destruction of key transportation nodes or the use of certain munitions in a specific area).

(d) Upon understanding what the supported commanders want to accomplish and what they want to avoid, interdiction-capable commanders can normally plan and execute their operations with only that coordination required with supported commanders.

(e) Joint force operations in maritime areas often require a higher degree of coordination among commanders because of the highly specialized nature of some naval operations,

such as submarine and mine warfare. This type of coordination requires that the interdiction-capable commander maintain communication with the naval commander. As in all operations, lack of close coordination among commanders in naval operating areas can result in fratricide and failed missions, especially in those areas adjacent to naval forces. The same principle applies concerning joint force air component mining operations in areas where land or naval forces may maneuver.

(9) Interdiction target priorities within the land or naval force boundaries are considered along with theater-wide interdiction priorities by JFCs and reflected in the apportionment decision. The JFACC will use these priorities to plan and execute the theater-wide interdiction effort.

(10) JFCs need to pay particular attention to, and give priority to, activities impinging on and supporting the maneuver of all forces. In addition to normal target nomination procedures, JFCs establish procedures through which land or naval force commanders can specifically identify those interdiction targets they are unable to strike with organic assets within their boundaries which could affect planned or ongoing maneuver. These targets may be identified, individually or by category, specified geographically, and/or tied to desired effects and time periods. The purpose of these procedures is to afford added visibility to, and allow JFCs to give priority to, targets directly affecting planned maneuver by land or naval forces.

g. Joint Precision Interdiction. JFCs have at their disposal a wide range of joint operational tactics, techniques, and procedures to influence the conduct of actions. As another example, JFCs may elect to use the technique of Joint Precision Interdiction (JPI), which orients on establishing an advantageous mobility differential over a hostile force. This advantage permits the judicious use of resources for decisive engagements at the time and place a JFC chooses. The major aspects of JPI (locating the enemy deep, blinding enemy sensors, adversely affecting enemy mobility, and preparing the enemy for closure and attack by friendly forces) seek to protect the JFC's freedom of maneuver while attacking the hostile mobility-producing potential. Doctrinal principles for planning and

executing interdiction operations and appropriate tactics, techniques, and procedures, including those associated with JPI, are provided in Joint Pub 3-03, "Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations."

h. Joint Fire Support. Joint fire support includes those fires that assist land and amphibious forces to maneuver and control territory, populations, and key waters. Joint fire support can include the lethal or destructive operations of close air support (CAS) (by both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft), naval gunfire, artillery, mortars, rockets, and missiles, as well as nonlethal or disruptive operations such as EW. Joint Pub 3-09, "Doctrine for Joint Fire Support," provides additional information and guidance.

i. Combat Assessment

(1) Combat assessment (CA) is the determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. Battle damage assessment (BDA) is one of the principle subordinate elements of CA.

(2) With the increasing complexity of modern warfare and its effects, the traditional bomb damage assessment has evolved through BDA to CA. At the JFC level, the CA effort should be a joint program, supported at all levels, designed to determine if the required effects on the adversary envisioned in the campaign plan are being achieved by the joint force components to meet the JFC's overall concept. The intent is to analyze what is known about the damage inflicted on the enemy with sound military judgment to try to determine: what physical attrition the adversary has suffered; what effect the efforts have on the adversary's plans or capabilities; and what, if any, changes or additional efforts need to take place to meet the objectives of the current major operations or phase of the campaign. CA requires constant information flows from all sources and should support all sections of the JFC staff and components.

(3) CA is done at all levels in the joint force. JFCs should establish a dynamic system to support CA for all components. Normally, the joint force J-3 will be responsible for coordinating CA, assisted by the joint force J-2.

(4) JFCs apportion joint force reconnaissance assets to support the CA intelligence effort that exceeds the organic capabilities of the component forces. The component commanders identify their requirements and coordinate them with the joint force J-3 or designated representative.

4. Joint Operations in the Littoral or Maritime Environment

a. Depending on the situation, JFCs may conduct operations in the littoral to achieve or support joint force objectives. The littoral area contains two parts. First is the seaward area from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore. Second is the landward area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea. Control of the littoral area is often essential to dimensional superiority. Naval operations in the littoral can provide for the seizure of an adversary's port, naval base, or coastal air base to allow entry of other elements of the joint force. Maintaining access to the operational area may involve clearing mines or other sea obstacles as well as neutralizing enemy coastal defenses.

b. Controlled littorals often offer the best positions from which to begin, sustain, and support joint operations, especially in operational areas with poor infrastructure for supporting operations ashore. Sea-based airpower and sea-launched land combat power are formidable tools that JFCs can use to gain and maintain initiative. Naval forces operating in littoral areas can dominate coastal areas to mass forces rapidly and generate high intensity offensive power at times and in locations required by JFCs. Naval forces relative freedom of action enables JFCs to position these capabilities where they can readily strike opponents. Naval forces very presence, if made known, can pose a threat that the enemy cannot ignore.

c. Even when joint forces are firmly established ashore, littoral operations provide JFCs with excellent opportunities to achieve leverage over the enemy by operational maneuver from the sea. Such operations can introduce significant size forces over relatively great distances in short periods of time into the rear or flanks of the enemy. The positional advantage gained by such maneuver creates an obvious dilemma for the enemy. The mobility of naval forces at sea, coupled with the ability to rapidly land operationally significant forces,

can be key to achieving JFC objectives. These capabilities are further enhanced by operational flexibility and the ability to identify and take advantage of fleeting opportunities.

d. JFCs can operate from a headquarters platform at sea. Depending on the nature of the joint operations, a naval commander can serve as the JFC or function as a JFACC while the operation is primarily maritime, and shift that command ashore if the operation shifts landward in accordance with the JFC's concept of operations. In other cases, a naval headquarters may serve as the base of the joint force headquarters, or an other-than-naval JFC may use C4I facilities aboard ship. Naval air and missile defense can project that coverage inland, during both entry operations and sustained operations ashore.

e. Transferring C2 from sea to shore requires coordination throughout the joint force in order to maintain uninterrupted C2 for current operations. Such a transition may involve a simple movement of flags and supporting personnel, or it may require a complete change of joint force headquarters. The new joint force headquarters may use personnel and equipment, especially communications equipment, from the old headquarters, or it may require augmentation from different sources. One technique is to transfer C2 in several stages. For example, as the shore-based headquarters develops functional capabilities--such as the ability to conduct targeting or intelligence operations--it may assume responsibility for these functions. Another technique is for the JFC to satellite off the capabilities of one of the components ashore until the new headquarters is fully prepared. Whichever way the transition is done, staffs should develop detailed checklists to address all of the C2 requirements and the timing of transfer of each. The value of joint training in this transition is evident.

#### 5. Operations When Weapons of Mass Destruction Are Employed

a. As WMD proliferate, the likelihood of their use against friendly forces increases not only in war but also in operations other than war. An enemy's use of such weapons can quickly change the nature of a campaign, perhaps even affecting the combatant commander's strategic objectives. The use or the threat of use of these weapons can cause large-scale shifts in strategic

and operational objectives, phases, and COAs. Thus, planning for the possibility of both friendly and enemy use is important to campaign design.

b. It may not be the sheer killing power of these weapons that represents the greatest effect. It is the strategic, operational, psychological, and political impacts of their use that can affect strategic objectives and campaign design.

c. The effective combination of conventional offensive and defensive operations can help reduce the effectiveness or success of an enemy's use of WMD. Offensive measures include raids, strikes, and operations designed to locate and neutralize the threat of such weapons. JFCs implement defensive nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) measures and plan for effective air and theater missile defense with different systems. For more information, see Joint Pub 3-11.

d. Multinational operations become more complicated with the threat of employment of these weapons. An enemy may use WMD against other coalition members, especially those with no or little defense against these weapons, to disintegrate the coalition.

e. Intelligence systems and planners advise JFCs of an opponent's capability to employ WMD and under what conditions that opponent is most likely to do so. This advice includes an assessment of the enemy's willingness and intent to employ these weapons. A significant intelligence task is locating these weapons and assessing the probability of their employment. The integration of national, joint, and multinational intelligence means is vital to this effort. It is important to ensure that friendly force dispositions do not provide lucrative targets for enemy WMD.

f. When directed by the NCA, JFCs plan for the employment of nuclear weapons by US forces in a manner consistent with national policy and strategic guidance. The employment of such weapons signifies an escalation of the war and is an NCA decision. USSTRATCOM's capabilities to assist in the planning of all nuclear missions are available to support nuclear weapon employment.

g. If directed to plan for the use of nuclear weapons, JFCs typically have two escalating objectives:

(1) The first is to deter or prevent an enemy attack that employs WMD. To make opponents understand that friendly forces possess and will use such weapons, JFCs may simply communicate that to the enemy, using PSYOP or other means. More often, such notification is made at the national strategic or diplomatic level. Regardless, JFCs implement measures to increase readiness and preserve the option to respond, including the alert and forward positioning, if required, of appropriate systems. Attempts at prevention or denial may include targeting and attacking enemy WMD capability by conventional and special operations forces.

(2) If deterrence fails, JFCs respond appropriately, consistent with national policy and strategic guidance, to enemy aggression while seeking to control the intensity and scope of conflict and destruction. That response could be conventional in nature, but may include the employment of WMD. If these weapons are employed, they should be used to destroy critical centers of gravity to end the war quickly with consideration given to the damage likely to be inflicted. More information can be found in Joint Pub 3-12 series.

h. Force protection is imperative in this environment. The joint force can survive use of WMD by anticipating their employment. Commanders can protect their forces in a variety of ways, including training, PSYOP, OPSEC, dispersion of forces, use of protective clothing, inoculation, and proper use of terrain for shielding against effects. Enhancement of force protection by using all available measures reduces incentives for a first strike by an enemy with NBC weapons.

## 6. Considerations for Termination and Postconflict Operations

a. Even as joint forces conduct sustained operations, JFCs plan for termination and postconflict operations. Just as intelligence provides the indications and warning that may signal the start of combat operations, so too does it signal indications that termination conditions are met. As these conditions are met, JFCs continue to position forces for postconflict operations.

b. These operations often require a realignment in joint force structure. JFCs may need to bring forward or realign forces to be in position to begin postconflict operations. The JFC's planning and continuous development of the estimate of the situation will reveal the nature and scope of these activities and the forces required. Such activities can include, for example, mine sweeping and clearing operations, prisoner of war operations, demobilization of friendly insurgent forces, and various kinds of assistance operations. It may even be necessary to establish a temporary government.

c. Combatant commanders may require different C2 structures for the joint force, necessitating a transition between subordinate JFCs and organizations. The forces involved may be available within the joint force or may be required from another theater or from Reserve components of the Total Force. JFCs integrate interagency operations and work closely with Department of State and other representatives of the United States. Chapter V discusses postconflict operations in more detail.

d. As postconflict operations progress, the military instrument of national power typically gives way to other instruments. At some point, military forces will largely be in support of other US and international agency efforts.

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## CHAPTER V

### MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

#### 1. General

a. Military operations other than war encompass a wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than the large-scale combat operations usually associated with war. Although these operations are often conducted outside the United States, they also include military support to US civil authorities. Military operations other than war usually involve a combination of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces as well as the efforts of governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations, in a complementary fashion. This chapter addresses key operational-level concepts and types of operations.

b. For detailed guidance on specific operations other than war, refer to the Joint Pub 3-07 series.

#### 2. Role in the Strategic Security Environment

a. Combatant commanders support national objectives through combatant command strategies and military operations, which translate strategic intent into operational and tactical actions. Thus, joint operations other than war involve strategic, operational, and tactical considerations. Because the Department of State is a principal player in joint operations other than war outside the CONUS, JFCs should maintain a working relationship with the chiefs of the US diplomatic missions in their area.

b. Many US Government agencies, other than the Department of Defense, can be involved in operations other than war, including the Department of State; the Department of Agriculture; the Department of Commerce; the Department of Justice; Department of Transportation; and the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) within the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Both DART and OFDA are offices within AID. Nongovernmental organizations such as the American Red Cross and the Save the Children Fund are also frequently involved. Examples of international organizations that can be involved in such operations include the United Nations (UN), the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the UN High

Commissioner for Refugees. These organizations may assume the lead to coordinate actions for other nongovernmental agencies. Military planners should therefore establish contact with lead nongovernmental agencies to ensure coordinated efforts.

c. The instruments of national power may be applied in any combination to achieve national strategic goals in operations other than war. The manner in which they are employed is determined by the nature of each situation. For operations other than war, the military instrument is typically tasked to support the diplomatic instrument, working with the economic and informational instruments.

3. Principles for Joint Operations Other Than War. There are six principles applicable for joint operations other than war. They are objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.

a. Objective

(1) Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.

(2) This principle of war applies also to operations other than war. A clearly defined and attainable objective--with a precise understanding of what constitutes success--is critical when the United States is involved in operations other than war. Military commanders should also understand what specific conditions could result in mission termination as well as those that yield failure. JFCs must understand the strategic aims, set appropriate objectives, and ensure that these aims and objectives contribute to unity of effort with other agencies.

b. Unity of Effort

(1) Seek unity of effort in every operation.

(2) The principle of unity of command in war also applies to operations other than war; but, in operations other than war, this principle may be more difficult to attain. In these operations, other government agencies may often have the lead. Commanders may answer to a civilian chief, such as an ambassador, or may themselves employ the resources of a civilian agency. Command arrangements may often be only loosely defined and many times will not involve

command authority as understood within the military. This arrangement may cause commanders to seek an atmosphere of cooperation to achieve objectives by unity of effort. Military commanders need to consider how their actions contribute to initiatives that are also diplomatic, economic, and informational in nature. Because operations other than war will often be conducted at the small unit level, it is important that all levels understand the military-civilian relationship to avoid unnecessary and counter-productive friction.

c. Security

(1) Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage.

(2) In joint operations other than war, security deals principally with force protection against virtually any person, element, or group hostile to our interests. These could include a terrorist, a group opposed to the operation, and even looters after a natural disaster. JFCs also should be ready constantly to counter activity that could bring significant harm to units or jeopardize mission accomplishment. JFCs should not be lulled into believing that the nonhostile intent of their mission does not put the force at risk. Inherent in this responsibility is the need to be capable of rapid transition from a peaceful to a combat posture should the need arise. The inherent right of self-defense from the unit to the individual level applies to all operations.

d. Restraint

(1) Apply appropriate military capability prudently.

(2) The actions of military personnel and units are framed by the disciplined application of force, including specific ROE. In operations other than war, these ROE will often be more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in war. Moreover, these rules may change frequently during operations. Restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence characterize the environment. The use of excessive force could adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short- and long-term goals. This

concept does not preclude the application of overwhelming force, when appropriate, to display US resolve and commitment. The reasons for the restraint often need to be understood by the individual Service member because a single act could cause critical political consequences.

e. Perseverance

(1) Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.

(2) Some operations other than war may be short, others protracted. Peacetime operations may require years to achieve the desired effects. Underlying causes of confrontation and conflict rarely have a clear beginning or a decisive resolution. It is important to assess crisis response options against their contribution to long-term strategic objectives. This assessment does not preclude decisive military action but does require careful, informed analysis to choose the right time and place for such action. Commanders balance their desire to attain objectives quickly with a sensitivity for the long-term strategic aims and the restraints placed on operations. Therefore, the patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives, for as long as necessary to achieve them, is often the requirement for success.

f. Legitimacy

(1) Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.

(2) This principle focuses on internationally sanctioned standards as well as the perception that authority of a government to govern is genuine, effective, and uses proper agencies for reasonable purposes. Joint force operations need to sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government. During operations where a government does not exist, extreme caution should be used when dealing with individuals and organizations to avoid inadvertently legitimizing them. PSYOP can enhance both domestic and international perceptions of the legitimacy of an operation.

4. Planning Considerations. Operations other than war can involve threats that may be subtle and indirect, normally regional in nature, may develop quickly, may or may not be long-term, may or may not involve conflict, but may have serious implications for the safeguard of US interests.

a. Interagency Operations. Inherent in operations other than war is the need for the military to work with other agencies of the US Government as well as other nations' governments. Consensus building is a primary task and can be aided by understanding each agency's capabilities and limitations as well as any constraints that may preclude the use of a capability. The goal--to develop and promote the unity of effort needed to accomplish a specific mission--can be achieved by establishing an atmosphere of trust and cooperation. Finally, consensus building helps develop goals each agency will support, helping all focus on a common objective.

b. Command and Control. Each operation other than war can be unique. There is no single C2 option that works best for all such operations. JFCs and their subordinates should be flexible in modifying standard arrangements to meet the specific requirements of each situation and promote unity of effort.

c. Intelligence and Information Gathering. Force protection can be significantly improved with the proper mix of intelligence and information gathering. As soon as practical after an operation is declared, JFCs and planners determine the intelligence requirements needed to support the operation. Intelligence planners also consider the capability for a unit to receive external intelligence support, the capability to store intelligence data, the timeliness of collection systems, the availability of on-the-shelf intelligence publications, and the possibility of using other agencies and organizations as intelligence sources. In some military operations other than war (such as peacekeeping), the term "information gathering" is used rather than the term "intelligence" because of the sensitivity of the operation.

d. Constraints and Restraints. A commander tasked with conducting a joint operation other than war may face numerous restrictions in addition to the normal restrictions associated with ROE. For example, international acceptance of each operation may be extremely important not only because military forces may be used to support international sanctions but also

because of the probability of involvement by international organizations. As a consequence, legal rights of individuals and organizations and funding of the operation should be addressed by the combatant commander's staff. Also, constraints and restraints imposed on any agency or organization involved in the operation should be understood by other agencies and organizations to facilitate coordination.

e. Training and Education. The US Armed Forces may be directed to conduct joint operations other than war with very little notice. Therefore, training and education programs focusing on joint, multinational, and interagency operations should be developed and implemented for individuals and units. Personnel from other US Government agencies and nongovernmental and international organizations should be invited to participate in these programs.

f. Postconflict Operations

(1) Planning for postconflict operations should begin as early as possible, and preferably before the conflict begins. As combat operations are nearing termination, military forces should prepare to transition to operations other than war. Refugee control, reestablishing civil order and public services, medical assistance, and other postconflict activities may be done best by military forces during this turbulent period. Postconflict activities typically begin with significant military involvement, then move increasingly toward civilian dominance as the threat wanes and civil infrastructures are reestablished.

(2) The military's presence and its ability to operate in crisis environments and under extreme conditions may give it the de facto lead in operations normally governed by other agencies. Military forces need to work competently in this environment while properly subordinating military forces to the agency in charge. To be effective, planning and conducting postconflict activities require a variety of perspectives and expertise and the cooperation and assistance of governmental agencies, other Services, and alliance or coalition partners. Typical postconflict activities include:

- (a) Transition to Civil Authorities. This transaction could be to local governments or host nations after natural disasters, to a UN peacekeeping operation after peace-enforcement operations, or through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to a nongovernmental agency in support of refugees.
- (b) Support to Truce Negotiations. This support may include providing intelligence, security, transportation, and other logistic support, and linguistics for all participants.
- (c) SOF Activities. These activities include civil affairs support to reestablish a civil government, additional training for host-nation armed forces, PSYOP to foster continued peaceful relations, and intelligence gathering.
- (d) Public Affairs Operations. These operations include command information programs, media support, and international information campaigns.
- (e) Redeployment. Redeployment may include waste disposal, port operations, closing of financial obligations, clearing and marking of minefields and other explosive ordnance disposal activities, and ensuring appropriate units remain in place until their missions are complete. Redeployment must be planned and executed in a manner that facilitates the use of redeploying forces and supplies to meet new missions or crises.

#### **Operation PROVIDE COMFORT**

As the Gulf War's fighting ended on February 28, 1991, a Kurdish rebellion erupted in northern Iraq. Iraqi forces attacked the Kurds. People fled from cities and towns. Worldwide television showed cold, wet Kurds suffering from hunger and disease and dying in the hills of northern Iraq and southern Turkey.

On April 6, 1991, USCINCEUR established JTF Provide Comfort. Initial objectives were to provide humanitarian relief by airdropping food and other necessities, establishing relief centers, supervising distribution of food and water, and

improving sanitation and medical care. JTF Provide Comfort included USAF airlift, a special operations command, and an amphibious ready group (with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit). When it became apparent that operations would significantly increase in complexity and duration, USCINCEUR expanded the organization of the JTF, changed commanders to reflect the changed nature and increasing complexity of the operation, and established the JTF headquarters at Incirlik, Turkey.

The new JTF commander established two subordinate JTFs: JTF Alfa, a special operations task force, at Silopi, Turkey; and JTF Bravo at Zakhu, Iraq. JTF Bravo's mission was to provide security in its operational area inside Iraq, build refugee camps, and move displaced persons into these camps. JTF Bravo forces included the Marine Expeditionary Unit, a British Commando Brigade, a French Parachute Regiment, a Spanish Parachute Regiment, and US Army airborne infantry and attack helicopter battalions as well as PSYOP and civil affairs units. Ultimately, JTF Bravo included combat and combat support units from US and coalition member nations, including an Italian Composite Special Forces Airborne Brigade, a Dutch Marine Combat Battalion, and an Infantry Rifle Platoon from Luxembourg.

Air Force forces (AFFOR) operated from Incirlik, and established and maintained an air exclusion zone over the protected area and coordinated air delivery. Army and non-US cargo helicopters were OPCON to COMAFFOR. Army forces (ARFOR) (less those in JTF Bravo) were also based at Incirlik. COMARFOR was also designated commander of a multinational support command, with OPCON of Army, Air Force, and Marine logistic units to support its multinational force.

PROVIDE COMFORT was a coalition effort. The United Kingdom, Spain, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Australia, Luxembourg, Canada, Germany, and the United States contributed forces. The operation also encompassed United Nations relief assistance. The JTF became Combined Task Force (CTF) Provide Comfort.

Especially in its early weeks, PROVIDE COMFORT demonstrated the remarkable agility and flexibility of a team-oriented effort. The CJTF and subordinate commanders used Service capabilities where they were needed. They assigned clear (although not easy) missions; gave direct, simple guidance; and

established command relationships that facilitated mission accomplishment. It was an outstanding example of the complexity of the end state and posthostilities operations.

5. Types of Operations Other Than War. Operations other than war include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. Arms Control. The main purpose of arms control is to enhance national security. Although it may be viewed as a diplomatic mission, the military can play a vital role. For example, US military personnel may be involved in verifying an arms control treaty; may seize WMD (NBC or conventional); may escort authorized deliveries of weapons and other materials (such as enriched uranium) to preclude loss or unauthorized use of these assets; or may dismantle or destroy weapons with or without the consent of the host nation. All of these actions help reduce threats to regional stability.

b. Combatting Terrorism. These measures are both offensive (counterterrorism) and defensive (antiterrorism) in nature. The former typically occurs outside the territory of the United States, while the latter may occur anywhere in the world. The Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Federal Aviation Administration are actively involved in antiterrorism operations. See Joint Pub 3-07.2 for more information.

c. DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations

(1) The national drug control strategy (NDCS) is issued by the President pursuant to the Antidrug Abuse Act of 1988. The antidrug plans and programs of the Department of Defense are an integral part of the NDCS and include detection and monitoring; support to cooperative foreign governments; support for interdiction; support to drug law enforcement agencies; internal drug prevention and treatment programs; research and development; and command, control, communications, and intelligence support. See Joint Pub 3-07.4 for more information.

(2) The National Defense Authorization Act of 1989 assigned three major counterdrug responsibilities to the Department of Defense:

(a) Acting as the single lead agency for detecting and monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States.

(b) Integrating the command, control, communications, and technical intelligence assets of the United States that are dedicated to interdicting the movement of illegal drugs into the United States.

(c) Approving and funding State governors' plans for expanded use of the National Guard to support drug interdiction and enforcement operations of law enforcement agencies.

d. Nation Assistance. The main objective of nation assistance is to assist a host nation with internal programs to promote stability, develop sustainability, and establish institutions responsive to the needs of the people. Security assistance and foreign internal defense are the primary means of providing nation assistance.

(1) Security Assistance. Security assistance refers to a group of programs that provide defense articles and services, including training, to eligible foreign countries and international organizations that further US national security objectives. Public law prohibits personnel providing security assistance services (including mobile training assistance) from performing combatant duties.

(2) Foreign Internal Defense. Foreign internal defense (FID) supports a host nation's fight against lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency. US military support to foreign internal defense should focus on assisting host-nation personnel to anticipate, preclude, and counter these threats. Emphasis on internal defense and development programs when organizing, planning, and executing military support to FID programs is essential. Specific tools used in executing the DOD component of FID programs may include multinational exercises, exchange programs, civil-military operations, intelligence and communications sharing, logistic support of security assistance, and combat operations. See Joint Pub 3-07.1 for more information.

e. Noncombatant Evacuation Operation. The purpose of NEOs is to safely and quickly remove civilian noncombatants from an area outside the United States

where they are, or may be, threatened. Although NEOs are principally conducted for US citizens, US Armed Forces may also evacuate citizens from host, allied, or friendly nations if the NCA determine it to be in the best interest of the United States. The Department of State has the lead in conducting NEOs. US ambassadors or chiefs of diplomatic missions are responsible for planning for NEOs by preparing emergency action plans to be implemented when NEOs are required. See Joint Pub 3-07.51 for more information.

### **Operation EASTERN EXIT**

On January 1, 1991, the United States Ambassador to Somalia requested military assistance to evacuate the Embassy. Americans and other foreign nationals had sought shelter in the Embassy compound that day as the reign of Somali dictator Siad Barre disintegrated into a confused battle for control of Mogadishu.

The next day, Operation EASTERN EXIT was initiated. Despite the priorities of the Gulf War, special operations forces helicopters were put on alert, Air Force C-130 transport aircraft were deployed to Kenya, and two Navy amphibious ships with elements of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade embarked were sent south from the North Arabian Sea toward Somalia. Initial plans called for evacuation of the endangered Americans through Mogadishu's international airport, utilizing Air Force aircraft staged in Kenya. The situation in Mogadishu rapidly worsened and aircraft, even those of the United States Air Force, could not land safely at the airport. It seemed unlikely in any case that those sheltered at the Embassy could travel safely through the embattled city to the airport.

By January 4th, it had become apparent that the Embassy's only hope lay with the two ships still steaming south at flank speed. At 0247, two CH-53E helicopters with Marines and Navy SEALs departed the USS Guam for the 466-mile flight to Mogadishu. After two in-flight refuelings from KC-130 aircraft, the helicopters arrived over the Embassy at dawn. About 100 armed Somali stood with ladders by one wall. As the CH-53Es flew into the compound, the Somali scattered. Shortly after the helicopters touched down, a Special Operations AC-130 gunship arrived overhead to provide fire support, if

needed. The CH-53Es unloaded the security force, embarked 61 evacuees, and took off for the 350-mile return flight.

The ships continued to steam at full speed toward Somalia throughout the day. The final evacuation of the Embassy started at midnight, after the ships had arrived off the coast. The remaining 220 evacuees and the security force were extracted during the night.

EASTERN EXIT, which resulted in the rescue of 281 people--from 30 different countries--from a bloody civil war, was the result of the synergistic employment of widely dispersed joint forces which rapidly planned and conducted a NEO in the midst of the Gulf War.

f. Other Civil Support Operations

(1) These operations encompass worldwide humanitarian assistance, military support to civil authorities, and military assistance for civil disturbances. Worldwide humanitarian assistance operations fall under the umbrella of civil-military operations. They include disaster relief, support to displaced persons as well as humanitarian and civic assistance. United States participation in such operations may increase because of our capability to quickly respond to emergencies and disasters. Included in support to civil authorities are US domestic actions applicable to disaster-related civil emergencies and civil defense for attacks directed against the territory of the United States. Included in assistance for civil disturbances are military support to US domestic law enforcement agencies, protection of life and federal property, and prevention of disruptions to federal functions.

(2) The US Armed Forces can augment domestic governments of the United States. Such operations can include support to education systems, medical facilities, emergency response, and transportation systems in remote or depressed areas. Some of these operations directly contribute to military readiness; others do not.

**JTF Andrew**

At 0500 on August 24, 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck south Florida and caused extensive damage. The Governor of Florida requested federal assistance. The Secretary of the Army, as the President's executive agent, directed initiation of disaster relief operations in support of the federal response plan. As part of those operations, CINCPAC directed Second US Army to form JTF Andrew and begin humanitarian relief operations. Eventually composed of elements of all Services and both Active and Reserve forces, JTF Andrew began operations on August 28, 1992.

JTF Andrew's mission was to provide humanitarian support by establishing field feeding sites, storage and distribution warehousing, cargo transfer operations, local and line haul transfer operations, and other logistic support to the populace in affected areas. Commander, JTF Andrew, defined success as getting life support systems in place and relieving immediate hardships until non-DOD federal, state, and local agencies could reestablish normal operations. Operations were conducted in three phases. Immediate relief provided life support systems--food, water, shelter, medical supplies and services, information, sanitation, and transportation. A recovery phase ensured sustainment of services provided in Phase I while assisting federal, state, and local authorities to reestablish public services. Finally, a reconstitution phase continued to reestablish services under federal, state, and local control, while JTF forces redeployed.

During these operations, 1,014 sorties were flown, carrying over 19,000 tons of mission support materials. Almost 900,000 meals were served. Over 80,000 tons of humanitarian supplies were moved into the area by sea and over land. Almost 2,000 tons were moved by air. Over 67,000 patients received medical treatment, and over 1,000 tents were erected. A mobile radio station was established to provide emergency information to the local population and to provide route information to assist convoys as they arrive. Four life support centers were constructed, providing mass care for 2,400 people per day for approximately 2 months. Over 6 million cubic yards of debris were removed, and 98 schools were repaired.

JTF Andrew coordinated with multiple federal, state, and private agencies. These included the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Civil Air Patrol, the American Red Cross, the General Services Administration, the Public Health Service, the Department of Agriculture, the Salvation Army, the Boy Scouts of America, and numerous religious relief organizations.

This disaster relief effort demonstrated the versatility of the US Armed Forces. The training for war that developed and promoted initiative, ingenuity, and flexibility in leadership and conduct of operations, served the Nation well in a noncombat situation.

g. Peace Operations

(1) This term encompasses three general areas: diplomatic, traditional peacekeeping, and forceful military actions. Therefore, it may be helpful to view these types of operations with only three terms: peacemaking (diplomatic actions), peacekeeping (noncombat military operations), and peace enforcement (coercive use of military force). Peace operations are not typically conducted within the territory of the United States. For more information, see Joint Pub 3-07.3.

(2) The UN has been the most frequent sponsor of classical peacekeeping activities; however, regional organizations such as the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, and the Arab League have also acted in similar fashion to prevent, halt, or contain conflict in their respective regions.

(3) The objective of peace operations is to achieve a peaceful settlement among belligerent parties, primarily through diplomatic action. Military operations may be necessary if diplomatic actions are insufficient or inappropriate.

**Operations PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE**

Operations PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE demonstrated the complexity of integrating peace support operations with other types of operations and provided a glimpse of a new style of post-Cold

War military operations. By the middle of 1992, after years of civil war, drought, and famine, the situation in the southern half of Somalia had reached such a tragic state that humanitarian organizations launched a worldwide appeal for help. In response to this outcry, the President of the United States directed, in mid-August 1992, an airlift of food and supplies for starving Somali (Operation PROVIDE RELIEF).

US forces immediately initiated the airlift of relief supplies from Mombassa, Kenya, but continued instability in Somalia prevented safe passage of the flights. Relief workers in Somalia operated in this unsafe environment under constant threat. Distribution of relief supplies was haphazard and subject to banditry and obstruction by local warlords. The people of Somalia continued to suffer.

Based on the continued suffering and the realization that the United States was the only nation capable of decisive action, the President directed USCINCENT to plan a larger scale humanitarian relief operation. On December 3d, the President directed USCINCENT to execute Operation RESTORE HOPE. In broad terms, it was an effort to raise Somalia from the depths of famine, anarchy, and desperation in order to restore its national institutions and its hope for the future. Conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, Operation RESTORE HOPE was a multinational humanitarian assistance operation that ultimately involved more than 38,000 troops from 21 coalition nations, with an additional 9 nations providing funding, support, and facilities vital to the operation.

Unified Task Force (UNITAF) Somalia was formed with forces from France, Italy, Canada, Belgium, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, as well as other nations. On December 9, 1992, under UN auspices, US SOF and amphibious forces assaulted and secured the airport at Mogadishu and the seaport soon thereafter. Arriving supplies could now be off-loaded safely.

The task force methodically expanded throughout the capital city of Mogadishu and into the countryside. As land forces were added to the task force, control was pushed inland. The airlift of supplies increased significantly as air bases were secured. Over the next three months, the coalition expanded into the southern half of Somalia, establishing and securing relief centers and escorting supply convoys.

The operation was made more complex by continued uncertainty and instability in the Somali political situation. The task force, working closely with the US Department of State and eventually more than 50 humanitarian relief organizations, assisted in establishing an environment in which relief operations could proceed. Because of the proliferation of weapons throughout the country during the many years of civil war, relief efforts included the identification of individuals and groups that posed immediate threats and the removal of visible weapons from circulation. A radio station and newspaper were established to inform the public regarding the UN force objectives as well as public service information to enhance security.

As the situation was brought under control by military forces, priority shifted to diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain a lasting truce between competing factions. UNITAF Somalia was amended to include relief-in-place by forces assigned to the United Nations Operation in Somalia, now designated UNOSOM II. The distribution of relief supplies continued while great care was taken to ensure a seamless transition between UNITAF and UNOSOM II forces.

#### h. Support to Insurgencies

(1) Insurgencies attempt to exploit actual or perceived governmental weaknesses, such as failure to maintain law and order; inability to respond adequately to disasters; overreaction to civil disturbances; or failure to meet economic, political, ethnic, or social expectations.

(2) Organizational structures for US support to insurgencies can be overt, low visibility, clandestine, or covert. Each support program is conducted as a special activity within the meaning of section 3.4(h) of Executive Order 12333, 4 December 1981, "US Intelligence Activities," and is subject to approval by the US Congress.

(3) The US military principally trains and advises insurgent forces in unconventional warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures. These actions should be integrated with the programs of the other instruments of national power.

## CHAPTER VI

### MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

#### 1. General

a. US military operations are often conducted with the armed forces of other nations in pursuit of common objectives. Such operations have been the cornerstone of the US military since the Nation's infancy. From the Revolutionary War to the present, United States Armed Forces have often fought to defend US national interests as part of a larger multinational force.

b. Multinational operations, both those that include combat and those that do not, are conducted within the structure of an alliance or coalition:

(1) An alliance is a result of formal agreements between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is one example. These alliance operations are technically combined operations, though in common usage combined is often used as synonym for all multinational operations.

(2) A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action, for instance, the coalition that defeated Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in the Gulf War, 1990-1991.

c. Joint operations as part of an alliance or coalition require close cooperation among all forces and can serve to mass strengths, reduce vulnerabilities, and provide legitimacy. Effectively planned and executed multinational operations should, in addition to achieving common objectives, facilitate unity of effort without diminishing freedom of action and preserve unit integrity and uninterrupted support.

d. Each multinational operation is unique, and key considerations involved in planning and conducting multinational operations vary with the international situation and perspectives, motives, and values of the organization's members. Whereas alliance members typically have common national political and economic systems, coalitions often bring together nations of

diverse cultures for a limited period of time. As long as the coalition members perceive their membership and participation as advancing their individual national interests, the coalition can remain intact. At the point that national objectives or priorities diverge, the coalition breaks down.

e. US Armed Forces should be prepared to operate within the framework of an alliance or coalition under other-than-US leadership. Following, contributing, and supporting are important roles in multinational operations--often as important as leading. However, US forces will often be the predominant and most capable force within an alliance or coalition and can be expected to play a central leadership role, albeit one founded on mutual respect. Stakes are high, requiring the military leaders of member nations to emphasize common objectives as well as mutual support and respect.

## 2. Considerations for Multinational Operations

a. National Goals. No two nations share exactly the same reasons for entering a coalition or alliance. To some degree, participation within an alliance or coalition requires the subordination of national autonomy by member nations. The glue that binds the multinational force is agreement, however tenuous, on common goals and objectives. However, different national goals, often unstated, cause each nation to measure progress in its own way. Each nation, therefore, can produce differing perceptions of progress. JFCs should strive to understand each nation's goals and how those goals can affect conflict termination and the desired end state. Maintaining cohesion and unity of effort requires understanding and adjusting to the perceptions and needs of member nations.

### b. Unity of Effort

(1) Motivations of member nations may differ, but multinational objectives should be attainable, clearly defined by the commander or leadership structure of the multinational force, and supported by each member nation. Commanders of multinational forces should carefully consider the types of missions assigned to member forces. Capabilities will often differ substantially between national

forces, but sensitivity to and consideration of national honor, pride, and prestige will often be as important to final success as the contributions and capabilities of the national forces themselves. Small decisions, such as which national forces are involved in the main effort or perhaps play the lead role at the start of an offensive, can have major consequences in multinational operations. Multinational force commanders strive to involve all national forces commensurate with their capabilities and look for opportunities to showcase appropriately the contributions of member forces.

(2) Planning is often complicated by participation of all members. Multinational force commanders and staffs should seek to involve all member nations in the decisionmaking process, consistent with the terms established at the founding of the alliance or coalition. Member recommendations should be sought continuously by multinational force commanders, but especially during development of COAs and ROE, assignment of missions to national forces, and establishment of priorities of effort.

(3) JFCs should establish a working rapport with leaders of other national forces. A personal, direct relationship can often overcome many of the difficulties associated with multinational operations. Respect, trust, and the ability to compromise are essential to building and maintaining a strong team.

c. Doctrine, Training, and Equipment

(1) Doctrines, operational competence as a result of training and experience, and types and quality of equipment can vary substantially among the military forces of member nations. At times, national capabilities and national expectations or desires concerning roles to be performed may not be in balance. In such instances, multinational commanders and staffs should seek to optimize the contribution of member forces, at times compromising or modifying operational concepts in order to maintain a strong coalition.

(2) When the situation permits, JFCs seek opportunities to improve the contributions of other national forces through training assistance and sharing of resources consistent with US and alliance or coalition terms of reference, such as the loan of American equipment (for example, radios, vehicles, or weapons).

(3) JFCs implement measures to assess the capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of member forces to facilitate matching missions with capabilities. Getting to know and trust the leaders of member forces facilitates such assessments as well as guides appropriate actions and measures to balance roles and capabilities.

(4) Where member forces have unique or special capabilities, they should be appropriately exploited.

(5) Joint and multinational exercises are key components of joint training and doctrine refinement. Types of exercises include command post exercises (CPXs) and field training exercises (FTXs). Simulation can complement most exercises. Distributed simulation is a means to enhance training between remotely separated forces.

d. Cultural Differences

(1) Each partner in multinational operations possesses a unique cultural identity--the result of language, values, religious systems, and economic and social outlooks. Even seemingly minor differences, such as dietary restrictions, can have great impact. Commanders strive to accommodate religious holidays, prayer calls, and other unique cultural traditions important to allies and coalition members, consistent with the situation.

(2) Language differences often present the most immediate challenge. Specifying an official coalition language can be a sensitive issue. US forces cannot assume that the predominant language will automatically be English. Information loss during translation can be high, and misunderstandings and miscommunications can have disastrous effects.

(3) To assist with cultural and language challenges, JFCs employ linguists and area experts, often available within or through the Service components or from other US agencies. In some instances, members of Service forces may be especially familiar with the operational area, its cultures, and languages as a result of previous assignments or heritage. JFCs should seek to maximize the contributions of such individuals to facilitate understanding and communications. Appropriate security measures should be employed to ensure that unfamiliar linguists or area experts are not able to jeopardize the operation through espionage or subversion.

e. Management of Resources. Forces of member nations must be supported either by national assets or through the coalition. Resource contributions will vary between members. Some may contribute logistically, while others contribute military forces. Some may be able to do both. Commanders of multinational forces should seek to ensure that member forces are appropriately supplied and that contributions of member nations are consistent with national capabilities and the terms established at the formation of the alliance and/or coalition. Frequently, JFCs will rely on national political leadership and representatives from such agencies as the Department of State to effect such coordination with the leadership of member nations.

f. National Communications

(1) JFCs should anticipate that some forces from alliance or coalition member nations will have direct and near immediate communications capability from the operational area to their respective national political leadership. This communications capability can facilitate coordination of issues, but it can also be a source of frustration as leaderships external to the operational area may be issuing guidance directly to their deployed national forces.

(2) JFCs should have a responsive and reliable link to appropriate US agencies and political leadership. Where senior JFCs are in the chain of command between the deployed JFC and the NCA, provisions should be made for bypassing intermediate points in the chain

of command for exceptional and emergency situations. The conditions and supporting communications systems for such bypassing should be established by the appropriate military and political leadership early.

### 3. Considerations During the Planning and Execution of Multinational Operations

#### a. Rules of Engagement

(1) JFCs should give early attention to developing ROE that are appropriate to the situation and can be employed by all member forces. This task is often difficult, requiring the participation and cooperation of senior political and military representatives from member nations. Complete consensus or standardization of ROE may not be achievable because of individual national values and operational employment concepts. However, JFCs should strive to develop and implement simple ROE that can be tailored by member forces to their particular situation.

(2) In many cases, commanders of deployed member forces may lack the authority to speak on behalf of their nation in the ROE development process. This lack of authority may require considerable support from coalition political leadership both within and outside the operational area to coordinate and implement appropriate ROE.

#### b. The Media

(1) Though not directly related to the conduct of operations, JFCs seek to facilitate the activities of national and international press organizations, consistent with requirements for operational security.

(2) This task is complicated in a multinational situation where press corps from each member nation may have their own standards and requirements. JFCs cannot hope to impose control over such efforts and, instead, should seek to work closely with leaders of member forces and their national press elements to develop an open and collegial environment. Simple ground rules should be established by the senior political and military representatives of the

alliance or coalition at the earliest possible moment to avoid incidents that could jeopardize the operation or detract from coalition cohesion.

c. Local Law Enforcement. US forces will often not have the authority or capability to enforce local laws in the operational area. JFCs should seek clear guidance from the alliance and/or coalition political leadership during the planning phase of multinational operations. Where local law enforcement organizations are present and capable, JFCs establish systems and procedures to optimize the contributions of indigent law enforcement personnel in facilitating operations and protecting lives and property in the operational area. Where local law enforcement systems and organizations are not available, JFCs should consider deploying appropriate US forces early in the deployment flow as well as exploiting the capabilities of other member nations.

d. Command and Control

(1) Successful multinational operations can center on achieving unity of effort from the outset. Participating nations need to provide the multinational force commander sufficient authority over their national forces to achieve this unity. In turn, multinational force commanders and staffs exercise their authority to unify the efforts of the multinational force toward common objectives. Such authority, however, is seldom absolute. Consensus and compromise are important aspects of decisionmaking in multinational organizations.

(2) Alliances typically have developed C2 structures, systems, and procedures. Alliance forces typically mirror their alliance composition, with the predominant nation providing the coalition force commander. Staffs are integrated, and subordinate commands are often led by senior representatives from member nations. Doctrine, standardization agreements, and a certain political harmony characterize alliances. Figure VI-1 provides an example of a command structure within an alliance.




Figure VI-1. Combined Structure With National Integrity

(3) Coalitions are typically formed on short notice and can include forces not accustomed to working together. Establishing command relationships and operating procedures within the multinational force is often challenging. It involves complex issues that require a willingness to compromise in order to best achieve the common objectives. National pride and prestige can limit options for organization of the coalition command, as many nations prefer to not subordinate their forces to those of other nations.

Though many C2 structures can be employed, coalitions are most often characterized by one of two basic structures: parallel command or lead nation command.

(a) Parallel Command

1. Parallel command exists when nations retain control of their deployed forces. If a nation within the coalition elects to exercise autonomous control of its force, a parallel command structure exists. Such structures can be organized with:

a. Nations aligned in a common effort, each retaining national control.

b. Nations aligned in a common effort, some retaining national control, with others permitting control of their forces by a central authority or another member force.

2. Parallel command is the simplest to establish and often the organization of choice. Coalition forces control operations through existing national chains of command. Coalition decisions are made through a coordinated effort of the political and senior military leadership of member nations and forces. It is common for other command structures to emerge as coalitions mature, but the parallel model is often the starting point.

3. Figure VI-2 depicts the command relationships developed and employed by coalition forces for Operation DESERT STORM. These relationships represented a parallel command structure, with coordination facilitated by the Coalition Coordination, Communications, and Integration Center (C3IC). The C3IC was specifically established to facilitate exchange of intelligence and operational information, ensure coordination of operations among coalition forces, and provide a forum where routine issues could be resolved informally and collegially among staff officers.




Figure VI-2. Coalition Command Relationships for  
Operation DESERT STORM

(b) Lead Nation Command. In this arrangement, the nation providing the preponderance of forces and resources typically provides the commander of the coalition force. The lead nation can retain its organic C2 structure, employing other national forces as subordinate formations. More commonly, the lead nation command is characterized by some integration of staffs. The composition of staffs is determined by the coalition leadership.

(c) Combination. Lead nation and parallel command structures can exist simultaneously within a coalition. This combination occurs when two or more nations serve as controlling elements for a mix of international forces, such as the command arrangement employed by the Gulf War coalition. Western national forces were aligned under US leadership, while Arabic national forces were aligned under Saudi leadership.

(4) Coordination and Liaison

(a) Regardless of the command structure, coalitions require significant coordination and liaison. Differences in language, equipment, capabilities, doctrine, and procedures are some of the interoperability challenges that mandate close cooperation. Coordination and liaison are important considerations in alliances as well. Most longstanding alliances have procedures in place to ensure such requirements are continuously addressed.

(b) Robust liaison is critical to developing and maintaining unity of effort in coalition operations. Liaison exchange should occur between senior and subordinate commands, and between lateral or like forces, such as between national SOF units or naval forces. Liaison teams require support from linguists who can translate between languages and, just as importantly, can communicate operational concepts in terminology familiar to both parties. Such linguists are rare. To compensate, JFCs can pair linguists with operational experts to ensure that both components of communication (language and concept) are being accurately exchanged.

(c) Commanders and liaison teams require reliable communications, appropriate to the operational area and the coalition's concept of operations. JFCs often deploy robust liaison teams with sufficient communications equipment to permit instantaneous communication between national force commanders. This communication is especially important during the early stages of coalition formation and planning. JFCs should appropriately prioritize their liaison requirements during deployment into the operational area to facilitate communications as soon as possible.

(d) Liaison officers between multinational forces should be operationally proficient, innovative, and tenacious, at the same time diplomatic and sensitive to the multinational forces with whom they are detailed. They should have the authority to speak for their JFCs or national force commanders. Strong, dynamic liaison teams, deployed and established early in the life of the alliance or coalition, can be a force multiplier by facilitating understanding and unity of effort, foreseeing problems, and being proactive in avoiding or solving those problems.

(5) Plans and Procedures

(a) Plans in multinational operations should be kept simple and focused on clearly defined objectives. The more complex the operation or the more players involved, the more time and effort it takes to plan and coordinate the operation. Plans should be issued far enough in advance to allow sufficient time for member forces to conduct their own planning and rehearsals. Some alliance and/or coalition member forces may not have the planning and execution dexterity and flexibility characteristic of US forces. Therefore, JFCs should ensure that the tempo of planning and execution does not exceed the capabilities of national forces. Effective liaison and reliable communications can facilitate subordinate planning and execution.

(b) To the extent possible, procedures should be standardized within the multinational force, especially if mistakes can result in failed missions or fratricide. Procedures such as control of attacking aircraft, maneuver control and fire support coordinating measures, and requests for supporting fires should be standardized. Where this is not possible, liaison teams should be tasked to facilitate coordination and deconflict operations. JFCs should fully exploit all capabilities available to them to coordinate operations, including Marine ANGLICO companies and/or teams and Air Force tactical air control parties.

(c) Commanders may elect to organize the operational area that supports the command's organization. For example, when a parallel command structure is employed, there are advantages to assigning AOs to national forces. This assignment permits relative autonomy of operations and can significantly deconflict operations. This technique was successfully employed by JTF Bravo during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, where American, British, French, and Spanish forces operated in an area approximately 170 by 70 kilometers in size.

e. Intelligence

(1) The collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence can be a major challenge. Alliance and coalition members normally operate separate intelligence systems in support of their own policy and military forces. These national systems may vary widely in sophistication and focus. Members may not have capabilities similar to the United States to collect and process intelligence. Nonetheless, each nation's contributions and capabilities should be appropriately incorporated and exploited. JFCs should rapidly establish a system that optimizes each nation's contributions and provides member forces a common intelligence picture, tailored to their requirements and consistent with disclosure policies of member nations.

(2) JFCs need to determine what intelligence may be shared with the forces of other nations early in the planning process. The limits of intelligence sharing and the procedures for doing so need to be determined

during initial coordination and negotiation between senior political and military representatives from member nations.

(3) The National Disclosure Policy (NDP) provides initial guidance. It promulgates national policy and procedures in the form of specific disclosure criteria and limitations, definitions of terms, release arrangements, and other guidance. It also establishes interagency mechanisms and procedures for the effective implementation of the policy. In the absence of sufficient guidance, JFCs should share only that information that is mission essential, affects lower-level operations, and is perishable.

f. Logistics

(1) Multinational logistics is a major challenge. Potential problem areas include differences in logistic doctrine; stockage levels; logistic mobility; interoperability; infrastructure; competition between Services, alliance, and/or coalition members for common support; and national resource limitations. Nonetheless, JFCs need to coordinate the use of facilities such as highways, rail lines, ports, and airfields in a manner that supports mission accomplishment. The notion that logistics is primarily a national responsibility cannot supplant detailed logistic planning in the operational area. JFCs typically form multinational logistic staff sections early to facilitate logistic coordination and support multinational operations.

(2) Standardization of logistic systems and procedures can ease the logistic challenges. Interoperability of equipment, especially in adjacent or subordinate multinational units, is desirable and is considered by operational planners during concept development. Significant logistic operations include acquisition and distribution of food stuffs, fuels, ammunition, and spare parts; transportation; field services; and health service support.

(3) Contracting. Contracting for various types of support, especially labor, facilities, common supplies, and transportation, is a significant aspect of many military operations. Procurement of materiel and services in the joint force's operational area is done either through contracting on the open market or when the host nation offers support through specific

government agencies. The host nation may also restrict the joint force's contracting ability as it manages essential services for the host population. Requirements for materiel and services should be consolidated and validated as operationally required by the JFC's staff. A determination of appropriate source for meeting the requirements should then be conducted (that is, supply system, host-nation support, contracting). If contracting is deemed appropriate, JFCs should ensure that sufficient, qualified contracting officers are available from the outset to leverage the capabilities available within the operational area. When required, contracting officers should be paired with linguists and should be prepared to operate in currencies or commodities other than US dollars.

(4) Host-Nation Support. Nations hosting US joint forces may offer logistic support or limit the ability of the joint force to contract support only through host government agencies. JFCs can consider centralizing host-nation support functions so that requirements are both identified and supported, consistent with mission accomplishment. Nations might agree to have certain common supplies and support provided by member nations to other alliance and/or coalition forces. Nations might also agree on whether a multinational commander will have the authority to conclude host-nation support arrangements on behalf of participating nations.

(5) Integration of Multinational Units. If some level of force integration is necessary to conduct operations, planners should determine where the integration of units and headquarters need to occur. Such decisions affect the deployment priorities and schedules for personnel and equipment. If integration is to occur at an intermediate staging base or port of debarkation, its impact on those bases or ports can be significant and needs to be addressed and accounted for by base and/or port commanders and staffs.

g. Protection

(1) Protection measures that apply to joint operations are appropriate also for multinational situations. JFCs consider, for example, air defense, defensive counterair, reconnaissance and

surveillance, and security measures for the multinational force. These considerations extend to NBC warning and decontamination.

(2) Avoidance of fratricide, especially between member forces, is important because of its potential negative impact on coalition unity and trust between member forces. JFCs should carefully assess the risks of fratricide between member forces involved in COAs being considered and actively seek to minimize the fratricide potential through a combination of operational and technological solutions and expedients.

## APPENDIX A

### PRINCIPLES OF WAR

Principles of War. The principles of war guide warfighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They are the enduring bedrock of US military doctrine.

#### a. Objective

(1) The purpose of the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.

(2) The objective of combat operations is the destruction of the enemy armed forces' capabilities and will to fight. The objective of an operation other than war might be more difficult to define; nonetheless, it too must be clear from the beginning. Objectives must directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the purpose of the operation. Each operation must contribute to strategic objectives. Avoid actions that do not contribute directly to achieving the objective.

#### b. Offensive

(1) The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

(2) Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. The importance of offensive action is fundamentally true across all levels of war.

(3) Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary expedient and must seek every opportunity to seize or re-seize the initiative. An offensive spirit must therefore be inherent in the conduct of all defensive operations.

#### c. Mass

(1) The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the place and time to achieve decisive results.

(2) To achieve mass is to synchronize appropriate joint force capabilities where they will have decisive effect in a short period of time. Mass must often be sustained to have the desired effect. Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable even numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results and minimize human losses and waste of resources.

d. Economy of Force

(1) The purpose of the economy of force is to allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.

(2) Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. It is the measured allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations in order to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time.

e. Maneuver

(1) The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.

(2) Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver--or threaten delivery of--the direct and indirect fires of the maneuvering force. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and thus also protects the friendly force. It contributes materially in exploiting successes, preserving freedom of action, and reducing vulnerability by continually posing new problems for the enemy.

f. Unity of Command

(1) The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.

(2) Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward

a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. In multinational and interagency operations, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of effort--coordination through cooperation and common interests--is an essential complement to unity of command.

g. Security

(1) The purpose of security is to never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage.

(2) Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by commanders to protect their forces. Staff planning and an understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and doctrine will enhance security. Risk is inherent in military operations. Application of this principle includes prudent risk management, not undue caution. Protecting the force increases friendly combat power and preserves freedom of action.

h. Surprise

(1) The purpose of surprise is to strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which it is unprepared.

(2) Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of combat power and thus achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Factors contributing to surprise include speed in decisionmaking, information sharing, and force movement; effective intelligence; deception; application of unexpected combat power; operations security; and variations in tactics and methods of operation.

i. Simplicity

(1) The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.

(2) Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. When other

factors are equal, the simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity in plans allows better understanding and execution planning at all echelons. Simplicity and clarity of expression greatly facilitate mission execution in the stress, fatigue, and other complexities of modern combat and are especially critical to success in combined operations.

## APPENDIX B

## CONTRIBUTIONS OF OPERATIONS

1. Air Operations

a. Air operations seek to gain control of the air and then to allow all friendly forces to exploit this control for military and nonmilitary purposes. Control of the air protects friendly nations and US Armed Forces as well as creates advantages for operations of all components. Gaining control of the air may require both offensive and defensive operations, although offensive operations reduce risks to friendly forces and gain more enduring results by reducing or eliminating the enemy air threat. Effective suppression of enemy air defense systems, normally a joint effort, permits more effective joint air operations in airspace that the enemy might otherwise control.

b. Joint air operations exploit control of the air to apply force and enhance other kinds of operations. Force application against key enemy capabilities can provide advantages for subsequent operations by all components. Strategic attacks can disable important C2 systems, offensive capabilities, and defenses, for example. Joint force operations may be directed immediately against enemy centers of gravity deep in enemy territory. Where possible, specific operations may be conducted to attack directly specific centers of gravity by air, missile, special operations, and other deep-ranging capabilities. When air operations constitute the bulk of the capability needed to attack directly enemy strategic centers of gravity or to conduct air superiority operations, JFCs will normally task JFACCs, as supported commanders, to conduct such operations.

c. Interdiction may be planned to create advantages at any level from tactical to strategic with corresponding effects on the enemy and the speed with which interdiction affects front-line enemy forces. Interdiction deep in the enemy's rear may have broad theater strategic or operational effects but normally a delayed effect on land and naval combat and will thus be of direct concern to JFCs. Interdiction closer to land and naval combat will be of more immediate operational and tactical concern to maneuver forces. Thus, JFCs vary the emphasis upon interdiction and surface maneuvers depending on the strategic and operational situation confronting them.

d. Air operations support land and amphibious operations by attacking enemy forces in proximity to friendly forces with CAS operations. Airborne surveillance and reconnaissance operations support both strategic intelligence gathering and tactical surface units. Finally, airlift helps the JFC rapidly project capabilities into the theater and sustain joint operations. Airlift operations are either strategic (intertheater) or operational and/or tactical (intratheater) in nature.

## 2. Land Operations

a. Army and Marine Corps forces conduct land operations and provide a balanced and versatile force mix, increasing the options available to JFCs and NCA. Land forces possess varying degrees of deployability, sustainability, lethality, and survivability. A mix of these forces can provide the overwhelming combat power necessary to meet the unique strategic, operational, and tactical requirements of a variety of situations. Amphibious, airborne, and air assault forces, for example, may be inserted to force a lodgment that will support the later deployment of armored and sustaining elements. To protect the lodgment in depth, SOF can provide surveillance and target acquisition until the security zone is expanded.

b. Land operations can support air and maritime operations. Land forces can, for example, seize and secure air bases and sea ports to facilitate air and maritime component operations in theater. Land forces can also suppress and destroy enemy air defense capability in support of the theater-level air defense efforts of the area air defense commander.

c. Each type of land force complements the others as they contribute to the joint force. All are prepared to respond quickly during power projection operations. Land forces allow the JFCs to seize and retain land areas from which to conduct subsequent operations or that enhance control of populations and national capabilities.

## 3. Maritime Operations

a. The purpose of sea control operations is to gain control of defined sea areas on and below the surface and in the air. This control provides freedom of action and

force protection. To gain control of the sea, naval forces perform warfare missions across the range of military operations.

b. Naval forces bring unique contributions to littoral operations. Integrated information and netted sensors allow naval forces to use surveillance data from all sources--national and multinational--and to target and strike from a variety of land, sea, and air platforms. The naval force commander has the capability to command the joint force and function as, or host, a JFACC. C2 system capabilities enable domination of the battle space and are central to the precise application of power.

c. Through battle space dominance, naval forces can maintain access from the sea and permit effective entry of equipment and resupply. It also allows naval forces to bring to bear decisive power on and below the sea, on land, and in the air. Naval forces can deny access to a regional adversary and interdict the adversary's movement of supplies by sea, land, and air.

d. Through dominance of littoral areas, naval forces are able to mass rapidly and generate high intensity, precise offensive power at a time and location of the JFC's choosing. Naval forces support the decisive sea-air-land battle by providing the sea-based support that enables the application of the complete range of US combat power. During amphibious operations, naval aviation aboard aircraft carriers and, if required, land-based expeditionary aircraft can provide sustained, tactical air support ashore to extend the landward reach of littoral operations. Sea-based strike capability short of putting forces ashore can maneuver and build up power rapidly deep in the objective area to disorient, divert, and disrupt the enemy.

e. Naval forces provide the full range of logistic support that can be the critical element of any operation. During crisis, warfighting materiel afloat in maritime prepositioning ships can permit the near-immediate projection of military power. During war, strategic sealift ships can deliver heavy equipment and resupply land and air forces.

f. The Navy and Marine Corps conduct maritime operations as part of joint forces. These operations contribute to gaining and maintaining freedom of action in the employment of joint forces. Sea control, including countermine warfare, and control of the airspace above

and around a naval force allows the JFC to project power through the strategic and operational movement of forces by sea, protect sea LOCs, secure littoral areas from sea-based threats, execute air and land operations from the sea, and support air- and land-based operations.

g. Maritime operations support air and land operations ashore through the application of offensive maritime capabilities. These capabilities include carrier-based aircraft, amphibious assault forces, naval gunfire, and fleet ballistic missiles. Attacks from the sea to gain early entry or to support forces ashore can combine Army, Marine, and Navy capabilities in both fire and maneuver throughout the contested battle space. For example, Navy and Army air defense, along with attack helicopter assaults from sea-based platforms, can complement early-entry USMC activities. USMC forcible entry capability is a significant resource in opposed entry operations close to the shore. Naval forces perform strike warfare, amphibious warfare, antiair warfare, antisurface and subsurface warfare, EW, and mine warfare.

h. Maritime operations also include surveillance and reconnaissance and sealift in support of joint forces. Sealift provides the movement of large tonnages of supplies and heavy equipment and weapon systems. Sealift also allows for the projection of power through amphibious landings and transport to ports within or adjacent to the theater of operations.

#### 4. Space Operations

a. Space operations support all facets of joint operations. Space-based capabilities are critical to rapid force projection operations. Units will usually be offset from an AO at first and will rely on space-based systems to gain intelligence and to track deployment and early employment. Intelligence; early warning; communications; navigation; weather forecasting; environmental monitoring; mapping, charting, and geodesy; theater missile defense; and data processing are all enhanced by uninterrupted space operations. The resulting efficiencies have dramatic effects on joint force operations.

b. In an age of advanced technology, when potential enemies are armed with sophisticated, user-friendly weapon systems, US dominance in space is critical to protection of the force. Advanced conventional munitions, cruise and ballistic missiles, high-energy

systems, and a variety of WMD can threaten concentrations of friendly forces. Dispersion is one defense against such threats, but dispersion may not always be possible. Space-based systems, properly integrated with surface, subsurface, and air operations, can mitigate the danger through early detection of enemy threats.

c. Uninterrupted, space-relayed communications enhance the speed with which we can process information. These communications facilitate high-tempo operations, normally an advantage in maneuver warfare, and allow for mobile, deployable information-processing headquarters. Having fewer of these headquarters on the move increases agility. The proper integration of space systems with air, land, sea, and special operations forces means greater versatility. Joint Pub 3-14 discusses space operations.

## 5. Special Operations

a. Special operations are actions conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped forces to achieve military, diplomatic, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional means. US Special Operations Forces consist of Army, Navy, and Air Force units. Special operations occur in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas across the range of military operations. In operations other than war, the US Special Operations Forces may substitute for the commitment of general-purpose forces. The Joint Pub 3-05 series discusses special operations.

b. The joint force special operations component normally executes special operations as part of the theater commander's joint special operations effort. Preestablished command arrangements usually determine how the theater commander assigns missions to the SOF. SOF can also provide support to subordinate JFCs when their operational areas converge or coincide.

c. Special operations during war and in other hostile environments usually occur deep in enemy-controlled territory or in areas void of conventional maneuver forces. Special operations may also extend into the territory of hostile states adjacent to the operational area. While each special operations action may be tactical in nature, its effects often contribute directly

to theater operational or strategic objectives in support of the theater campaign plan. Special operations may seek either immediate or long-range effects on the conflict.

d. Typical missions include interdicting enemy LOCs and destroying military and industrial facilities. SOF detachments may also have missions associated with intelligence collection, target acquisition, terminal guidance for strike aircraft and missile systems, locating WMD, and personnel recovery. These detachments conduct PSYOP to demoralize the enemy and collect information in enemy-controlled territory. SOF organize, train, equip, and advise resistance forces in guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, and sabotage. They add depth to the campaign, forcing the enemy to deploy significant combat forces to protect its rear area.

## APPENDIX C

### THE ESTIMATE PROCESS

1. General. The estimate process is central to formulating and updating military action to meet the requirements of any situation. The estimate process should be used by commanders and staffs at all levels. Though its central framework for organizing inquiry and decision is essentially the same for any level of command, specific detailed questions within each part of this framework will vary depending on the level and type of operation. This framework is presented below. Specific material appropriate to joint force operations, especially for theaters of war and theaters of operations, has been added to flesh out the basic framework for readers of this publication.

#### 2. Mission

##### a. Mission Analysis

(1) Determine the higher command's purpose. Analyze national security and national military strategic direction as well as appropriate guidance in alliance and coalition directions, including long- and short-term objectives for conflict termination. Conflict termination objectives should include the military objectives that will provide the basis for realizing the political aim regardless of whether an imposed or negotiated termination is sought.

(2) Determine specified and implied tasks. If multiple, determine priorities.

##### b. Mission Statement

(1) Express in terms of who, what, when, where (task parameters), and why (purpose).

(2) Frame as a clear, concise statement of the essential tasks to be accomplished and the purpose to be achieved.

### 3. Situation and Courses of Action

#### a. Situation Analysis

##### (1) Geostrategic Context

(a) Domestic and international context: political and/or diplomatic long- and short-term causes of conflict; domestic influences, including public will, competing demands for resources, and political, economic, legal, and moral constraints; international interests (reinforcing or conflicting with US interests, including positions of parties neutral to the conflict), international law, positions of international organizations, and other competing or distracting international situations.

(b) Characteristics of the operational area, including: military geography (topography, hydrography, climate, and weather); transportation; telecommunications; economics (organization, industrial base, mobilization capacity); social conditions; science and technology factors affecting the operational area.

(2) Analysis of the Enemy. Enemy situation, including capabilities and vulnerabilities (at the theater level, commanders will normally have available a formal intelligence estimate):

(a) Broad military COAs being taken and available in the future.

(b) Political and military intentions and objectives (to extent known).

(c) Military strategic and operational advantages and limitations.

(d) Possible external military support.

(e) Center(s) of gravity (strategic and operational).

(f) Specific operational characteristics: strength, composition, location and disposition, reinforcements, logistics, time and space

factors (including basing utilized and available), and combat efficiency (including proficiency in joint operations).

(3) Friendly Situation. Should follow the same pattern used for the analysis of the enemy. At the theater level, commanders will normally have available specific supporting estimates, including personnel, logistics, and C4 estimates; multinational operations require specific analysis of alliance or coalition partner objectives, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.

(4) Restrictions. Those limitations to the use or threat of use of force that are imposed or necessary to support other worldwide strategic requirements and associated diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts.

(5) Assumptions. Assumptions are intrinsically important factors on which the conduct of the operation is based and must be noted as such.

(6) Deductions. Deductions from above analysis should yield estimates of relative combat power, including enemy capabilities that can affect mission accomplishment.

b. Courses of Action Analysis. COAs development (based on the above analysis and a creative determination of **how** the mission will be accomplished). Each COA must be **adequate, feasible, and acceptable**. State all practical COAs open to the commander that, if successful, will accomplish the mission. Generally, at the theater level, each COA will constitute a theater strategic or operational concept and should outline:

(1) Major strategic and operational tasks to be accomplished in the order in which they are to be accomplished.

(2) Forces required.

(3) Logistic concept.

(4) Deployment concept.

(5) Estimate of time required to reach termination objectives.

(6) Concept for maintaining a theater reserve.

4. Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action

a. Determine the probable effect of possible enemy COAs on the success of each friendly COA.

b. Conduct this analysis in an orderly manner: by time phasing, geographic location, and functional event. Consider the potential actions of subordinates two echelons down.

c. Consider conflict termination issues; think through own action, enemy reaction, counterreaction.

d. Conclude with revalidation of suitability, adequacy, and feasibility; determine additional requirements, if any; make required modifications; list advantages and disadvantages of each COA.

5. Comparison of Own Courses of Action

a. Evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each COA.

b. Compare with respect to governing factors:

(1) Fixed values for joint operations (the principles of war, the fundamentals of joint warfare, and the elements of operational art).

(2) Other critical factors (for example, political constraints).

(3) Mission accomplishment.

c. If appropriate, merge elements of different COAs into one.

6. Decision. Translate the selected COA into a concise statement of what the force, as a whole, is to do and explain, as may be appropriate, the following elements: when, where, how, and why.

APPENDIX D

USERS EVALUATION REPORT  
ON JOINT PUB 3-0

1. Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this pub by removing this page and sending it to JDC. Please fill out the following: users' POC, unit address, and phone (DSN) number.

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2. Content

a. Does the pub provide a conceptual framework for the topic? \_\_\_\_\_

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b. Is the information provided accurate? What needs to be updated? \_\_\_\_\_

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c. Is the information provided useful? If not, how can it be improved? \_\_\_\_\_

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e. Can this pub be better organized for the best understanding of the doctrine and/or JTTP? How? \_\_\_\_\_

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3. Writing and Appearance

a. Where does the pub need some revision to make the writing clear and concise? What words would you use? \_\_\_\_\_

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b. Are the charts and figures clear and understandable? How would you revise them? \_\_\_\_\_

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4. Recommended urgent change(s) (if any). \_\_\_\_\_

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5. Other \_\_\_\_\_

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d. Is this pub consistent with other joint pubs? \_\_\_\_\_

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3. Writing and Appearance

a. Where does the pub need some revision to make the writing clear and concise? What words would you use? \_\_\_\_\_

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b. Are the charts and figures clear and understandable? How would you revise them? \_\_\_\_\_

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4. Recommended urgent change(s) (if any). \_\_\_\_\_

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5. Other \_\_\_\_\_

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6. Please fold and mail comments to the Joint Doctrine Center (additional pages may be attached if desired) or FAX to DSN 564-3990 or COMM (804) 444-3990.

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## GLOSSARY

## PART I--ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AFFOR	Air Force forces (a Service component of a joint force)
AI	air interdiction
AID	Agency for International Development
ANGLICO	air and naval gunfire liaison company
AO	area of operations
AOA	amphibious objective area
AOR	area of responsibility
ARFOR	Army forces (a Service component of a joint force)
ATF	amphibious task force
BDA	battle damage assessment
C2	command and control
C2W	command and control warfare
C3IC	Coalition Coordination, Communications, and Integration Center
C4	command, control, communications, and computers
C4I	command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
CA	combat assessment
CAS	close air support
CENTAF	US Air Force component, US Central Command (9th AF)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIO	Central Imagery Office
CINC	commander in chief (of a combatant command)
CINCFOR	Commander in Chief, US Forces Command
CJTF	commander of joint task force
COA	course of action
COCOM	combatant command (command authority)
COMAFFOR	commander, Air Force forces (a Service component commander)
COMARFOR	commander, Army forces (a Service component commander)
COMMARFOR	commander, Marine Corps forces (a Service component commander)
COMMZ	communications zone
COMNAVFOR	commander, Navy forces (a Service component commander)
CONUS	continental United States
CPX	command post exercise
CTF	combined task force

DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DMA	Defense Mapping Agency
EA	electronic attack
EP	electronic protection
ES	electronic warfare support
EW	electronic warfare
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FID	foreign internal defense
FLOT	forward line of own troops
FSCL	fire support coordination line
FTX	field training exercise
HUMINT	human intelligence
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
J-2	intelligence staff function
J-3	operations staff function
JFACC	joint force air component commander
JFC	joint force commander
JFLCC	joint force land component commander
JFMCC	joint force maritime component commander
JFSOCC	joint force special operations component commander
JIC	joint intelligence center
JMETL	joint mission essential task list
JOA	joint operations area
JOPEs	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JPI	joint precision interdiction
JRA	joint rear area
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSOA	joint special operations area
JTCB	Joint Targeting Coordination Board
JTF	joint task force
JTTP	joint tactics, techniques, and procedures
LDRS	leaders
LOC	line of communication
MARCENT	US Marine Corps component, US Central Command
MARFOR	US Marine Corps forces (a Service component of a joint force)
MARFORLANT	US Marine Corps component, US Atlantic Command

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVCENT	US Navy component, US Central Command
NAVFOR	US Navy forces (a Service component of a joint force)
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA	National Command Authorities
NDCS	national drug control strategy
NDP-1	National Disclosure Policy document
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
NMJIC	National Military Joint Intelligence Center
NMS	National Military Strategy
NSA	National Security Agency
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OPCON	operational control
OPORD	operations order
OPSEC	operations security
PDF	Panamanian Defense Forces
PSYOP	psychological operations
PUB	publication
ROE	rules of engagement
SOCENT	Special Operations component, US Central Command
SOCEUR	Special Operations component, European Command
SOF	special operations forces
SOUTHAF	US Air Force component, US Southern Command
TACON	tactical control
UCP	Unified Command Plan
UN	United Nations
UNITAF	unified task force
USARPAC	US Army component, US Pacific Command
USCENTCOM	US Central Command
USCINCCENT	Commander in Chief, US Central Command
USCINCEUR	US Commander in Chief, Europe
USCINCSO	Commander in Chief, US Southern Command
USSOCOM	US Special Operations Command
USSTRATCOM	US Strategic Command
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

## PART II--TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

aggravated peacekeeping. Military operations undertaken with the nominal consent of all major belligerent parties, but which are complicated by subsequent intransigence of one or more of the belligerents, poor command and control of belligerent forces, or conditions of outlawry, banditry, or anarchy. In such conditions, peacekeeping forces are normally authorized to use force in self-defense, and in defense of the missions they are assigned, which may include monitoring and facilitating implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement, or supporting or safeguarding humanitarian relief efforts. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 3-07.3.)

air interdiction. Air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. (Joint Pub 1-02)

battle damage assessment. The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or nonlethal, against a predetermined objective. Battle damage assessment can be applied to the employment of all types of weapon systems (air, ground, naval, and special forces weapon systems) throughout the range of military operations. Battle damage assessment is primarily an intelligence responsibility with required inputs and coordination from the operators. Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment. Also called BDA. See also combat assessment. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 2-0.)

boundary. A line which delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

campaign. A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (Joint Pub 1-02)

campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed to achieve strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

centers of gravity. Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

civil affairs. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

close air support. Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Also called CAS. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

coalition force. A force composed of military elements of nations that have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combat assessment. The determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. Combat assessment is composed of three major components, (a) battle damage assessment, (b) munitions effects assessment, and (c) reattack recommendations. The objective of combat assessment is to identify recommendations for the course of military operations. The J-3 is normally the single point of contact for combat assessment at the joint force level, assisted by the joint force J-2. Also called CA. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 2-0.)

command and control warfare. The integrated use of operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade or destroy adversary command and control capabilities, while protecting friendly command and control capabilities against such actions. Command and control warfare applies across the operational continuum and all levels of conflict. Also called C2W. Command and control warfare is both offensive and defensive:

(1) counter command and control. To prevent effective command and control of adversary forces by denying information to, influencing, degrading or destroying the adversary command and control system.

(2) command and control protection. To maintain effective command and control of own forces by turning to friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy the friendly command and control system. (Joint Pub 1-02)

concept of operations. A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander's assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Frequently, it is referred to as commander's concept. (Joint Pub 1-02)

contingency. An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterdrug. Those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. Also called CD. (Joint Pub 1-02)

coup de main. An offensive operation that capitalizes on surprise and simultaneous execution of supporting operations to achieve success in one swift stroke. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

crisis. An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 5-0.)

economy of force theater. Theater in which risk is accepted to allow a concentration of sufficient force in the theater of focus. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

electronic warfare. Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support.

a. electronic attack. That division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic or directed energy to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability. Electronic attack includes (1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception, and (2) employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams). Also called EA.

b. electronic protection. That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly, combat capability. Also called EP.

c. electronic warfare support. That division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. Thus, electronic warfare support provides information required for immediate decisions involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical action such as

threat avoidance, targeting, and homing. Electronic warfare support data can be used to produce signals intelligence, both communications intelligence, and electronic intelligence. Also called ES. (Joint Pub 1-02)

expedition. A military operation conducted by an armed force to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

expeditionary force. An armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country. (Joint Pub 1-02)

fire support coordinating measure. A measure employed by land or amphibious commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

functional component command. A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Services which may be established in peacetime or war to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (Joint Pub 1-02)

humanitarian assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. (Joint Pub 1-02)

in extremis. A situation of such exceptional urgency that immediate action must be taken to minimize imminent loss of life or catastrophic degradation of the political or military situation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

interdiction. An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's surface or subsurface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. (This term and definition is provided for information and is proposed for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 3-03.)

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of the Army, the Navy or Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of these Services, operating under a single commander authorized to exercise operational control. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

joint force air component commander. The joint force air component commander derives authority from the joint force commander who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among subordinate commanders, redirect and organize forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. The joint force commander will normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint force air component commander's responsibilities will be assigned by the joint force commander (normally these would include, but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the joint force commander's apportionment decision). Using the joint force commander's guidance and authority, and in coordination with other Service component commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders, the joint force air component commander will recommend to the joint force commander apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas. Also called JFACC. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force land component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of land forces, planning and coordinating land operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force land component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of land forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. Also called JFLCC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force maritime component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of maritime forces and assets, planning and coordinating maritime operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force maritime component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force maritime component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of maritime forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. Also called JFMCC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force special operations component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of special operations forces and assets, planning and coordinating special operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force special operations component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of special operations forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. Also called JFSOCC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint special operations area. A restricted area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities. The commander of joint special operations forces may further assign a specific area or sector within the joint special operations area to a subordinate commander for mission execution. The scope and duration of the special operations forces' mission, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of special operations forces deployed into a joint special operations area. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. Also called JSOA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

military deception. Actions executed to mislead foreign decisionmakers, causing them to derive and accept desired appreciations of military capabilities, intentions, operations, or other activities that evoke foreign actions that contributed to the originator's objectives.

a. strategic military deception. Military deception that targets foreign national security policy objectives, courses of action, and military strategies for the overall conduct of military campaigns as employed by heads of state and national high commands.

b. operational military deception. Military deception that targets the opposing commander's preparations and intentions for using military force to accomplish defensive or offensive operational missions at the theater level and below. Operational military deception is employed by theater, subtheater, and joint task force (JTF) commanders in the operational chain of command.

c. tactical military deception. Military deception that targets the on-scene opposing commander's actions during combat. Tactical deception is employed by all levels in the operational chain of command.

d. Service military deception. Military deception planned and executed by Military Services about military systems, doctrine, tactics, techniques, personnel, Service operations, or other activities to result in foreign actions which increase or maintain the originator's capabilities relative to adversaries.

e. military deception in support of operations security. Military deception that targets the threat intelligence systems in order to support maintaining essential secrecy. Deceptive operations security measures are employed at all levels in any chain of command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

mission type order. 1. Order issued to a lower unit that includes the accomplishment of the total mission assigned to the higher headquarters. 2. Order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished. (Joint Pub 1-02)

national military strategy. The art and science of distributing and applying military power to attain national objectives in peace and war. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

national security strategy. The art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. Also called national strategy or grand strategy. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

operational art. The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander's strategy into operational design, and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities of all levels of war. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

operational level of war. The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operations security. A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to:

- a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems.
- b. Determine indicators adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries.
- c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

peace-building. Action to identify and support structures which would strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 3-07.3.)

peace-enforcement. Armed intervention, involving the use of force or the threat of the use of force, pursuant to authorization by the United Nations Security Council for the coercive use of military power to compel compliance with international resolutions, mandates, or sanctions to maintain or restore international peace and security, or address breaches to the peace or acts of aggression. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 3-07.3.)

peacemaking. Action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. Process of arranging an end to disputes and resolving issues that led to conflict, primarily through diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 3-07.3.)

peace operations. All actions taken by the United Nations or regional organizations under the authority of Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter and those Chapter VII operations not involving the use of unrestricted, intense use of combat power to fulfill a mandate. Peace operations include traditional peacekeeping, aggravated peacekeeping, and low intensity peace enforcement operations not involving the use of unrestricted, intense use of combat power to fulfill a mandate. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 3-07.3.)

preventive diplomacy. Actions taken to resolve disputes before violence breaks out. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 3-07.3.)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

reconnaissance. A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy; or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Service component command. A command consisting of the Service component commander and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under the command that have been assigned to the unified command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

strategic estimate. The estimate of the broad strategic factors that influence the determination of missions, objectives, and courses of action. The estimate is continuous and includes the strategic direction received from the National Command Authorities or the authoritative body of an alliance or coalition. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

strike. An attack which is intended to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective. (Joint Pub 1-02)

surveillance. The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

theater of focus. A theater in which operations are most critical to national interests and are assigned the highest priority for allocation of resources. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

theater strategy. The art and science of developing integrated strategic concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and alliance or coalition security policy and strategy by the use of force, threatened use of force, or operations not involving the use of force within a theater. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

traditional peacekeeping. Deployment of a United Nations, regional organization, or coalition presence in the field with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations, regional organizations, or coalition military forces, and/or police and civilians. Noncombat military operations (exclusive of self-defense) that are undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the dispute. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 3-07.3.)

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